BUSINESS BEFORE QUESTIONS

Spoliation Advisory Panel

Resolved,
	That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, That she will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House a Return of The Report from the Right Honourable Sir David Hirst, Chairman of the Spoliation Advisory Panel, dated 24 June 2009, in respect of eight drawings now in the possession of the Samuel Courtauld Trust.— ( Kerry McCarthy .)

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Secretary of State was asked—

Ukraine

Anne McGuire: What assessment he has made of the effect of the global economic downturn on Ukraine's need for development aid from his Department.

Gareth Thomas: On a personal note, Mr. Speaker, may I add my congratulations to those of others on your election as Speaker?
	The World Bank expects Ukraine to experience a significant recession in 2009. To counter the impact of the recession, the International Monetary Fund has agreed a package with the Ukrainian Government worth $16.4 billion. Other international institutions are standing by if needed.

Anne McGuire: I thank my hon. Friend for his response. He will be aware that western Ukraine has often been referred to as the bread basket of the country, yet it appears to lack the basic storage and transport infrastructure needed to improve efficiency, eliminate poverty and even out some of the inequalities between itself and other regions. Given Ukraine's ambition to join or draw closer to the EU, does my hon. Friend not agree that there remains a need for the UK to give assistance, principally through his Department?

Gareth Thomas: I commend my right hon. Friend's interest in Ukraine and I recognise her description of the regional needs of the part of the country to which she refers. She will recognise that there are significant costs involved in the infrastructure for which she has rightly made the case. I hope she will understand when I point her to the work of the World Bank and other international financial institutions on infrastructure in Ukraine and other countries. We will continue to watch the regional economic needs of Ukraine through our involvement with those institutions.

Gary Streeter: Given the strategic significance of Ukraine as a political buffer zone between the EU and Russia, does the Minister not think that it was perhaps an error of judgment to close the DFID programme in Ukraine last year? It would be an utter tragedy if Ukraine's democracy should fail, so should we not at the very least be running significant capacity-building programmes to support it?

Gareth Thomas: We are running capacity-building programmes on democracy and good governance through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Indeed, the European Commission is also running such programmes. As I indicated in answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire), we continue to make the case for further involvement from donors to Ukraine. Substantial donor programmes are available through international financial institutions, and we are closely involved in the decisions that they take. Given our need to focus on the poorest countries, I believe that that is the right way forward.

Hugh Bayley: Last weekend the World Bank published its global economic outlook, the development finance report, which predicted that developing countries will lose $1 trillion as a result of the economic downturn. What is the Minister's Department doing to identify the countries that will be most badly hit and to ensure that development aid is provided to enable them to deal with the downturn?

Gareth Thomas: I know that my hon. Friend takes a particular interest in economic growth through his work on the Select Committee on International Development. He will know from the leadership of the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that we led work at April's G20 summit to secure additional resources for the IMF and the World Bank to focus on the needs of the poorest people in countries that have been most devastated by the impact of the global recession. We will look to ensure that that support, having been committed, is delivered to those international financial institutions.

Afghanistan

Mark Harper: What steps he is taking to assess the effectiveness of his Department's programmes in Afghanistan.

Douglas Alexander: DFID's work in Afghanistan from 2001 to date was independently evaluated in 2008. All DFID projects have clear, measurable benchmarks to ensure accurate and reliable monitoring in accordance with DFID procedures. The office in Kabul has established a dedicated results team to monitor the effectiveness of our work. We are also planning an independent assessment of DFID's ongoing work in Helmand province.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Secretary of State for that answer. NATO's Secretary-General said that the problem in Afghanistan was not too much Taliban, but too little good governance. Over the next four years, nearly half the Department's funding to Afghanistan will be channelled through that country's Government. What steps will the Secretary of State take to ensure that corruption in that country is tackled effectively?

Douglas Alexander: There are two dimensions to the hon. Gentleman's question. First, he is right to recognise the significance of governance, which is one of the four identified priorities for the approximately £510 million that we will spend between 2009 and 2013. I concur with the view that it is not the strength of the Taliban but the weakness of the Government that poses one of the significant challenges—along with others—that NATO and the Afghan people face in the years ahead.
	The hon. Gentleman also asked about corruption, which we are approaching in a number of ways. First, in relation to UK funds, we are working through the Afghan reconstruction trust fund, which is independently audited by recognised accountants from outside the country. We have a degree of confidence in those systems. We are also supporting efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Government, because corruption is a consequence and a cause of the poverty affecting Afghanistan.

Ann Clwyd: As my right hon. Friend knows, abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad caused untold damage to the coalition at the time. Now, allegations have been made by the BBC about the abuse of detainees at Bagram air base in Afghanistan. Will he tell me what action he proposes to take?

Douglas Alexander: Not least because I heard the allegations on the radio only this morning, I am not in a position to give my right hon. Friend the detailed answer her question deserves, but I will endeavour to speak to my colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and ensure that an answer is forthcoming.

Michael Moore: Mr. Speaker, may I add my congratulations to you on your election on Monday, and may I wish you many happy years occupying the Chair?
	Following the Secretary of State's previous answer, may I ask him, in the context of the United States' major reassessment of its strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, and of the tragic loss of life following the recent drone attack, how we are going to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan and to what extent he is reconfiguring his country plan to recognise those problems?

Douglas Alexander: The hon. Gentleman's question has a number of aspects. We recognise that there is a powerful connection between the interests of the people of Afghanistan and those of the people of Pakistan. In the statement that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made to the House on 29 April, it was made clear that we are taking a joined-up approach in what is colloquially called the "AfPak" strategy, because there is a strong strategic interest in having a stable and secure state on both sides of the border. It is of course necessary for the forces of extremism that threaten Afghanistan and Pakistan to be tackled not solely by military means. That is why, along with the development partnership agreement that we have for Pakistan, there has been a significant rebalancing of our programme in recent months towards the needs of education, in particular, in Pakistan. I will be happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on this matter.

Andrew Mitchell: Congratulations on your election, Mr. Speaker. Your interest in international development is well known, and is very welcome.
	At the last DFID questions, the Secretary of State claimed that his Department withdrew funding to the United Nations Development Programme—UNDP—Afghanistan counter-narcotics trust fund as soon as serious weaknesses became apparent. However, I have obtained an internal DFID memo that reveals that the Secretary of State's predecessor was clearly warned about anticipated problems with the fund before Ministers signed off £20 million for it. Will the Secretary of State explain why Ministers ignored those warnings?

Douglas Alexander: It will not come as a surprise to the House that I am unfamiliar with the memo the hon. Gentleman describes. I can assure hon. Members that the UNDP's internal evaluation unit recently evaluated operations in Afghanistan, and it was on that basis that ministerial decisions were reached.

Andrew Mitchell: Let me read to the Secretary of State from the memo, which Ministers received before signing off that money. It warned that, in Afghanistan, the UNDP's reporting is "poor", and that it suffers from a "lack of experienced people" who
	"only do the minimum in terms of their contractual obligations".
	Yet, so far this year, the Secretary of State has signed off another £14 million for the UNDP in Afghanistan. Will he pledge today to launch an urgent investigation into whether UK funds have been misused, and to instigate a full review of the taxpayers' money given to the UNDP in Afghanistan?

Douglas Alexander: We are always seeking to ensure that UK taxpayers' money is used effectively and properly, whether through the UNDP or other parts of our aid programme. It is right to recognise that the review that was published identified weaknesses within the UNDP's approach regarding co-ordination, a focus on short-term rather than long-term priorities, and the need to simplify and strengthen financial rules. It is on that basis that we have acted. The review is not a secret document; it is available on the UNDP's internet site, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it informs the decisions that my Department is reaching.

Humanitarian Assistance (Pakistan)

Sandra Osborne: What assistance his Department has provided to improve the humanitarian situation in north-west Pakistan in the last 12 months.

Tom Clarke: What steps his Department is taking with international partners to ensure the direct delivery of aid to internally displaced persons in the autonomous tribal areas of northern Pakistan.

Michael Foster: My Department has made available £22 million for humanitarian assistance in Pakistan, which is helping those displaced by conflict in the federally administered tribal areas as well as those displaced in North West Frontier province. With our international partners, we are ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches those who need it most through established co-ordination mechanisms for allocating finance, clear funding criteria and careful monitoring.

Sandra Osborne: For months, the international community has been urging Pakistan to act against the Taliban in the north-west territories. Millions of people have paid the price with death, destruction and internal displacement. Given the number of people living with host communities, what support can DFID provide in the circumstances?

Michael Foster: My hon. Friend is right to point out the fact that an estimated 2.4 million people have been displaced as a result of the conflict, the vast majority of whom are living in host communities. To ensure that aid gets to those living in host communities, we have helped to establish 34 separate aid stations to enable the fair distribution of aid.

Tom Clarke: In view of the importance of security in northern Pakistan to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan, does the Minister share my concern that the aid agencies and NGOs are clearly underfunded? Can we give some thought to ensuring that proper resources are made available?

Michael Foster: My right hon. Friend has a long and distinguished record of interest in development. The Pakistan humanitarian response plan is 35 per cent. funded and the International Committee of the Red Cross appeal is 59 per cent. funded, but it is clear that more could and should be done. We are actively lobbying with other countries, including the Government of Pakistan, to do more.

Alistair Burt: A group of international aid agencies reckons it has a deficit of about £22.5 million in dealing with the humanitarian consequences of conflict in the Swat valley. Within that, World Vision—a charity with which you, Mr. Speaker, and I have a particular connection—reports a deficit of about £7.5 million. Is there anything that the Minister and the Department can do directly to be involved with that group of charities and the problems it faces in the Swat valley?

Michael Foster: The UK's bilateral contribution of £22 million is the second largest made by any nation to deal with the humanitarian crisis. On the specific lobbying on behalf of World Vision, I am happy to meet the hon. Gentleman and to talk to my officials to see what we can do to help him.

Greg Mulholland: Aid to this region is enormously important not only from a humanitarian perspective, but politically, considering the circumstances. How is the Department dealing with the difficult challenge of the tribal regions and the fact that a lot of the region is still controlled by the Taliban, particularly the Swat valley?

Michael Foster: The hon. Gentleman is right to point out the difficulties in providing aid, especially in the front-line areas. To be honest, we have no real assessment of the number of people who have been displaced and are still beyond the front line. Our difficulty is enabling safe access to those areas for our aid workers.

Tony Lloyd: Pakistan is different: the humanitarian situation requires help in its own right, but that country is also a vital strategic ally of this country. Will the Government put pressure on the rest of the EU to take on its own share of funding the humanitarian assistance? Frankly, our European allies are not doing enough.

Michael Foster: My hon. Friend will be interested to know that just last week—at the Europe-Pakistan summit, on 17 June—the European Commission made an additional pledge of some €65 million to deal with the issue he raises.

Mark Lancaster: A few moments ago, the Minister acknowledged that British NGOs face a serious funding shortfall in Pakistan, but, with the monsoon season approaching, 45 per cent. of the money that his Department has announced remains unallocated to specific projects. Can he simply reassure the House that there is a plan and explain exactly where that money will be spent?

Michael Foster: I can indeed give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. I can also tell him that where concerns have been expressed about the speed at which aid through the UN has been allocated, we have taken the exceptional decision to fund NGOs directly to speed up the process of getting aid to those people in need.

Development Agenda

Malcolm Bruce: What progress has been made on implementing the development agenda from the G20 London communiqué.

Douglas Alexander: The London summit achieved important development outcomes, including a commitment to provide additional funds—mainly through the international financial institutions—for many of the poorest countries. We are working closely with partners to ensure that summit agreements are now fully implemented.

Malcolm Bruce: In welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Speaker, may I say, as Chairman of the International Development Committee, that while the House has gained a great deal, I am afraid that our Committee has lost a great deal? We very much appreciate your contribution.
	I thank the Secretary of State for his answer, but does he not acknowledge that the economic downturn and climate change have mostly been caused by the G20, yet the impact is felt mostly by poor and developing countries? What steps will he take to ensure that the Copenhagen summit delivers for the poor, that there is a Doha development round, and that the pledges made at Gleneagles will be not only maintained but supplemented?

Douglas Alexander: As befits the Chair of the International Development Committee, the right hon. Gentleman asked three questions rather than one. On trade, I assure him that we are continuing to work with our colleagues in the European Union in endeavouring to reach the conclusion to the Doha development round that eluded us last year. As we look ahead to the G8 meeting in L'Aquila and other international gatherings, we will continue to press the countries that made agreements at Gleneagles to meet the commitments that were made back in 2005.
	In relation to climate change, I assure the House that we recognise the importance of Europe's assuming a leadership role, as it did at the time of the Kyoto agreement. We also recognise, in the context of common but differentiated responsibilities, that many of the countries that have been worst affected by climate change bear the least responsibility for generating the emissions that have caused it.

Education (Pakistan)

Gordon Prentice: What recent steps his Department has taken to support projects to increase literacy amongst girls in Pakistan.

Michael Foster: My Department has set aside a total of £250 million over five years to improve education in Pakistan. We are designing programmes in North West Frontier province, Punjab and Balochistan that will increase girls' access to school and improve both their literacy and their numeracy. We are already financing stipends so that 300,000 girls in North West Frontier province can attend school, and the same programme is providing text books for 4.3 million girls and boys.

Gordon Prentice: That is marvellous, and we applaud the Government for their action, but does it not make you weep, Mr. Speaker, that Pakistan spends 60 per cent. of its budget on defence and 11 per cent. on education, and that 42 per cent. of women and girls are illiterate? What can we do to persuade Pakistan to change its warped sense of priorities whereby more money is spent on guns than on education?

Michael Foster: My hon. Friend is right to point out that Pakistan's education spending of just 2.4 per cent. of GDP is among the lowest in the world. He is also right to point out that if we are serious about tackling poverty and social exclusion and dealing with the grievances that lead to insecurity, education must play a central role.  [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Far too many private conversations are taking place. Members asking questions should be heard, and so should Ministers answering them.

Tony Baldry: After the earthquake in Kashmir, we raised enough money in Banbury to build a whole new girls' school in the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir. However, like the hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice), I weep, because, notwithstanding assurances from the Ministry, the problems caused by the machinery of government in Islamabad with the adoption of the school were very depressing. Whatever development aid we give Pakistan, we must make it clear to its Government that unless they sort out some fundamental machinery of government issues and make basic joined-up government work, none of that aid will be of any real long-term benefit.

Michael Foster: I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman about the importance of governance, or about the role of Government in helping donors such as the United Kingdom to get their support on to the ground to meet the needs of the people whom both he and I want to help.

Middle East

Alistair Carmichael: What recent assessment he has made of the humanitarian situation in Gaza; and if he will make a statement.

Michael Foster: The conflict earlier this year intensified an already difficult humanitarian situation in Gaza. The pace of deterioration has slowed since the ceasefire in January, but the humanitarian situation remains extremely serious. Around 90 per cent. of Gazans still partly depend on food aid.
	Success of the response effort continues to depend on opening the crossings from Israel to allow movement of materials and personnel into Gaza. The UK presses the Israeli Government regularly on this issue.

Alistair Carmichael: To say that the situation is serious is masterful understatement; it verges on the desperate. There can, however, be no improvement until the borders are opened. What are the Government doing to impress on the Israeli Government the need to let the basic foodstuffs and essentials of everyday life through the border crossing points and into Gaza?

Michael Foster: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: access through the border crossings from Israel into Gaza is essential to deal with development aid and to help complement the long-term peaceful political solution that is needed in that part of the world.

Phyllis Starkey: A number of British charities are active in Gaza, one of which is Interpal. Its ability to deliver development aid is being seriously constrained by its inability to access international clearing banking facilities. Will the Minister meet the charity to see—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I apologise for interrupting the hon. Lady, but I am not sure whether she can be heard, and there are still far too many private conversations taking place.

Phyllis Starkey: Will the Minister meet representatives of Interpal to discuss the difficulties it is having, and to see what help the British Government can offer?

Michael Foster: I understand that Interpal has had difficulties in accessing finance, and I am perfectly happy to meet my hon. Friend and the organisation to see what can be done to resolve them.

Ian Taylor: Part of the problem in Gaza is the rivalry between Fatah and Hezbollah. Does the Minister have any engagement in the discussions to try to keep the peace, and has Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu given any assurances in respect of Gaza in his comments about a two-state solution?

Michael Foster: I have had no direct discussions with those two parties representing the Palestinian people, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we welcome Prime Minister Netanyahu's recently announced support for a two-state solution, which we think will deal with this situation once and for all.

Fairtrade

Alison Seabeck: What funding his Department has provided to Fairtrade initiatives in the latest period for which figures are available.

Gareth Thomas: Between 1999 and 2009, the Department for International Development committed just over £3 million-worth of support to Fairtrade, of which £2.6 million has so far been released. The majority of current funding is through the global Fairtrade Labelling Organisations International. We also continue to work in developing countries and internationally to improve countries' and producers' access to markets and capacity to trade.

Alison Seabeck: I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. He will know that Plymouth has been at the forefront of promoting Fairtrade, and I am sure we will want to sell the new cosmetic line. However, there are still concerns, including those raised with me by the ladies of the Inner Wheel in Roborough. Can my hon. Friend assure me that, in the current global downturn, his Department will continue to scrutinise the way in which payments are made and ensure that wages are not being cut as markets and trade fall?

Gareth Thomas: I know from a previous visit I made to Plymouth of the importance that Fairtrade is given in the town, including in my hon. Friend's constituency. I am delighted that she continues to be lobbied by supporters of Fairtrade in Plymouth for further DFID work on this issue. I can assure her that we will continue to fund Fairtrade and to work with the Fairtrade Foundation and with a series of similar initiatives to promote the cause of poor producers getting access to our markets.

Oliver Heald: Does the Minister agree that we should congratulate Letchworth garden city, the world's first garden city, on obtaining Fairtrade status two weeks ago, and that this is a fine initiative that helps to market products and assists some of the most vulnerable people in the world?

Gareth Thomas: I am delighted to agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I am also delighted that his constituents—and, no doubt, others nearby—have worked so hard to ensure that Letchworth garden city is now a Fairtrade garden city. I look forward to his continuing to raise these issues at DFID questions.

Middle East

Jim Sheridan: What his latest assessment is of the humanitarian situation in Gaza; and if he will make a statement.

Michael Foster: I refer my hon. Friend to my previous answer.

Jim Sheridan: My hon. Friend will be aware that the Israeli blockade is causing extreme problems for people in Gaza. Cement supplies have been held up in the blockade, but how can people reconstruct and build their houses if they cannot get those materials?

Michael Foster: My hon. Friend makes a valid point. The United Nations believes that only 25 types of relief out of the some 4,000 that are needed in Gaza are actually getting through the crossings, and construction materials are essential if we are to rebuild Gaza city.

PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister was asked—

Engagements

Patrick Hall: If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 24 June. May I also welcome you, Mr. Speaker, to your first Prime Minister's questions as Speaker of this House?

Gordon Brown: Before I list my engagements, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in sending our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Major Sean Birchall, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, who was killed in Afghanistan last week. He died serving our country and the people of Afghanistan. His death reminds us how difficult it is for men serving in Afghanistan at the moment. He, and others who have lost their lives, will never be forgotten.
	I am sure that the House will wish to send our sincerest condolences also to the families and friends of Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell following the tragic news of their death in captivity in Iraq. The taking of hostages is a cruel and barbaric act and can never be justified. I can assure the House that the Government are doing all that we can, and our thoughts and those of everyone in this House will be with the families and friends who wait for news.
	This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall have further such meetings later today.

Patrick Hall: I wish to associate myself with the sentiments expressed by my right hon. Friend regarding our troops, the hostages and their families.
	One of the key issues raised with me by my constituents is that of housing, and specifically access to affordable housing and the need for mortgage finance. My constituents are aware that despite the urgent need for more house building, Conservatives generally campaign against it, as well as oppose the measures needed to fix the financial system— [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: I think that the Prime Minister has got the gist.

Gordon Brown: We are investing billions of pounds more in new affordable housing. We are helping more households into home ownership through shared ownership. We have secured commitments from the major banks that they will invest a large amount of the £70 billion extra that they are investing over the course of the next year in housing. Of course, that would not be possible if we were to implement a programme of 10 per cent. cuts in our spending.

David Cameron: The Prime Minister had a bit more than the gist of the question: he had a prepared answer to it as well.
	I join the Prime Minister in paying tribute to Major Sean Birchall from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, who was killed in Afghanistan, and I very much agree with the Prime Minister about expressing our heartfelt sympathy to the families of Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell at their loss. The Prime Minister knows that he has our full support in all the efforts being made to free the remaining hostages in Iraq.
	Last week, the Prime Minister told the House:
	"Capital expenditure will grow until the year of the Olympics."
	The Government's own figures show that that is just not the case. Will he take this opportunity to correct what he told the House last week?

Gordon Brown: Well obviously yes, in the building of the Olympics capital investment will rise very substantially. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that capital investment is rising from £29 billion to £37.7 billion, and then to £44 billion in 2009-10, and that is to help complete the building of the Olympics. Thereafter it will fall as a result of decisions that we have made, but the comparison is between £44 billion of investment now and—even in real terms—the figure for 1999-2002, when he was in charge of advising at the Treasury. We are investing £44 billion: he was investing only £16 billion.

David Cameron: I am afraid that that is just not good enough. Last week the Prime Minister made a very clear statement to the House of Commons. He said:
	"Capital expenditure will grow until the year of the Olympics."—[ Official Report, 17 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 295.]
	Here are the figures: capital expenditure this year, 2009, is £44 billion; next year, 2010, it is £36 billion; in 2011 it is £29 billion; and in the year of the Olympics, 2012, it is £26 billion. That is a cut of almost half from £44 billion to £26 billion. Will the Prime Minister now apologise, correct his statement and admit that he is cutting capital expenditure?

Gordon Brown: I was just explaining how we had brought forward capital investment to last year and this year. The figure for capital investment in 2006-07 was £36 billion. That has risen to £38 billion in 2008-09 and to £44 billion in 2009-10. That is so that we can advance capital expenditure to deal with the downturn. The problem for the right hon. Gentleman is that he wants to cut capital investment now. He wants to cut it whereas we are increasing it. We are increasing it to complete the building of the Olympics and other projects, whereas his party would be cutting capital investment now. He has got to face up to the fact that he is going to spend less than us in every year.

David Cameron: The Prime Minister has been caught absolutely red-handed. He made a statement to the House about capital expenditure growing every year and the fact is that it is being cut. If he believed in transparency, honesty and truth in public life, he would get up at that Dispatch Box and say, "I'm sorry, I got it wrong. I gave the wrong figures; here are the right ones." Now do it.

Gordon Brown: I have explained to the House that money has been brought forward to 2008-09 and 2009-10. Instead of having expenditure of just £30 billion in 2008-09, it is £38 billion. Instead of expenditure of less in 2009-10, it will be £44 billion. We took the decision to advance public expenditure to deal with the recession. Let him come clean: he would cut public expenditure this year, next year and every year after. He is trying to evade his responsibility for wanting 10 per cent. cuts.

David Cameron: In the answer before last, the Prime Minister talked about the year 2007-08. In the last answer, he talked about the year 2008-09. Those years have already happened. He said at the Dispatch Box last week that capital expenditure would grow between now and the Olympics. The figures are in the Red Book, on page 226. Capital expenditure will be £44 billion in 2009, falling to £36 billion, then to £29 billion and then, in the year of the Olympics, to £26 billion. There is no other way to cut it. There is nowhere else he can hide. He must stand up, explain that he got it wrong and say that what he told the House last week was wrong. Why not do it for once?

Gordon Brown: We brought forward spending to deal with the recession. I know that he is against our bringing forward the spending, but we brought forward current and capital spending to deal with the recession. Let me tell him that spending is £44 billion in the year 2009-10. That is the highest capital expenditure ever in our country. It compares with the recession years under the Tories, when capital spending was only £12 billion or £16 billion. We are taking the action to invest in our public services—they would cut our public services now. Why does he not admit that there would be 10 per cent. cuts in public services under the Conservatives?

David Cameron: Let us first of all be clear about the Prime Minister's claims about Conservative policy. Even his own colleagues do not believe him. This is the report that we had from last week's Cabinet:
	"Darling pointed out that Brown's Tory cut figures did not represent the"—
	Conservative—
	"party's policy but were merely extrapolations"—
	[Hon. Members: "Ah!"] It gets more interesting:
	"Cooper, previously the Treasury minister responsible for public spending, echoed his concerns",
	and:
	"According to one source who was present, Brown was visibly irritated at the way he had been undermined, and brought the meeting to an early close".
	He says that he wants to be a teacher, but it sounds like he has lost control of the classroom. Last week, at that Dispatch Box, the Prime Minister did not talk about bringing forward capital expenditure. He said, very clearly:
	"Capital expenditure will grow until the year of the Olympics."— [ Official Report, 17 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 295.]
	Let me give him one more chance to show that the talk of transparency, truth and honesty means something. He should find that moral compass, stand up there and tell us that he got it wrong.

Gordon Brown: I read out the figures to the House. We are spending £38 billion in that year 2008-09—more than the Tories would ever do. We are spending £44 billion in the coming year—more than the Tories would ever do. We are spending more money on capital investment than at any time in our history— [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I apologise for interrupting the Prime Minister, but there is simply far too much noise. The public do not like it, and neither do I.

Gordon Brown: We have to face up to the fact that a sensible debate in this country means that the Conservatives are going to cut spending on housing, education, policing and all the vital public services. The right hon. Gentleman cannot evade the fact that his figures are lower than any of ours in any year. That is the truth about public spending in our country.

David Cameron: The entire country will have heard one very important thing—that this Prime Minister cannot give a straight answer, and that he is not a big enough man to say that he got it wrong.

Gordon Brown: His is the party of 10 per cent. cuts in public expenditure, and the party that would cut the vital public services at a time of recession. We have brought forward public expenditure to help people stay in their homes and get into jobs and to help build schools and hospitals. Those are exactly the public services that the Conservatives would cut savagely, by 10 per cent. That is not going to be allowed to happen.  [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Fabricant, you must calm yourself. It is not good for your health. I call Paul Farrelly.

Paul Farrelly: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and may I also welcome you to your new role? Many of us here will welcome the fact that the Prime Minister has rowed back from holding an inquiry into Iraq in private. It would have been a misjudgment to do so. That said, the Opposition motion and the amendment before us this afternoon contain two points of difference—whether the terms of reference are discussed and published, and whether the committee should have a wider composition. What can the Prime Minister say to the House to address those two points of difference?

Gordon Brown: I can say that Sir John Chilcot, the chair of the inquiry—and it is an independent inquiry—has written to me to make it absolutely clear that the inquiry will need expert assessors at the highest level including in military, legal, international development and reconstruction matters. He has already begun to identify people who may be willing to serve in that capacity. As for the terms of reference, I cannot think of an inquiry with wider terms of reference. It covers nearly eight years, from 2001 to 2009. It covers all issues that refer to the conflict itself, the causes of the conflict, and the reconstruction after the conflict. The inquiry will be set up on the basis that it will be allowed to have all the evidence and materials, whether classified or not, that it needs to look into the matter. The terms of reference of this inquiry are very wide indeed.

Nicholas Clegg: I should like to add my own expressions of sympathy and condolence to the family and friends of Major Sean Birchall, who tragically lost his life in Helmand this week. I of course also join in the expressions of sympathy and condolence to the families and friends of Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell. We all hope that the remaining hostages will be released safely as soon as possible.
	On the Gurkhas, the Prime Minister was wrong and was forced to back down. On MPs' expenses, he was wrong and forced to back down. On the Iraq inquiry, he was wrong and is now being forced to back down. The only gear left for this Government seems to be reverse, so when will we hear from him that he is wrong too on public spending?

Gordon Brown: I am not wrong on public spending. We want to increase public spending. I am not wrong on wanting to help people in difficulty in the recession by helping the unemployed and home owners. It is the Liberal party that wants to cut public expenditure, not the Cons—not the Labour party.  [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I know it is the third time, but perhaps third time will be lucky. We must have some order in this House.

Nicholas Clegg: The Prime Minister cannot keep avoiding the questions. Today, new figures from the EU have been published that show that we have the largest underlying deficit anywhere in Europe. Why does he not admit that balancing the nation's books will take big, difficult, long-term decisions? Nobody is fooled by his trick of dressing up cuts as investment. We are setting out what needs to happen—unlike him, and unlike the Leader of the Opposition—on Trident, on baby bonds, and on tax credits for high-income families. There are some ideas, now where are his?

Gordon Brown: Given that there is no problem of inflation at the moment in our country, and given that interest rates are low, it is right for us to take action to help people get into work. It is right for us to take action to help 150,000 businesses, as we are doing. It is right for us to move forward the housing programme and our programme of capital investment. These are the right things to do. I do not think that the Liberals, with their proposals to cut public spending, are doing the right thing at the moment at all.

Jim Cunningham: Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker, and congratulations on your election. Will my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spell out the implications for the public services, pensioners and the less well off of the 10 per cent. cut proposed by the Opposition?

Gordon Brown: Increasingly, the choice within our country will become one between us wanting to preserve our public services and wanting to expand them and a Conservative party that is determined to cut them by 10 per cent. Once the public knows that that is the choice, Conservative Members will have to explain in every constituency how many police, nurses and teachers are going to be cut as a result of their restrictions on spending.

James Duddridge: Can the Prime Minister confirm whether he has had any correspondence, e-mail, telephone calls or texts from Damian McBride since the day he resigned, and just to clear up the confusion that there seems to be around this issue, will he write to the Parliamentary Standards Authority confirming the answer to this question?

Gordon Brown: The answer is no, but is it not amazing when we are discussing Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and other major issues that a Back Bencher can reduce himself to re-asking a question that was asked last week?

Ashok Kumar: Has my right hon. Friend seen my early-day motion 1552 regarding steel making on Teesside? What help and support is he willing to give so that we can keep the Redcar steel complex open and protect 22,000 direct and indirect jobs as well as a strong manufacturing base?

Gordon Brown: I have talked to the company and also met the trades unions, as has the Business Secretary. The future of steel making in this region is absolutely crucial, so we are trying to do everything we can to make that happen. Clearly, there is a dispute between Tata and the partners involved in the consortium that has now withdrawn its order for steel making in the area. We want to support a reconciliation between the two groups, which is what we are trying to do. In the meantime, One North East is trying to help people in search of jobs.

Daniel Kawczynski: The Prime Minister's insult to the Law and Justice party of Poland in his European statement yesterday is a great insult to the President of Poland, who is a member of that party and to the Polish people who elected that party into office. No matter what he may think of the Law and Justice party, he must understand that as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom he has a duty to implement basic diplomatic procedures.

Gordon Brown: I have very good relationships with the person the hon. Gentleman is talking about. As for the Polish Law and Justice party, the Conservatives should look at the policies of the parties they are having dealings with.

Tom Clarke: Can the Prime Minister tell the House of his reaction to recent events in Burma? Does he agree that the imprisonment, illegal as it is, of pro-democracy campaigners and the shameful, farcical and sham trial of Aung San Suu Kyi does nothing for Burma's standing in the international community?

Gordon Brown: First, let me congratulate my right hon. Friend on the 27th anniversary of his election to the House of Commons; he has given great service, particularly in terms of our relations with other countries. In Burma a sham trial of Aung San Suu Kyi is taking place, and it is completely unacceptable not just to us, but to all members of the international community. At the last meeting of the European Council, we sent out a powerful message that unless action is taken in Burma to free Aung San Suu Kyi, we will be prepared to take further sanctions against the regime. I have also talked to the UN Secretary-General and encouraged him to visit Burma—Mr. Gambari, his representative, is there at the moment. I hope that the Secretary-General will visit Burma to send a message to the regime as soon as possible.

Peter Bone: In May 1997, there were 1,826 people unemployed in Wellingborough; at the end of last month, that figure had risen to 3,366—an increase of 84 per cent. Whose fault is that: is it (a) the last Conservative Government; (b) the previous US President; or (c) the Prime Minister who claimed he had ended boom and bust?

Gordon Brown: The figures are all the more reason to support our policies to get people back to work. Were it not for the policies we are adopting, 500,000 more people would be out of work—that is what official estimates say. The hon. Gentleman should be supporting the public expenditure we are engaged in to help people get back into work.

Martin Salter: Mr. Speaker, it gives me particular pleasure to welcome you to the Chair as our new reforming Speaker. May I say how much I endorse the wise words of the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young), who called for the whole House now to get behind you? That should be the whole House.The Prime Minister deserves great credit for bringing forward proposals to establish the Parliamentary Standards Bill and to set up a Select Committee on reform of the House of Commons, but may I draw his attention to the unnecessarily tight terms of reference on today's Order Paper, and to the cross-party amendment in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright)? Surely, it cannot be right for the Committee to be constrained to discuss only non-governmental business.

Gordon Brown: We have proposed measures to modernise the House of Commons, in particular the election of Select Committee Chairs, the scheduling of non-Government business and the raising of public issues for debate. All those other matters can be considered in due course, and the Leader of the House will lead a debate on them.

Bob Russell: Mr. Speaker, the university of Essex is proud of you.
	Earlier this month, the Conservatives were humiliated in the local elections in Colchester. Will the Prime Minister discuss with his Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families why Essex county council is ignoring what the Secretary of State promised in the House in May last year, and is proceeding to close two secondary schools, against the democratic wish of the people of my constituency?

Gordon Brown: As the hon. Gentleman knows, investment in schools is rising, as is investment in new school buildings generally. The hon. Gentleman has specific questions he wishes to address to the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, and I hope that he will be able to meet my right hon. Friend soon.

Barry Gardiner: This morning, Superintendent Simon Corkill from Wembley police station telephoned me— [ Interruption. ]—to say that there had been a drop in gun crime of 45 per cent., a drop in knife crime of 19 per cent. and a drop in youth offending of 19 per cent. in the past year. I know the Prime Minister will want to congratulate Wembley police force on those statistics, but will he join me in asking for a 10 per cent. cut next year? I mean, of course, a further cut in the statistics.

Gordon Brown: Since 1997, the investment we have made in neighbourhood policing and in policing generally has led to a reduction in crime. As a result of that investment, people can feel safer in their homes, but it is equally important that we maintain investment in policing—a 10 per cent. cut in policing budgets would be totally disastrous for police forces and communities.

Mark Harper: One in four people will suffer at some point in their life from a mental health problem, and there is a great deal of stigma about that. Will the Prime Minister take some advice from Alastair Campbell, whose advice seemed to work very well for his predecessor? When giving evidence to the Speaker's Conference on improving diversity, Mr. Campbell suggested that we get rid of the provision in the Mental Health Act 1983 that Members of Parliament who are sectioned for a mental health problem lose their seat. Will the Prime Minister take steps on that measure and end stigma against people with mental health problems?

Gordon Brown: Mental health is a serious problem and we should look at it with great care before we make any decisions, but of course I will look at what the hon. Gentleman says. I think he will understand that it needs the greatest of care.

Jim Dobbin: Hopwood Hall college in my constituency delivers vocational programmes to learners throughout Heywood, Middleton and Rochdale—all areas of high deprivation. The college capital programme has had to be put on the back burner because of the funding crisis at the Learning and Skills Council. Will the Prime Minister have a look at the specific problem for me, and perhaps designate the appropriate Minister to meet the college principal, the local authority and me to see if we can get ourselves out of this mess?

Gordon Brown: The Learning and Skills Council has written to the principals of all colleges about capital investment for the future. It hopes to announce projects to go through to the next stage of the process as soon as possible. As my hon. Friend will know, we made available an extra £300 million in the Budget for further education colleges. I am sure that the Minister will be happy to meet him.

Phil Willis: May I say to the Prime Minister that this year's 10 per cent. increase in applications to higher education is a massive cause for celebration? The fact that the major increases are particularly among young black males, students over 40 and people in lower socio-economic groups is a double cause for celebration. Will the Prime Minister therefore say why the planned 15,000 extra higher education places were cut to 10,000 last year and are now being cut to 3,000? Is it not better to invest in people in higher education than to invest in them on the dole queues?

Gordon Brown: We want more people to be able to go to university. If there are more applications this year, we must look at that very carefully. I shall look at what the hon. Gentleman says about the numbers, and I know that the Business Secretary is looking at what can be done. We want to give this year's school leavers a guarantee that they will also have opportunities, and the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families is taking action to ensure that opportunities are available to every school leaver this summer.

Linda Gilroy: The Prime Minister will be aware of the pain caused by very high water bills to my constituents in the far south-west, especially those on low and modest incomes. We eagerly look forward to the publication of the interim findings of the Walker review on water metering and charging. Will the Prime Minister meet me and a group of colleagues who have been working on finding solutions for many years to see how far the review will be able to help to address the problems?

Gordon Brown: My hon. Friend has campaigned on water charges in her region for many years. I believe that the interim report is scheduled for publication next week, with a final report expected in the autumn. We will provide a full response following the publication of the final report and I will be happy to meet my hon. Friend to talk about it.

Paul Beresford: A considerable number of my constituents are Equitable Life victims and the quality of the retirement that they paid for has been crippled. The Government's response to the two ombudsman's reports added insult to that injury. Will the Prime Minister look again at the delays in paying compensation and the partiality of the Government's compensation scheme?

Gordon Brown: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the ombudsman made certain recommendations, which we are looking at. We have set up a separate inquiry to look at the implication of what was said and we will report in due course.

David Crausby: Despite all the point scoring on cuts in public expenditure, will my right hon. Friend assure me that no money will be cut from protecting our armed forces on active service? Will he say that, in any circumstances, the priority will be to spend whatever money is available on the front line, unlike the situation under the Tories, who made redundancies while—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister does not have to concern himself with Opposition policy.

Gordon Brown: We have shown our commitment to our armed forces by increasing expenditure on them every year. We have made extra money available for all the additional responsibilities that they have had to discharge in Iraq and Afghanistan. We want a spending path for the armed forces that is completely consistent with their responsibilities. It would not make sense—regardless of need and what has happened to the economy—to announce 10 per cent. cuts in the defence budget now.

Julian Brazier: Will the Prime Minister tell the House whether he has received advice from the Chief of the Defence Staff calling for sustained and substantial reinforcement for our hard-pressed armed forces in Afghanistan?

Gordon Brown: If the hon. Gentleman was here yesterday, he would know that I answered exactly that question. I said that we had raised the number of forces in Afghanistan for the period of the election campaign from 8,100 to 9,000. For that period, which takes us right through to the autumn, we are meeting additional responsibilities to ensure that the democracy of Afghanistan is maintained and that elections can happen with greater security and safety. Of course, we maintain our ongoing campaign against the Afghanistan Taliban.

Phil Wilson: Does my right hon. Friend believe that it is the role of mainstream UK political parties to associate with Latvia's For Fatherland and Freedom party, which honours veterans of the Waffen-SS, or does he believe that that should be left to the British National party?

Gordon Brown: Is it not remarkable that the Conservatives have formed an alliance in Europe that excludes the German Christian Democrats, excludes the French party of President Sarkozy, excludes the Italian party of Prime Minister Berlusconi— [Interruption. ] —excludes all reputable political parties in Europe— [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Gordon Brown: The Conservatives are now isolated on the fringes of Europe.

Susan Kramer: Would the Prime Minister agree with me that both the Tamil and Sinhalese people of Sri Lanka deserve an investigation into alleged war crimes committed during the civil war in Sri Lanka? Given the cowardly decision by the United Nations Human Rights Council to resist any such inquiry, what steps can he take to make sure that the issue is not abandoned and forgotten?

Gordon Brown: As the hon. Lady may know, I have spoken to the President of Sri Lanka, and I have urged him to ensure reconciliation with the Tamil community. It is very important, after the events that we have seen happen, that those people who have been displaced are given urgent humanitarian help, that the regime itself recognises that it has to make peace with the Tamil members of the community, and that action is taken as quickly as possible for that purpose. What we need is not violence in Sri Lanka but reconciliation.

Speaker's Statement

Mr. Speaker: Just before we move on to the main business, I want to make a brief statement of just three points. First, as I said on Monday, when Ministers have key policy statements to make, the House must be the first to hear them, and they should not be released beforehand. Secondly, in statements, I ask the Front Benchers to stick to their allotted times. I also ask that the Back-Bench Members taking part each confine themselves to one, brief supplementary question. In the same vein, I hope that Ministers' replies will be kept to a reasonable length. Finally, I always expect that those speaking in this Chamber will be heard, so that an atmosphere of calm, reasoned debate is maintained.

Points of Order

Crispin Blunt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This is really further to your statement, and particularly the first point in it. It was remarkable to read in  The Independent today that
	"Britain is to appoint its first national cyber security chief to protect the country from terrorist computer hackers and electronic espionage, Gordon Brown will announce tomorrow.
	The Prime Minister's move comes amid fears that the computer systems of government and business are vulnerable to online attack from hostile countries and terrorist organisations."
	A civil servant is then named:
	"Neil Thompson, a senior civil servant, will be charged with protecting the national computer network."
	Cyber-security is a very important issue, and the cyber-threat to the United Kingdom is extremely severe. I understand that there are no plans for an oral statement to this House tomorrow, quite apart from the fact that there is no record that there will be any written or oral statements to the House today on the issue. Would it be as well for the Government to prepare an oral statement of some kind for tomorrow?

Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he has just said, which seems to underline the merit of my having made the statement that I did. On the specifics of the question, of which I did not have any advance notice, I can only say to him and to the House that I will certainly look into the matter.

Andrew Selous: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Does your first ruling extend to Ministers commenting on the publication of Bills, and to cases in which no Member of this House has had an opportunity to see a Bill before they hear the relevant Secretary of State telling the world what is in it on the "Today" programme?

Mr. Speaker: Certainly, Ministers ought to make key statements to the House before they are made elsewhere. I should have thought that that was pretty clear. I note that the Leader of the House and other senior Ministers are present on the Treasury Bench. I say to the hon. Gentleman: let us see how it goes, but I hope that the thrust of what I have said is pretty clear.

Evan Harris: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It relates to a matter about which I wrote to you this morning. Tomorrow we are debating a motion to set up a Select Committee to make recommendations about how the House can better hold the Government to account through procedural changes. One of the main issues at stake is the way in which the House is able to scrutinise public Bills on Report, which has been appalling, and which many senior Members on both sides of the House—including yourself, sir, while you held such public opinions as a Back Bencher—agree has not been satisfactory. We assumed that the Wright Committee would be able to consider that, but its terms of reference say only that it will be able to look at procedures relating to non-Government business. To help with how we settle this, could you clarify whether you would agree that the way in which the House scrutinises Bills, even those introduced by the Government, is the very essence of House business, because it is the job of the House to scrutinise legislation? It is not the job of the Government to scrutinise legislation.

Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. Unfortunately, I do not have the advantage of having seen his letter, though I do not doubt that it has been sent to me. Of course, he has tabled an amendment, of which I am aware and with which other Members of the House will be familiar.

Norman Baker: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will be aware that following the recent Government reshuffle, an increasing number of Ministers of the Crown find themselves in the other place, rather than in this place, including two Secretaries of State. Given your welcome determination to introduce reform in the House, what consideration will you give to holding those Ministers and particularly Secretaries of State accountable to this House, perhaps by their giving statements in this House?

Mr. Speaker: That would certainly require a change in the rules of the House, but it is something that the Procedure Committee might wish to consider, and I have just a sense that the hon. Gentleman will encourage the Committee to do just that.

Opposition Day
	 — 
	[14th allotted day]

Iraq Inquiry

Mr. Speaker: I advise the House that I have selected the amendment in the name of the Prime Minister.

William Hague: I beg to move,
	That this House, while welcoming the announcement by the Government of an Inquiry into the war in Iraq, believes that the proceedings of the Committee of Inquiry should whenever possible be held in public and that the membership of the Committee should be wider and more diverse than the Government has proposed, and calls on the Government to revise its proposals for the Inquiry to meet these and other objections raised by hon. Members and to submit proposed terms of reference for it to the House on a substantive motion for full debate and scrutiny.
	On a matter related to the motion, but before discussing it, may I express again the condolences of the Opposition to the families and friends of the two British hostages in Iraq, Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell, whose remains were returned to the care of this country at the weekend. Their tragic deaths are a reminder that the lives of many British citizens are still painfully bound up with developments in Iraq, and that there are still three families waiting anxiously for news.
	This is the fourth debate that I have opened on the subject during this Parliament, and when I heard that the Prime Minister was set to announce the long awaited and much delayed inquiry, I honestly did not expect to have to do so again. This debate is different from the previous ones, in that hitherto we have been pressing on the Government the need to establish an inquiry; our debate today is in direct consequence of the Government's decision, welcome in itself and in principle, to hold an inquiry.
	The need for the debate has arisen from the fact that nine days ago the Prime Minister stood here and announced proposals for the Iraq inquiry which betrayed both poor advance preparation and inadequate consultation, and which as a result received severe and sincere criticism from all quarters of the House—criticism that was reflected in the reaction of people throughout the country. There was genuine disappointment that the Prime Minister had produced proposals for such a secretive, behind-closed-doors inquiry, despite the fact that both of the main Opposition parties had made representations to the Government that the proceedings of the inquiry should be much more open to public view, and it was accentuated by the fact that only the previous week the Prime Minister had talked of improving accountability and transparency.
	Hon. Members on the Government Benches were among those who said that they were extremely disappointed that the inquiry would be limited in its remit or that they had hoped for a new politics of openness. The points were made that the membership was too restricted, quite apart from the timing being so utterly cynical and politically motivated, and that the response of the Prime Minister to important questions such as whether evidence would be given to the inquiry on oath was, to say the least, unsure. It was the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright), who is in his place, who put it to the Prime Minister, politely on that occasion, that he should regard his statement as
	"the beginning of a short process of consultation, so that he can carry the whole House with him"—[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 37.]
	Since then, the Government have engaged in a series of climbdowns—a U-turn that was executed in stages as painful to watch as those of a learner driver doing a six-point turn having started off the wrong way down a motorway. The Government have performed that U-turn by getting the inquiry chairman himself, Sir John Chilcot, to announce the changes that we have all demanded, so that no Minister has had to return to the House and admit that the Government were in the wrong. Indeed, Sir John is now busily engaged in the very process of consultation with Opposition parties and others which a Prime Minister who was doing his job properly would have carried out beforehand.

Lembit �pik: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one reason why the public and right hon. and hon. Members are so sceptical about the chances of openness and transparency is the very attitude that he has outlined, whereby the Government have to be dragged kicking and screaming, unwilling to achieve such transparency from the outset? It suggests that they will do the very minimum necessary to get the inquiry through, rather than as much as possible to ensure that it is genuinely transparent and genuinely independent.

William Hague: The hon. Gentleman is quite right, because such a beginning to the processes of the inquiry damages its credibility in the eyes of the public and makes it all the more important that that damage be now put right.

Michael Ancram: My right hon. Friend referred to the politically cynical timing of the inquiry. Is he aware that, on 23 October 2003, on a motion that I proposed from that Dispatch Box calling for a public inquiry, one reason given for not acceding to it by the present Justice Secretary, who was then the Foreign Secretary, was that it could not report before the general election?

William Hague: Yes, I am aware that my right hon. and learned Friend proposed an inquiry and has, therefore, been proposing one for six years now. That tells us something about the extent of the delay and the Government's ability to pluck out any convenient reason for changing the timingeven from one Parliament to another. However, the uncertainty and confusion that all that has produced is the reason why we are proceeding with today's motion and debate.

Dari Taylor: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

William Hague: Let me just finish this point, and then I shall certainly give way to the hon. Lady.
	In one important sense, we have already achieved the central objective of tabling the motion for debate, which is that it has now been announced, albeit by Sir John Chilcot and not by Ministers, that
	it will be essential to hold as much of the proceedings of the inquiry as possible in public, consistent with the need to protect national security.
	It should not have been necessary to table the motion in order to produce that result, but it was and so be it. It is of course a welcome development, but, given the uncertainty

Clive Efford: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

William Hague: No, I shall not give way at the moment, because I am just explaining why we have moved the motion.
	Given the uncertainty that preceded that concession, the need for the Government in the form of the Foreign Secretary to make it clear that the Government's position has changed; the need for Ministers also to make it clear, in the light of weekend speculation, that they see no problem in this new approach to the inquiryof evidence being given in public wherever possibleapplying to the evidence to be given by the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair; and, given the number of other inconsistencies and clearly inaccurate statements

Clive Efford: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

William Hague: I have explained when I shall give way, and I am in the middle of an admittedly long sentence.
	Given the number of other inconsistencies and clearly inaccurate statements produced by Ministers during the process of establishing the inquiry, combined with a continuing refusal to put the terms of reference of the inquiry to the House on a substantive motion, it is clearly necessary for the House to have a more detailed debate for the will of Parliament to be clear, and this motion provides the vehicle for those things to happen. [Hon. Members: Full stop!]
	Now, first in the queue for an intervention was the hon. Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor).

Dari Taylor: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is speaking to the House with considerable gusto this afternoon. I totally appreciate that; it is time that we all said as we think. However, is he suggesting to the House that, in any way, shape or form, he has evidence that the Government will not co-operate fully and factually with the inquiry? We need to hear from the right hon. Gentleman.

William Hague: I am glad that the hon. Lady appreciates the gusto, although if she has been listening to my speech she will know that I have not said anything of the kind. My contention is that, although the Government set out to try to keep the inquiry behind closed doors and Sir John Chilcot's statement may now have rectified that, there are other serious deficiencies in the arrangements for the inquiry, and I am about to turn to them. First, however, I give way to the hon. Member for Eltham (Clive Efford).

Clive Efford: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman; the people, on both sides of the House, who were responsible for taking us into the war should not be able to hide behind the cloak of secrecy when they give evidence to the inquiry. However, will he explain how Sir John Chilcot's powers to expand the breadth of what is held in public have changed since the announcement last week? If what the right hon. Gentleman is putting forward is true, the Government must at some time have altered the powers given to Sir John Chilcot to set up the inquiry that he wants to set up.

William Hague: That will be the subject of some of my speech and perhaps some of the Foreign Secretary's. The issue is not so much that the Government have altered Sir John Chilcot's powers; it is that they have now placed on him the burden of coming up with the proceedings and rules for the inquiryincluding how much of it is to be heard in public. If I continue with my speech for a little, there will be an answer to the hon. Gentleman's point.
	The Government's basic defence of their inquiry proposals is that many of us asked for a Franks-style inquiry and that that is what they consider they have produced. In fact, it is necessary to have only the most cursory acquaintance with the Franks inquiry to know that several of its attributes, which were important in making its processes and findings acceptable to Parliament and the public, were completely missing from the Government's proposals and how they went about them. Meanwhile, the one attribute of the Franks inquiry that almost everyone outside the Government regarded as no longer appropriateits having been conducted behind closed doorswas the very one that the Government chose to continue with. I shall come to the point about openness or secrecy in a moment.

Oliver Heald: Does my right hon. Friend agree that another concern is that only recently the Government proposed that inquests could be held privately, without being open to the public gaze? Those proposals were later changed, but suspicions were raised about what the Government were up to.

William Hague: My hon. Friend makes a related point, although not one immediately relevant to the motion. It was a good point, but I will carry on explaining the comparison with the Franks inquiry. It is possible for the House to understand how and why the Government went wrong on the issue only if it is aware of how the Government went about the consultation in advance of last Monday's announcement, and how that contrasts with the consultation that followed the Falklands war and preceded the Franks inquiry.

Paul Flynn: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

William Hague: Not at the moment, because a lot of Members will wish to speak.
	The Franks inquiry was characterised by wide and lengthy consultation by the Government of the time with the Opposition parties. That led to broad agreement on the nature, scope and composition of the inquiry in advance of its announcement. In fact, in the debate on the Franks inquiry, Denis Healey, the then shadow Foreign Secretary, went out of his way to praise Baroness Thatcher, the then Prime Ministersomething that we would all admit he has hardly ever done in his life. During that debate on 8 July 1982, Denis Healey said:
	I must pay tribute on behalf of the other parties in the House to the fact that she consulted all of us about the procedures, the terms and the composition of the inquiry. She made substantial changes to her original intentions.[ Official Report, 8 July 1982; Vol. 27, c. 503.]
	He credited that attitude with producing the widespread support that the final proposals received.
	In contrast, on this occasion, the Prime Minister initiated only limited consultation with Opposition partiesand then ignored most of the points that we made. Ministers therefore have no excuse for thinking that what they announced had the agreement of the Opposition. Asked last Tuesday on the BBC Today programme whether the Opposition had agreed that the membership of the committee of inquiry was right, the Foreign Secretary replied:
	Yes but my understanding is...I was in Brussels yesterday, but the err...
	That was the transcript, but he did say yes. I hope that he will acknowledge today that in claiming that the Opposition had agreed the membership of the inquiry, he was not making an accurate statement.
	Let me be clear about this. On the Friday afternoon, the Conservative party was given the inquiry proposals to be made on the Monday. That gave no time for any face-to-face meetings between Opposition leaders and Ministers, or even among ourselves. Nevertheless, we made several criticisms of the inquiry proposals. Only one of them was taken fully on board by the Government. They had intended that the inquiry should be able to look back no further than late 2002, but they accepted our suggestion that the date should be put back to 2001, bringing in the period following the 9/11 attacks.
	However, we also argued, as I believe did others, that the inquiry sessions should be much more open, and indeed open whenever possiblethe exact formulation that the Prime Minister chose to ignore but has belatedly been constrained to accept. We also called for an interim report from the inquiry in early 2010, given the unnecessary delay in its establishment and the Government's transparent intention to delay the publication of findings until after the last possible date for a general electiona manoeuvre that itself reduces public confidence in the inquiry process. An interim or earlier report would help to remedy that. That point, too, was ignored by the Government.

Paul Flynn: Although I believe that the openness of the inquiry has already been acceded to, the important point is the one that the Public Administration Committee has raised. That is the suggestion of having a two-tier inquiry, one to deal with the general issue for a long period and one to concentrate, in a short report produced in perhaps a matter of six months, on Britain's involvement. The key issue is the torment of the families of the fallendid their loved ones die in vain? Was Britain deceived in going into the war? That can be reported on very rapidly.

William Hague: We all hope that all those things will be encompassed in one inquiry, and I am sure that it is better to examine them in the round.

David Winnick: I was one of those many Labour Members who urged last week that the inquiry should be as public as possible. That is right and proper.
	I believe that I spoke after the right hon. Gentleman in the debate just before we went into war. He was speaking from the Back Benches. I stand by my vote at that time, on the basis that the chief weapons inspector had not said that he was satisfied that all the weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed. On that basis, I voted for war. Does he stand by his vote?

William Hague: I do stand by my vote and my speech on that occasion. No doubt when the inquiry reports, we will all have time to reflect on who was right and who was wrong. That is one of the reasons for having an inquiry.
	I was running through the points that the Opposition made over the weekend of consultation before the announcement. We said that the membership of the inquiry, while encompassing people whom we had no call to criticise, seemed to us too narrow. We said in particular that some experience of ministerial office was desirable. The following Monday, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition also made the point that military experience was desirable.
	We further pointed out that the inquiry, as proposed by the Government, would consist of four nominees, none of whom was a woman. The Government went a small way to meeting part of the objection by adding Baroness Prashar to the inquiry membership. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will acknowledge that his statement on the Today programme that the five people were approached before the Cabinet Secretary went to talk to the Opposition parties was inaccurate. The fifth, Baroness Prashar, was added only when it was pointed out to Ministers that they had proposed an inquiry too narrow in its membership.
	In many ways, I am sorry to make these points to the Foreign Secretary, because he is normally perfectly good at consultation with the Opposition. Clearly he was misinformed and not properly briefed on what was happening by a Downing street that does not share his willingness to consult on and agree matters with the Opposition. Let us hope that that emboldens him when he comes to his next opportunity to depose the Prime Minister, which normally recurs about every 12 weeks.
	The upshot was that the consultation with the Opposition was inadequate and unnecessarily short. Nor did the Prime Minister even bother to consult the armed forces about how an inquiry into this country's largest military endeavour since world war two should be conducted. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, stated last week that he was not privy to the discussions about how the inquiry would be conducted.

John Barrett: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the changes that he suggests should take place because the public have lost confidence in the House for another reason, and that it is absolutely vital to regain their confidence? Unless the changes that he has outlined are taken on board, the public will not believe that the outcome of the inquiry is fair and just.

William Hague: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the mess and chaos that I am describing, which accompanied the launch of the inquiry, underlines the need to take on board the points that Members throughout the House have been making, to give the inquiry proper public credibility and support.
	At the same time as everything I have described was happening, ample consideration was given to the concerns of the former Prime Minister, Mr. Blair, who reportedly feared that an open inquiry would become a show trial. Time was found also to consult Mr. Alastair Campbell; he has confirmed that he was consulted on the specific point of whether the inquiry should be public or private. Their advice was taken, at least initially.
	The proposals that the Government came up with were not the result of proper consultation. Nor have they had it in mind to subject them to democratic accountability and consultation after the announcement, for they have provided no opportunity to debate the inquiry's terms of reference in the House, as happened in Government time after the announcement of the Franks inquiryanother point that we put to the Government that was ignored, and another omission that the motion seeks to address.
	The Foreign Secretary may wish to explain to the House what detailed terms of reference the committee of inquiry will be given, when it will be given them and whether the Government will respond to the widespread demand for those terms of reference to be approved on a substantive motion in this House. If they are not to be approved in this House, just who are they going to be approved by? Is it not unfair to Sir John Chilcot to expect him to clarify all the procedures and rules of the inquiry, leaving him open to subsequent criticism, rather than the Government being clear about what they want and winning the approval of the House?

Gordon Prentice: On that very point, the Government amendment asks the chairman of the inquiry, Chilcot, to consult party leaders on
	the scope for taking evidence under oath.
	Surely everyone who gives evidence to the inquiry must give it under oath?

William Hague: Sir John Chilcot has been placed in a difficult position by the ill-prepared announcement that was made last week. Clearly the Government had not anticipated the issue of taking evidence under oath, and they are now trying to put it right by asking Sir John to come up with some formulation that encompasses that. It would be useful to know whether the Foreign Secretary thinks that a solution has been arrived at, and I hope that he will address that point.

Malcolm Rifkind: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the most outstanding continuing defect in the Government's proposals was shown in the Prime Minister's statement last week that the inquiry that he has established, unlike the Franks inquiry, will not be able to apportion blame even if it believes it appropriate?
	My right hon. Friend said in his speech on 25 March that if the inquiry had not completed its proceedings by the time a Conservative Government came into office, they would feel free to alter its terms of reference. Can he tell the House that if the Prime Minister and the Government continue to refuse to allow the committee to apportion blame at the end of the inquiry if it so wishes, and the inquiry has not been completed when a Conservative Government come into office, they will give it such powers?

William Hague: Yes, we certainly reserve the right to do that if the Government change and a committee of inquiry is proceeding in a way that we believe to be inadequate and without adequate terms of reference.
	My right hon. and learned Friend makes an important point, and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will explain whether the inquiry's terms of reference will include the Prime Minister's injunction to it last week that it should not set out to apportion blame. Although we absolutely agree that learning lessons for the future is the primary purpose of the inquiry, a positive prohibition on its apportioning blame seems to us an unnatural and unnecessary restriction on any normal discussion of what happened in the past. The attempt to prevent the inquiry from apportioning any blame is again in sharp contrast to the Franks inquiry, and it is further evidence that Ministers have not set out to set up a Franks-style inquiry at all.

Rob Marris: rose

William Hague: I think that I had better make a bit of progress.

Menzies Campbell: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

William Hague: I will end up having to give way to both Members; I give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

Menzies Campbell: I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, if I am still allowed to call him that. Before he leaves the question of evidence on oath, does he understand that Sir John does not have the power to put witnesses on oath? He might have that power if this were an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, or if the House conferred it upon him. That is all the more reason for the procedures to be within the ownership of the House of Commons, not that of the Prime Minister.

William Hague: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right. That is why the terms of reference should be brought to the House. Then it would be open to any of us to move amendments to them, in order to clarify the many points such as the one that he has just made. Out of a sense of equality, I now give way to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris).

Rob Marris: The right hon. Gentleman is generous as ever. Can he give an indication of what he thinks the inquiry's terms of reference ought to be?

William Hague: Yes. I have described what the terms of reference should be several times in debates over the past three years. However, now that we have reached the point of the inquiry being set up, those terms of reference need to set out more of the procedures and rules, so that Sir John Chilcot is not placed in the unfortunate position of having to determine them all by himself.
	The Franks inquiry was entirely different from what the Government have proposed. As Humphrey Atkins, one of the Ministers who resigned over the Falklands war, explained in the debate on the Franks inquiry:
	The inquiry may or may not apportion blame. That is for it alone to decide.[ Official Report, 8 July 1982; Vol. 27, c. 489.]
	If Ministers really want a Franks-style inquiry, let them be absolutely clear that the members of the committee will have the same freedom to give their views. A debate on the terms of referencesomething to which many hon. Members have referredis one of the actions for which our motion calls. However, it also calls for the committee of inquiry to have a wider and more diverse membership, which the Government have so far failed to bring about or, indeed, tried to bring about.

Gavin Strang: rose

William Hague: I might give way to the right hon. Gentleman later, but I know that a lot of Members wish to speak.
	The committee's members are distinguished historians, commentators and public servants. We have no objection to any of them as individuals, but the composition overall still leaves a lot to be desired. Not a single member has high-level military or governmental experience. There are no former chiefs of staff and no one with experience of being in a Cabinet. Those are considerable omissions, given that much of the inquiry's scope will either be military in nature or concern the decision-making processes at the highest level of Government.
	Whatever the case against having such members, however, it cannot possibly be the one advanced by the Prime Minister in the House last week, which was wholly specious, and easily demonstrably so. His justification was that, rather than have people with political or military experience,
	We would do better in these circumstances to draw on the professional and expert advice of people who have not been involved in commenting on this issue over the last few years.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 27.]
	In making that remark, he revealed either that he was trying to brush off the objections in this House with an argument that he knew to be bogus, or that he knew astonishingly little about the people whom he had just appointed to the inquiry.
	Of the four members of the inquiry who were originally proposed by the Government, Lawrence Freedman has written that
	The Iraq war is rightly criticised for its flimsy rationale and incompetence of the occupation,
	and has referred at other times to the
	inept conduct of the Iraq war, from pre-war diplomacy to post-war reconstruction.
	Martin Gilbert, a great historian, wrote in 2004 that George W. Bush and Tony Blair
	may well, with the passage of time and the opening of the archives, join the ranks of Roosevelt and Churchill.
	Sir Roderic Lyne has not only commented on the war but was involved in the efforts to secure a second UN Security Council resolution, recalling that
	Like other British ambassadors, I received what is now known as the 'Dodgy Dossier',
	and referring to
	a massive failure of British intelligence,
	and
	obviously a failure of political intelligence.
	Sir John Chilcot, the chairman of the inquiry, was a member of the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war and has therefore helped to produce a whole report on one aspect of the war, let alone comment on it. All those people have commented on the war, and in some cases liberally so. In the light of that, how the Prime Minister came to think that none of the people appointed to the inquiry had commented on the Iraq war defies imagination. It is quite hard to think how he could stand up in this House and justify the exclusion of others on the basis of an argument so obviously and totally inaccurate in its very foundations.
	When the Foreign Secretary comes to reply, perhaps he will explain the answer to these questions. First, is it still the Government's considered view that it is not necessary to have on the inquiry anyone with substantial military, governmental or, indeed, legal experience? Secondly, if that is still their view, what is the real reason for that view, given that no credence whatever can be attached to the reason given last week by the Prime Minister? Thirdly, as Sir John Chilcot has tried to deal with part of the problem by having a military assessor attached to the inquiry, what possible reason is there not to have that military assessor as a full member of the inquiry? Fourthly, has the Foreign Secretary or anyone else asked Sir John Chilcot whether he would like the expertise that I have described among the inquiry's membership, and if not, why not?
	It must be clear by now that the inquiry that Ministers announced was not remotely modelled on the Franks inquirynot in its membership, not in its terms of reference, not in the House's ability to approve the terms of reference and not in the consultation process that preceded it. The Government decided to adopt the one aspect of the Franks inquiry that suited themthat it was held in secretand say that they had announced something like the Franks inquiry.
	The Prime Minister made much of that last week, saying that I had asked for a Franks-style inquiry, which he said
	is what we have got.
	He also said:
	If people on the Opposition Benches want to change their mind, it is their right to do so, but what they say is completely inconsistent.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 27-30.]
	In fact, we have never called for a secret inquiry. In one of the all too many speeches that I have given in the House on this matter, I argued in the debate two years ago not only that the membership of the inquiry should
	draw on very senior diplomatic, military or political experience,
	but that it should be able
	to hold some of its sessions in confidence if it needs to and to summon all the papers and persons it deems necessary.
	The Prime Minister is happy to state in this House that the Opposition had asked for a secret or private inquiry, but the fact that we had said that it should be able to hold some of its sessions in confidence hardly equates to that.
	In that same debate two years ago, hon. Members in all parts of the House were clear that the inquiry should be open. Indeed, I recall one hon. Member who was a Back Bencher at the time saying that
	we need an inquiry that is fully in the open.[ Official Report, 11 June 2007; Vol. 461, c. 534.]
	That was the demand of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who is now the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. I am confident that he still holds the same view, although fully in the open goes beyond anything that we have asked for or that the Prime Minister has countenanced. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman's views were never asked foror perhaps they were ignored.
	The Prime Minister went on to assert that a more open inquiry would be bad for the armed forces. No sooner had he said that than he was contradicted by a mass of military figures. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, said that a part public, part private inquiry was an option
	that has a lot of merit to it.
	General Sir Mike Jackson, head of the Army during the Iraq invasion, said:
	I would have no problem at all in giving my evidence in public...The main problem with a secret inquiry...is that people would think there is something to hide.
	Air Marshal Sir John Walker, the former head of defence intelligence, said:
	There is one reason that the inquiry is being heard in private and that is to protect past and present members of this Government. There are 179 reasons why the military want the truth to be out.
	In this war of words, I think that the generals represented the Government's true motives as clearly as the Government misrepresented theirs. Nevertheless, armed with those completely inaccurate assertions about the views of the Opposition and the military, the Prime Minister was insistent at the beginning of last week that the whole inquiry would be held in private. That was on Monday. On Tuesday, we tabled the motion now before the House, and many Government Members indicated that they agreed with it. On Wednesday, the Prime Minister suddenly wrote to Sir John Chilcot asking that
	those appearing before the inquiry do so with the greatest possible candour and openness
	and asking him to explain how the inquiry would be conducted. By Monday of this week, Sir John had given the more satisfying reply to which I have referred.
	So when the Prime Minister was asked, during a limited consultation, to ensure that the inquiry was open whenever possible, he chose to ignore those requests. However, when faced with the possibility of a difficult vote in his House, he changed within hours the approach that he had been insistent on, but chose to do so not by coming to the House and saying that he had modified his proposals, but by setting up an exchange of letters with Sir John, without any announcement to the House.
	One of the purposes of this debate is to allow Ministers to explain to the House their understanding of an inquiry that we are pleased will now be carried out on a substantially different basis from the one on which they were insistent only nine days ago. The policy on secrecy has been changed. The lack of military expertise has started to be addressed, but has not been fully addressed. The chairman of the inquiry has begun a process of consultation, suggesting that more changes could be on the way, as they should be.
	An inquiry that is seriously overdue cannot even get off to a clean start, but will spend an unspecified period of time adjusting its remita recipe for confusion, rather than clarity. We appreciate the efforts of Sir John Chilcot to make up for the deficiencies in the initial announcement, but the Government's handling of the issue means that, as things currently stand, the inquiry will start its work with far less credibility in the eyes of the public or Parliament than it should have had.
	In addition to answering the questions that I asked earlier, let the Foreign Secretary now assist the inquiry, the House and the country by being clear about the following matters. Is it now the view of Ministers, as well as of Sir John Chilcot, that the evidence put to the inquiry should be heard in public whenever possible, and will the Foreign Secretary confirm that to the House? Will he explain the true reason why the Government were opposed to such a position until days ago, given that the reasons put to the House by the Prime Minister were not credible ones? Will he confirm that it is the Government's view that the desirability of holding sessions in public whenever possible applies as much to the inquiry's forthcoming sessions with Mr. Tony Blair, Mr. Alastair Campbell and the Prime Minister as to anyone else? Will he also confirm that the inquiry will indeed be free to issue an interim report at any stage of its work, if it wishes to do so? Is he happy that a way can be found of giving evidence on oath or some equivalent to it? Will he confirm that the inquiry will have access to all relevant records of meetings and dealings between the British and American Governments?
	Finally, will the Foreign Secretary apologise on behalf of the Government for the monumental mess that has been made of what should have been a straightforward process of consultation and consensus? Will he also undertake that the Government will provide to the House the honesty about their own processes, the accuracy about the statements of others, the clarity about the operation of the inquiry and the efficiency in the whole conduct of this business, which this Government, from the Prime Minister down, have so far been unable to supply?

David Miliband: I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from House to the end of the Question and add:
	welcomes the announcement by the Government of a wide ranging and independent inquiry to establish the lessons to be learnt from the United Kingdom's engagement in Iraq, which will consider the run-up to the conflict, the military action and reconstruction; recognises the importance of allowing the families of those who gave their lives in Iraq to express their views about the nature and procedures of the inquiry; notes the Prime Minister's request that the chairman of the inquiry consult party leaders and chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees on the scope for taking evidence under oath and holding sessions in public; and commends the proposal by the chair of the inquiry to hold as much of the proceedings as possible in public without compromising national security or the inquiry's ability to report thoroughly and without delay.
	The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) started his remarks by referring to the terrible situation of the families who have heard that their loved ones have been confirmed dead and of those who are waiting in fear for further news of the three hostages still being held in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, I hope that you will allow me to use this opportunity to confirm that the Government are exploring every avenue and following every lead to try to save the lives of the three remaining hostages. I hope that you will also allow me to take this opportunity to say something that we do not often get a chance to say: namely, that on matters such as this, the Government and the Opposition have to keep in close touch. The right hon. Gentleman referred on television the other day to the fact that he had been kept in touch on this issue over the past 18 to 24 months. It is important that I put on record in return that, at every stage, he has maintained the confidentiality that is essential to such relationships. I recognise that and, of course, it will continue.
	Britain's involvement in Iraq has been one of the longest and gravest military and civilian deployments abroad since the second world war. It cost the lives of 179 British servicemen and women, and hundreds more were seriously injured. We will all wish to pay tribute to their sacrifice and that of their families. In addition, I am sure that the House will join me in recognising the courage and selflessness of all the military and civilian personnel who have served and continue to serve in Iraq, and the courage of the brave Iraqi people, many, many thousands of whom have also lost their lives, their livelihoods and their homes. Profound questions of international relations, nation building and regional security were, and are, at issue.

Harry Cohen: Is not the Secretary of State being mealy-mouthed in saying that many thousands of Iraqis died? Was it not 1 million? Cannot he at least confirm that?

David Miliband: It would be quite wrong of me to confirm that, because nothing

Harry Cohen: Hundreds of thousands?

David Miliband: There were many hundreds of thousands. As I said, many, many thousands have lost their lives. There is no difference between us, whether we voted for the war or against it, about the scale of the suffering and the destruction. That certainly does not come between us at this point.

David Winnick: We all know that hundreds of thousands have died, murdered, in the main, and certainly not by the British or the Americans, but by outright terrorists; so why will the opponents of the war, while maintaining their positionthey say that they were absolutely right, and all the rest of itnot condemn the terrorist action, which they refuse to do[Hon. Members: Oh!] Mass murder was carried out by terrorists, and certainly not by Britain or the United States.

David Miliband: Whatever position any right hon. or hon. Member has taken, I am sure that they all condemn the killing of the British servicemen and women and the innocent Iraqi civilians as a result of terrorist action. I honestly do not think that the passion that we all bring to this debate divides us on the ground of whether or not we condemn the killing of innocent people.

Tobias Ellwood: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: On that point?

Tobias Ellwood: No.

David Miliband: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his honesty. I shall make some progress.
	The House is united on the point that the significant nature of Britain's involvement in Iraq demands an inquiry. It needs to be comprehensive, independent and
	not a trial or an impeachment, but an effort to learn for the future. [ Official Report, 25 March 2008; Vol. 474, c. 47.]
	Those are the words of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks in March 2008, and I agree with him on how the inquiry should be conducted. It will have complete freedom to write its own report. The Government's case today is simple: Sir John Chilcot's inquiry and his proposed method of conducting it will meet all reasonable aspirations for an Iraq inquiry. The combination of his remit and his membership, plus expert advisers, and his commitment to public sessions for as much of the proceedings as possible will deliver to the country an inquiry of insight and value. Yes, the Government have listened. There is a balance to be struck between speed and confidentiality on the one hand and comprehensiveness and transparency on the other. The balance now proposed by Sir John Chilcot is new, but the Government believe that it will be effective and that it deserves strong support.
	The right hon. Gentleman referred to the fact that there have been four previous debates on an Iraq inquiry. There have been four demands from the official Opposition in each case, and they will be at the heart of my remarks today, in addition to my answers to the points that he has just made. The first demand was that the inquiry should be comprehensive. The hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox), who is here today, said in the most recent debate on the matter, on 25 March, that the inquiry should have
	the fullest remit, including the run-up to the war, the conduct of the war and the preparation for, and conduct of, the post-conflict period.[ Official Report, 25 March 2009; Vol. 489, c. 362.]
	The second demand was that the inquiry be independent. Each of the three motions on the subject moved by the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorksin June 2007, March 2008 and March 2009has referred to the need for an inquiry by an independent committee of Privy Counsellors. The third demand was that the inquiry draw on expertise from outside the world of politics. The right hon. Gentleman said in 2006:
	A committee of seven Members of Parliament would necessarily be a partisan committee and the credibility of its findings would be correspondingly reduced.[ Official Report, 31 October 2006; Vol. 451, c. 182.]
	The fourth demand was for a Franks-style inquiry. In motions, amendments, and speeches, the right hon. Gentleman has insisted that the inquiry be modelled on the 1982 Franks inquiry. The truth is that all four points are reasonable and serious and all deserve proper consideration. All draw on precedent as well as on common sense and all will be addressed in my speech today.

Malcolm Rifkind: The Foreign Secretary has just said that the Chilcot inquiry will be completely free to write its own report as it wishes. Will he therefore confirm that, like the Franks committee, if the Chilcot inquiry decides that it wishes to attribute blame, it will be entirely free to do so?

David Miliband: It is inherent in the inquiry writing its own report that it will be entirely free to write its own report. As the Prime Minister said

Malcolm Rifkind: So the answer is yes?

David Miliband: As the Prime Minister said last week, this is not an inquiry that has been set up to establish civil or criminal liability; it is not a judicial inquiry. Everything beyond that will be within its remit. It can praise or blame whomever it likes, and it is free to write its own report at every stage. That will be taken forward.

Tony Wright: We are clearly in a much better place than we were just a few days ago. In addition to the points that the Foreign Secretary has just mentioned, will he tell me whether, after Sir John Chilcot has consulted, there will be formal terms of reference? If so, will they be converted into a substantive motion to be put before the House? Both of those things happened in the case of the Franks inquiry.

David Miliband: I will come to that later in my speech.
	Last week, the Prime Minister said in his statement that the inquiry would
	consider the period from summer 2001, before military operations began...and our subsequent involvement in Iraq right up to the end of July this year.
	He then talked about an inquiry that will look at
	the run-up to the conflict... the... conflict and reconstruction.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 23.]
	so that we can learn lessons in each and every area. I will highlight later the fact that we have deliberately not ruled out areas that the committee can examine. Everything in the period 2001 to 2009 is within its remit. On the question of a vote in Parliament, we are obviously going to vote today. That is a good opportunity for right hon. and hon. Members.

Angus MacNeil: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that if anybody has lied to take the country to war, there will be no sanction as a result of the inquiry?

David Miliband: As the Prime Minister set out last week, this is an inquiry not to establish civil or criminal liability, but to learn lessons for the future, and it will write its own report. The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks used the term impeachment. It is not an impeachment or a trial, but an inquiry designed to learn lessons.

John Baron: I thank the Foreign Secretary, who is being generous in giving way. May I suggest that his list of characteristics of the inquiry misses the central point? I put it to him that, outside this Chamber, there is a real sense of anger and betrayal that this country went to war on a false premise, that premise being weapons of mass destruction. If the inquiry, or large elements of it, is not held in public, I suggest that that sense of betrayal will not be purged and the inquiry will fail, like the others before it.

David Miliband: With the greatest respect, I can only believe that the hon. Gentleman was not listening to what I said at the beginning of my speech. To quote myself, Sir John Chilcot's inquiry has made absolutely clear its commitment to hold public sessions for as much of the proceedings as possible. That answers the hon. Gentleman's point directly. I will go into some detail later.

Several hon. Members: rose

David Miliband: May I make some progress? Then I will happily bring in further comments and questions.

Gordon Prentice: Will the Secretary of State give way on that point?

David Miliband: I will return to the point about the public sessions. First, I want to deal with the scope of the inquiry.
	The concern has been to ensure that the inquiry is able to address itself to all aspects of preparation for the military campaign, the military campaign itself, and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. That is important. At various points, there have been allegations, for example, that the inquiry would not be able to look at the run-up to the war, or the decisions taken in Basra in 2006 to 2008. Those concerns are not well founded.
	The Chilcot inquiry has the widest possible remit. The committee will be free not just to examine all the evidence, as I will set out, but to pursue what it considers are the most important issues. The scope is deliberately not limited. As the Prime Minister said last week:
	No inquiry has looked at such a long period, and no inquiry has the powers to look in so much breadth.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 23.]
	Secondly, on the question of independence, the Prime Minister wrote to Sir John Chilcot on 17 June assuring him of the Government's commitment to a thorough and independent inquiry. Sir John confirms in his reply of 21 June:
	I welcome the fact that I and my colleagues are free to decide independently how best to fulfil our remit.

Lynne Jones: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: I want to get to the end of this section of my speech, then I will bring in my hon. Friend. I want to make four points before I pause, take interventions and deal with the public-private issue.
	Thirdly, on co-operation from Government and access to Government papers and people, the Prime Minister has made clear not just to Sir John Chilcot, but to all Ministers and former Ministers, the need for full co-operation with the committee. The Cabinet Secretary has written similarly to Departments. Access to papers in official archives will be similarly unrestricted.
	In the previous debate in the House, I was asked whether the committee's access to documents would include all Cabinet papers. I confirm that that will be the case. We have also been asked whether that includes access to papers from foreign Governments held by the Government here. Again, I confirm what the Prime Minister has said: that will indeed be the case.
	On ensuring that witnesses give evidence with the greatest possible candour, Sir John has confirmed that he and his colleagues will consider whether it is possible to have a process whereby evidence is given under oath, taking into account the non-judicial nature of the inquiry. Again, that is an issue

Lynne Jones: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: I have said that I want to get through this section of my speech; then I will bring in my hon. Friend. Perhaps I will anticipate some of her questions.
	Again, that is an issue on which it is right and proper to leave the discretion to Sir John and his colleagues.
	In respect of the old canard about whether Tony Blair is willing to stand up in public and defend his decisions on the Iraq war, during a question-and-answer session last nightI am not sure whether it was a continuation of the masochism strategy that was started in 2005he said, I don't know how many times I have answered questions about Iraq in public, including now. There is no problem for me in answering questions in public. That is a canard.

Several hon. Members: rose

David Miliband: I want to deal with the questions on membership, but my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) has been very insistent and I will let her intervene.

Lynne Jones: I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. Who did the Prime Minister consult about the composition of the inquiry, whether it would meet in public and its modus operandifor example, in hearing evidence under oath? As Sir John Chilcot has raised those points about evidence being given predominantly in public, why was he not consulted before the Prime Minister announced that the inquiry would be in private?

David Miliband: Sir John was consulted. That is one of the points and I will come on to the reasons. The hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) wanted to intervene earlier. Is his point still relevant? He is a former officer.

Tobias Ellwood: I would like to intervene now, whether it is or is not still relevant.  [Laughter.] One learns quickly in the House, Mr. Speaker.
	My question is simple: does it require an inquiry to understand the fundamental flaw and the frustration that the military finds, which was echoed by General Robin Brims, who was the commander of 1 (UK) Armoured Division and in charge of the forces in Basra? He said that we went into Iraq and, a month later, it was clear that the looting would start, the gangs would form and the militias would be created because there was no plan for peace. Will the Secretary of State now acknowledge that we need a huge overhaul and an examination of the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development? The world of warfare has changed from cold war to stabilisation operations. That is the fundamental frustration with our military, which is getting blamed for what happened in Iraq because the war fighting went well, but the peacekeeping was an absolute failure.

David Miliband: In the first debate on Iraq in which I participated after becoming Foreign Secretary, I talked about the precise fact that the success had been in winning the war, but not in winning the peace. I also talked about the fact that there were plans, as we now know, for how the process of peace building would be taken forward, but if those were not binned, they were certainly sidelined in the US Administration. All those issues, which are precisely about stabilisation and reconstruction, will be at the heart of the inquiry.
	It is very importantthe hon. Gentleman will know this better than many peoplenot to draw facile comparisons between Iraq and Afghanistan. None the less, there is a major job of reconstruction and stabilisation going on in Afghanistan, and we should certainly be sure that, in addition to the internal MOD inquiries, there are external inquiries.

Several hon. Members: rose

David Miliband: I shall bring in the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram). Then, I want to make progress.

Michael Ancram: The Foreign Secretary mentioned a moment ago the fact that Sir John Chilcot has been told to see whether there are ways in which he can produce evidence under oath. Mine is a genuine inquiry: can the Foreign Secretary tell me under what authority or power Sir John could do that, other than under a statutory inquiry procedure, or, indeed, by being given a power to do so by legislation passed by the House?

David Miliband: The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows well that the Inquiries Act 2005 sets out what is effectively a quasi-judicial procedure that may be appropriate for an inquiry that is set out to mediate between competing interests, but that is not what this inquiry is about. That Act also assumes legal representation for all parties concerned and restrictions on who may be questioned. For those reasons, among others, we chose the inquiry.
	The Prime Minister raised the question of oaths in his statement last Monday. Sir John Chilcot believes that there are ways in which he will be able to meet that need. We cannot say that he has full independence to pursue his remit as an independent chair and then start to fetter his discretion.

Tom Levitt: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way and I thank him for the frankness of his statement.
	No one underestimates the difficulty that Sir John Chilcot will have during the months of his work, but is he aware quite how difficult the job might be made for him by the publicly given evidence being put through a media filter by people who have already made up their mind on what the outcomes of his inquiry should be, based on evidence that cannot be complete because some of it will, of course, be given in private? Is Sir John capable of resisting media attempts over the months to prejudice the outcome of his discussions?

David Miliband: Sir John is a strong, able, dedicated public servant, and I think that he is well able to look after himself. He understands the need for an inquiry, not a circus. As I shall explain in a moment, the way in which he will balance the public and private elements will, I think

Clare Short: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: On this point?

Clare Short: On the point with which he is dealing.

David Miliband: In view of the right hon. Lady's role, I will give way, but then I must make some progress.

Clare Short: I thank the Foreign Secretary.
	Surely it is wrong to allow Sir John Chilcot to decide whether evidence should be taken under oath when he does not have the power to require it to be taken under oath? He could make a recommendation to the House, but it is the House that would have to give that power to the inquiry. It will not be good enough unless evidence is taken under oath. I ask the Foreign Secretary please to reconsider.

David Miliband: Sir John has made it clear that there are ways in which he can invite the witnesses to make some kind of representation. This will not be a judicial inquiry. Sir John is not there to establish criminal [Interruption.] He has said that he thinks he is able to do that, and I think we should let him do that. Certainly, if any witness did not follow the protocols established by Sir John, people would draw conclusions from that.

Paul Flynn: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: No. I need to make some progress.
	Fourthly, let me deal with the membership of the committee. The Government propose a committee of senior public servants and figures from outside Government. As the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks said, they are recognised as outstanding figures in their respective fields. He spoke of military insight, but the more he described the work of the committee members, the more evident it became that they possessed a large amount of relevant expertise. Sir Lawrence Freedman is the official historian of the Falklands campaign, Sir Martin Gilbert has written extensively on military matters, Sir Roderic Lyne was private secretary for defence and foreign affairs, and Sir John Chilcot was permanent secretary at the Northern Ireland Office. The hon. Member for South Hampshire is

Keith Simpson: Mid-Norfolk.

David Miliband: I am sorry. The hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) is becoming excited.
	In passing, the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks mentioned the role of the expert assessors, who will be chosen on the basis of their experience not only in military matters, but in legal, international development and reconstruction matters. It is true that the five people appointed to the inquiry are there because of their ability to sift different material, to ask hard and probing questions and to compose a final report of independence, insight and foresight. I believe, however, that Sir John's decision to add the assessors will ensure that any deficiencies that may exist are properly accounted for.

Patrick Mercer: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: I want to make some progress, because I know that many Members wish to speak. If the hon. Gentleman will let me do that, we shall see how we get on.
	Fifthly, I want to deal with an issue that has already prompted a number of questions: the conduct of the inquiry. The Prime Minister has invited Sir John Chilcot to consult leading Members of the House, including Select Committee Chairmen, and present proposals for the conduct of the inquiry to ensure that those who appear before it do so with the greatest possible candour and openness.
	There are trade-offs on the public nature of the inquiry in the context of intelligence and other matters mentioned by the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks. He referred to the Franks report and the starring role of Denis Healey in the 1982 debate. He will also remember that Lord Callaghan described the Franks inquiry as a whitewash. Private inquiries are sometimes described as a whitewash, but other people have described the Hutton inquiry, which was held in public, as a whitewash. The truth is that if people have decided in advance what they are going to conclude, they will describe either a public or a private inquiry as a whitewash.
	I think that Sir John Chilcot has anticipated precisely the points that were raised by my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak (Tom Levitt). Let me go through them. Sir John has set out four main parts of the inquiry, combining public and private aspects. First, there is examination and analysis of documentary evidence, which will be crucial to decisions on the course of the inquiry, including decisions on the selection of witnesses and detailed lines of questioning. It will, by definition, occur in private. Secondly, there is the question of public proceedings. Sir John Chilcot has said that it will be essential to hold as much as possible of the proceedings in public, consistent with national security and the candour of written and oral evidence. The Prime Minister and Sir John Chilcot have had close to the front of their minds the strong and legitimate interest especially of families of those who lost their lives in Iraq, and Sir John has made clear his determination to facilitate the public or private presentation of views.
	Thirdly, there is the question of private proceedings, which will be important in allowing examination of matters relating to national security. Classified information will be protected and witnesses will be able to speak without fear of legal action. Intelligence questions obviously fit into that category. It is also important to protect the position and relationships of current public servants, while ensuring that the committee is given the full benefit of their expertise.
	Fourthly, and much unheralded, as Sir John has pointed out, there is the publication and debating of the final report. The Prime Minister made clear last week that all relevant evidence should be published, except when national security or similar considerations prevent it. Sir John has confirmed his determination to follow that pattern.
	The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks asked whether the Government supported those points. I confirm what the Prime Minister said in his reply to Sir John Chilcot the day before yesterday. The answer is yes, we do support the approach that Sir John has set out, and, as I said at the beginning of my speech, we have listened to the points that have been made.

Patrick Mercer: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

Bernard Jenkin: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: I was going to conclude my speech, but I will give way to the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), because he has been trying to intervene for some time.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful to the Foreign Secretary.
	The Chief of the General Staff has made clear in the newspapers this morning that there were not enough troops to dedicate to Iraq, and that, even if there had been, the political will would not have been there. Will the Foreign Secretary guarantee that the balance of our fighting power, how and when it is deployed, and the mistakes that were made will be properly examined by the committee?

David Miliband: The whole experience will be examined, from 2001 to 2009. Precisely because nothing is ruled out and everything is ruled in, the committee will be able to do that.

Paul Flynn: rose

Gordon Prentice: rose

David Miliband: I am going to bring my remarks to a conclusion. I have been speaking for 25 minutes, and many right hon. and hon. Members

Gordon Prentice: rose

David Miliband: As I said to the hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice) at the beginning that I would give way to him later, I think that it would be unfair of me not to do so now.

Gordon Prentice: I thank my friend. I listened carefully to what he said earlier, but I am still not clear about whether the majority of the sessions will be held in public or in private. In a briefing paper circulated to Labour Members today, his office said:
	The committee will sit in private with scope for public events and hearings.
	Surely it should have said: The committee will sit in public with scope for private events.

David Miliband: I do not think that my hon. Friend has any difficulty in understanding the phrase as much as possible, and neither do I. As much as possible means that as much as possible will be in public. There will be the sifting of evidence that I have described, but when it comes to the hearings and evidence sessions, as Sir John Chilcot made clear in his letter to the Prime Minister earlier this week, as much as possible will be held in public. I am not going to put a percentage on it, but Sir John's intention is plain. He has made it clear that national security issues will prevent some sessions from being held in publicthat obviously relates to intelligence matters.

Paul Flynn: Will the Foreign Secretary clarify the answer that he gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright), who asked whether there would be another discussion on these matters and a vote? Is the only way of supporting the point made by my hon. Friend to vote against the Government amendment? The Foreign Secretary's answer was that we would have a vote today. Would he interpret a vote in favour of the amendment as a decision by the House that it is against a further vote and a further discussion on the final proposals?

David Miliband: No. I would interpret it as indicating that my hon. Friend supports the Government amendment, which says that Sir John Chilcot has set out the appropriate way in which to conduct the inquiry. My hon. Friend has been in the House longer than I have, and I certainly would not seek to prevent him from articulating his views further at any stage in the future, but I would interpret his support for the amendment as an indication that he believes, as I do, that for all the comings and goings of the past 10 days, the Chilcot approach now meets all reasonable aspirations for a comprehensive, independent, thorough inquiry into the Iraq conflict and its aftermath.

Bernard Jenkin: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: I give way to the hon. Gentleman, although I do not know why I am doing so.

Bernard Jenkin: May I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that, notwithstanding all the expertise that he has mentioned, he has not mentioned any expertise within Whitehall in relation to the considerable dislocation between Departments, which contributed to the lack of a plan at the time?
	The Foreign Secretary has not properly answered the point raised by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright), or the point about evidence being given on oath. I appreciate that he has made a lot of concessions in terms of the original proposal, but is not the present proposal for an inquiry really just a mess, and should he not withdraw it, and instead consult properly with the Opposition parties and move forward with a proper consensus?

David Miliband: I honestly think that the hon. Gentleman must have been talking too much to his colleagues during the course of the debate so far, or at least not have been listening. I think that we have clearly answered the questions that have been put. I am reliably informed that one does not need a statutory power to administer an oath, and I am happy to give further guidance on that later.
	The truth is that for two years the Government and Opposition have been agreed on the need for a Privy Council inquiry into Iraq.

Harry Cohen: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: No.

Harry Cohen: On a point of clarification?

David Miliband: In that case, I shall give way.

Harry Cohen: I just want to ask this question: will the inquiry be able to call witnesses who are not of UK origin, such as, perhaps, Hans Blix or Kofi Annan?

David Miliband: I am very happy to give an unabashed and unwavering affirmative answer to my hon. Friend on that issue, and I am sure the inquiry would take evidence from him as well, if he would like to give it.
	I was saying that the truth is that

Lynne Jones: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

David Miliband: No, I am sorry but I will not give way. My hon. Friend can speak later in the debate and [Interruption.] Well, she is not a member of the Defence Committee, which was the reason I gave way previously. Nevertheless, I shall give way once again.

Lynne Jones: All I would like to know is whether, when the Prime Minister consulted Sir John Chilcot about the inquiry, Sir John agreed that it should meet in private.

David Miliband: My understanding is that Sir John Chilcot had no objection to the announcement the Prime Minister made on Monday 15 June. He was very content with that and with the proposal that was made. In the light of the Prime Minister's subsequent letter of 17 June, Sir John Chilcot considered the best way of conducting the inquiry.
	As I was saying, the truth is that for two years the Government and Opposition have been agreed on the need for a Privy Council inquiry into Iraq, and we now have one. We have been agreed that it should be broad ranging and independent and draw on non-political expertise. That is the model that we have proposed. We also now have a widely respected chairman setting out the foundation of his approach and the balance between public and private hearings, with as much as possible in public. The result is an inquiry that can fulfil the mandate given to it of learning lessons that strengthen our diplomacy, our military and our democracy.
	The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks cannot credibly claim any fundamental disagreement with the Government about the nature, terms, scope or organisation of the inquiry, and the longer he talked about how much he welcomed the changes we have made since last Monday, the harder it became to understand why he was still making his own proposal for an inquiry. Sham outrage, and never mind bandwagonism, are good reasons to vote down the Opposition motion. An even better reason is that the Government amendment offers the country an inquiry that meets the needs of the country, and I commend it to the House.

David Heath: I should start by offering the apologies of my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) for not being present. I think that he has written to both the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) and the Foreign Secretary to explain why, for family reasons, he has not been able to open the debate for the Liberal Democrats.
	I welcome the debate; it is both timely and valuable. I also accept right from the start that it is fair criticism of me and my colleagues to say that we approach this issue with a particular mindset. We opposed the war in Iraq and none of us have changed our minds on that. I and my party have never faltered in expressing our enormous respect for the courage and professionalism of the armed forces who are deployed in Iraq, and it is precisely because we are concerned about that deployment and the equipping of those armed forces that we think this inquiry is so important. I and my party have repeatedly and regularly argued for an open, independent and thorough inquiry. What we want is not a closed, Franks-style inquiry, nor an inquiry designed to protect the former Prime Ministeror, indeed, anybody elsebut one that is capable of arriving at the facts and displaying them openly. Every time we have argued for thatwhich has been over many years nowwe have been met with a degree of prevarication from the Government; there has always been one reason after another why the time was not right to have this inquiry. Possibly the most disingenuous was that, in the very latter stages of British troop involvement in Iraq, it would somehow cause a massive diversion of military attention if we were to hold an inquiry in this country into the causes and conduct of the conflict in Iraq. It was argued that that would distract the military authorities from their role in Iraq. However, at the same time, we were massively increasing our involvement in Afghanistan. That, apparently, was not any sort of distraction at all.

Richard Shepherd: Is the hon. Gentleman not struck by the fact that in the United States there have been a number of inquiries into the war, how it came about and the processes behind it, and that some of them have been conducted in public while excluding the necessarily secret areas? Is that not in stark contrast to the reluctance of the British Government, who seek privacy in trying to resolve such fundamental issues?

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is right. In both America and other European countries, there have not apparently been the obstacles that the British Government believe were in place to an open and independent inquiry. Also, historically, a number of examples of inquiries were held while hostilities were still taking place and they were faced with no apparent obstacle to their progress.
	We finally reached the end of this stonewalling period, however, and the Prime Minister came to the House on 16 June to announce the terms of the inquiry. I think it is fair to say that Members in all parts of the House were less than impressed with what they heard from him, because he seemed at pains to stressalmost over any other considerationhow little of the inquiry would be held in public.

Clare Short: None.

David Heath: Yes, if it had been possible to hold none of it in public, I think that would have been exactly the position the Prime Minister would have adopted. That is why I found it a bit rich to hear the Foreign Secretary's contribution today. He suggested that the Prime Minister, after having told the House that the inquiry would be held in private, immediately on returning to his office wrote to Sir John Chilcot to say, Well, of course I want you to make this as open as possible, and not the other way round. Had we had proper consultation on the way in which this inquiry would be conducted in advance of the Prime Minister's statement, that would have made him look a little less foolish, and it would also have been for the good of the House. He has clearly had his mind changed for himthat is more accurate than changed his mind, I think. Had we had the early consultation that I think most people in his position would have undertaken, we would not have been in that position, but it is clear that the consultation was vestigial and inadequate.
	What we had is what we always have from this Prime Minister: he develops an idea, he writes it down on a sheet of paper in big black felt-tip, and he then announces it and demands consensus support from all Members on both sides of the Houseand, in this instance, an independent chairman of a public inquiry. When he does not get that support and he has to backtrack on the position he has taken, he does not do so openly; he does not make an announcement

John Barrett: He does not do so here.

David Heath: Yes, as my hon. Friend says, he does not do that here. He just allows it to be known that the Government have changed their position. Well that is not good enough, and in this instance it puts Sir John Chilcot in the almost impossible situation of having to undertake an exercise in post facto consultation and then to derive different terms of reference for the inquiry from those that were set out by the Prime Minister.
	One of the difficulties that the Prime Minister has had is what he said, categorically, in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg):
	We also have to take into account what serving officers will want to say to the inquiry. I think that...all those things involve a degree of confidentiality that would not suit a public inquiry.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 29.]
	That bold assertion lasted barely 24 hours before senior members of the military said what nonsense it was. I am pleased that the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks quoted Air Marshal Sir John Walker, the former head of defence intelligence, because his comment was powerful and chilling in its clarity. He said:
	There is one reason that the inquiry is being heard in private and that is to protect past and present members of this Government. There are 179 reasons why the military want the truth to be out.
	Those are 179 good reasons, and one might add that there are several hundred thousand other good reasons in the state of Iraq.

John Baron: I suggest that this episode not only reveals the mindset of the Prime Minister, but illustrates yet again the hallmark of this Government, which has been secrecy about the lead-up to the war. Even when I asked the Foreign Secretary to ensure that the vast majority of the inquiry would be held in public, I did not get a definite answer that it would be. It was an answer in which he tried to hedge his bets when it came to the exact extent to which the inquiry would be held in public. That hallmark secrecy is what the public find so distressing about this Government's approach.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is right. When in doubt, a blanket will be drawn over proceedings. We heard the quote from the briefing note, cited by the hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice). Indeed, the Government amendment is not far removed from that briefing note. The difference is that last week the Prime Minister wanted us to believe that the inquiry would be in private. Now it suits the Government to have us believe that the inquiry will be mostly in public, but I have my doubtsand I have legitimate reasons to have doubts.

John Barrett: Does my hon. Friend agree that another group of people would like to see the inquiry held in public? When the 100th soldier died in Iraq, his parents, who are constituents of mine, contacted me because they were concerned about what had happened. They too deserve a full, open and public inquiry.

David Heath: Of course they do, and I am glad that my hon. Friend makes that point. Sadly, there are grieving families up and down this country who deserve to know the circumstances in which this conflict was undertaken and in which their loved ones died. Many more service personnel were wounded, and they have not yet been mentioned.
	I want to knowand it would be nice to hear from the Foreign Secretarythe precise criteria for closed sessions of the inquiry. What is the definition of the public events, mentioned by the hon. Member for Pendle, and the private sessions? Clearly, certain classified information will need private sessions, but many of us suspect that they will be the norm for much wider categories of information. What criteria will be used to determine whether a session should be in public or private? Will those criteria be published and how will they be assessed? We need to know the answers.

Michael Mates: I hope, but I obviously cannot predict, that the inquiry will work in the same way as Committees of the House. I had the honour of chairing the Defence Committee when we were holding some very sensitive inquiries into the Trident programme. It was more or less up to the witness to say, That is a question I cannot answer in public, but I will answer in private. We would go into private session when we had finished with the public part. So the public will get an idea of the sort of questions that witnesses are not prepared to answer in public, provided they are led down that path. That should be reassuring to some degree.

David Heath: I am not sure that I am entirely reassured by that. Yes, of course, it is reasonable for a witness to suggest that material that they may wish to share is confidential, but a decision then has to be takenas it would be in a court, in certain circumstanceson whether that view is justified. I hope that the committee will be sufficiently robust to take the view that that which does not have to be heard in private will not be heard in private.
	The inquiry will be essentially an inquisitorial process. It will not be the same as a court of law, which is confrontational. It needs to be able to scrutinise and sift material carefully, and it must also follow lines of inquiry. I share the view of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks that we need to ensure that the inquiry has access to those who are expert in the particular areas that need to be explored. It may be that the panel of assessors will cover all those areas, but Sir John Chilcot will have to be exceptionally careful to ensure that it does. But I would go further. Those inquiries that are most effective have the benefit of a counsel to the inquirysomeone who is expert in cross-examination and with experience of it in courts of law or elsewhere, and who can follow a line of inquiry in a way that no lay member of a committee, however experienced and competent, can do. I strongly argue that the inquiry should have the benefit of a counsel to the inquiry to provide that expert support, in terms of identifying the necessary written evidence and guiding lines of inquiry. I hope that Sir John Chilcot will accept that suggestion.
	The power to summons is not included in the terms of reference for the inquiry. The Prime Minister has provided an exhortation to people to be prepared to give evidence to the inquiry. I hope that that takes the form of an order to members of the Government in the wider senseincluding civil servants and former Ministersto give evidence to the inquiry. I hopeand I trust that Conservative Members agreethat if there is any request for evidence from our parties, we would be prepared to provide it in person and in supporting material. There were occasions, especially in the lead-up to the war, on which contacts were made by several parties with counterparts in the US and elsewhere that are relevant to the conduct of the war and the expectation that this House would support it.
	It has been made clear that Government papers will be provided, and the Foreign Secretary was explicit about Cabinet papers today. Can he be explicit about whether that will include legal advice to Cabinet, because that has so far been officially withheld? Will it be made available [ Interruption. ] The Foreign Secretary says from a sedentary position that it will be provided, so we have broken through that final barrier, that we have been arguing now for so longthat the legal advice on which the war was waged will be available to this inquiry and will be made public. I am very pleased to have had that answer. I hope that it will not be redacted to a plain piece of black paperwe shall see.

Clare Short: Just for clarity, the legal advice appeared at the last minute in an answer to a parliamentary question in the House of Lords. The other legal advice, which was never circulated to Cabinet, came out when it was leaked during the election campaign. There was no other legal advice.

David Heath: We had leaked advice, but it is a fundamental shift of policy by the Government formally to allow sight of the legal advice to the Cabinet. I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary has made that point and we shall see whether there is any other legal advice that was forthcoming in the context of the lead-up to the war. It is relevant.
	May I move to the issue of evidence under oath? I agree entirely with those who say that the best way of dealing with that is for this House to give authority to the inquiry to take evidence under oath. This is not an inquiry under the terms of the Inquiries Act 2005. It is not a court of law. However, it is nevertheless quite open to the House explicitly to give that power. I believe that the inquiry, in any case, has the right under law to receive evidence under oath. I have been looking carefullythis might surprise some hon. Membersat the Evidence Act 1851, and section 16 is still extant in this area. It states:
	Every court, judge, justice, officer, commissioner, arbitrator, or other person, now or hereafter having by law or by consent of parties authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence, is hereby empowered to administer an oath to all such witnesses as are legally called before them respectively.
	That confers a power not just on court officials but on any person and if both parties are agreed, they can give evidence under oath. That is important because once they have sworn an oath, they are subject to the laws of perjury. That is the key point [ Interruption. ] The hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox) disagrees with me on this point, but I have advice from another learned gentleman that that is precisely what would happen. The hon. and learned Gentleman must explain to me why it would not.

Geoffrey Cox: In order for someone to be found guilty of perjuryor to be charged with perjuryit has to be demonstrated that the events were proceedings within the meaning of the common law. The difficulty about an informal inquiry that is not set up under the Inquiries Act is that it is quite likely that a court would hold that its proceedings were not proceedings of that character. Clarification is needed, at the very least.

David Heath: Clarification is certainly needed, and I am not equipped to argue points of law with the hon. and learned Gentleman, save to say that any affidavit sworn before an officer of the court is subject to the law of perjury and that certainly is not within the course of proceedings.

Michael Ancram: There is one way of getting out of this confusion, and that is for this House to pass a one clause Bill enabling the committee to administer the oath within the proceedings.

David Heath: I think that that is the case, but I am not even sure that it needs an Act of Parliament. I think that a mere resolution of this House could confer that right. I do not understand why the Secretary of State or any other member of the Government should resist such a move, because it seems so self-evidently necessary. Although I welcome the fact that Sir John Chilcot has said that he wants to specify to witnesses the need to be truthful, I do not think that that suffices in the context of an inquiry of this nature.

Menzies Campbell: I am not sure that I am going to be entirely helpful to my hon. Friend, for which I hope that he will forgive me. The material part of the quotation that he read was the words by consent. In those circumstances, if a witness came before something that might not be proceedings in the technical sense and he or she declined to give consent, clearly the provisions of the statute to which he referred would not apply. As has just been pointed out, the straightforward way to do this is either with a piece of legislation or a resolution of the House empowering Sir John Chilcot's inquiry to put witnesses on oath and, more to the point, compelling them to attend.

David Heath: I entirely agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. That is the weakness of the positionthat provision depends on mutual consentbut, of course, if a witness was not prepared to accept the provisions of an oath by mutual consent, it would be in order for the inquiry to draw conclusions about the veracity of the evidence that was then adduced.

Tony Wright: Let me try to be additionally helpful on that point. Surely the essential difficulty is that the Inquiries Act abolished the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, which required a resolution of this House. Under that Act, all the powers that we are talking about were included. Parliament has given up the ability to enforce these provisions and needs to rediscover it.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I am delighted to say to him that if he is in the House on 7 July, he will hear that a ten-minute Bill in my name, the parliamentary commissions of inquiry Bill, will be introduced that restores the right of the House to do exactly what the hon. Gentleman's Committee has recommendedthat is, to be able to set up parliamentary commissions of inquiry independent of the Executive. That is exactly what this House should have the power to do.
	It surely cannot be right for witnesses to limit their preparedness to provide evidence. That means that someone cannot breeze in and say to the inquiry, Right, I've got an hour and then I'm off to Dusseldorf. I'm sorry, but that's what you've got, so please ask your questions and then I will be on my way. Frankly, we have seen that happen when people have appeared before Select Committees and it must not happen before an inquiry.
	As has already been said, the inquiry has an enormous remit and it breaks down into various parts. I welcome the fact that it has a large remit, but I do not welcome the almost interminable delay in producing any response that might be occasioned by the size of the remit. It is important that we therefore have phasingI do not know why the Foreign Secretary finds this amusing. It is quite clear that conduct before the war is quite different from the conduct of the war, which is quite different from the peacebuilding operation. It is perfectly proper for the inquiry to consider those matters separately and in turn and to produce interim reports. I see absolutely no reason why, in the first instance, it should not consider the matters that preceded the involvement of the United Kingdom in this conflict and report on that. It does not need to take a huge amount of time from now for that to happen. I strongly commend to the inquiry that it phases its work in such a way. If we can assist by giving an indication from this House that that would be our preference, I think that we should.
	The Iraq war was, in the view of many of us, a quite massive failure of British foreign policy that was aided and abetted by those on both sides of the House who were not prepared, perhaps, to consider the evidence with sufficient assiduity. It is essential that we form a view, that we learn from experience and that we provide the truth, as far as we can, by means of this inquiry. That will help all those who have enormous concern about the conduct of the warthey expressed it at the time and have expressed it sinceall those who have been involved through the military and who have seen at first hand the difficulties, and all those who wanted the rebuilding of Iraq to take place with greater coherence of strategy and policy than was the case.
	Until we have a proper open, transparent, rigorous public inquiry into these matters, those lessons will not be learned. That is why I will recommend that my right hon. and hon. Friends support the motion tabled in the name of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks. I hope that the House will speak clearly on this matter, because I do not believe that the Government will not take acquiescence with their proposed amendment today as approbation for the inquiry that they seek. I do not believe that the matter will come back to the House again on a Government motion. I believe that this is the last time that we will have the opportunity to speak on it and we must make our voices heard.

Several hon. Members: rose

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I should remind the House that Mr. Speaker has placed a 10-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches.

Tony Wright: Following that injunction, I think that we should all try not to revisit the substantive arguments about the Iraq war, on which we all took vigorous and divergent positions. For myself, I anticipated that I would support the Iraq war. I was a great admirer of the former Prime Ministeras, indeed, I am a great admirer of the current Prime Minister, and as I will be of any future Prime Minister from the Labour Benchesbut I was also taken with the courage of his devotion to the cause of liberal interventionism and of trying to do good against evil in the world.
	I was therefore in the market for military adventure, but the problem was that I could not follow the logic of the argument. I am sure that many others shared that problem. When we talk about the inquiry, the central and abiding questions that it has to engage with are as follows: how did we get from 9/11 to March 2003? How did we get from the twin towers to the invasion of Iraq? What was the policy narrative that took us from one to the other?
	Everyone has constructed their own narratives about these events, some of which will remain forever unverified. For example, I think that we shall never know about the legality of what was done. The nature of international law is such that we shall never come to a settled view on that. We can discover more about the process by which the Government took legal advice and so on, but I do not think that we will ever settle central questions of that kind. However, I do think that what we will be able to discover will enable us to understand far better the policy process that took us from 9/11 to the Iraq war. Further questions involve what happened after the invasion, and why we had so much trouble managing the peace in the years that followed.
	The inquiry needs to tell us all that because, as has been said, public confidence in our governing process has no chance of being restored unless we can find a narrative that people can test. They need to feel that the process has at least been properly interrogated and examined, and an inquiry is absolutely essential for that purpose.
	One of the difficulties with what the Government announced was that they seemed not to understand that that would be a central purpose of the inquiry. It is, of course, absolutely pivotal that we learn all the lessons, and the Government were right in the way that they established the scope of the inquiry and its extensive period. However, to think that the inquiry would be just about learning lessonsimportant though that isis to fail to understand what its several purposes have to be.
	Inquiries always have several purposes, but a major purpose of this inquiry must be the one that I am describingto get inside the policy process so that we can begin to answer the questions that still hang in the air and so contaminate people's trust in that process. Without wanting to insert my own narrative into the events, I believe that an inquiry therefore has to be a huge process of decontamination, as it were, of the decline in trust occasioned by what happened.
	As I said in an earlier intervention, we are in a much better place now than we were just a few days ago. If I may say so, I did not feel that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's heart and mind were fully engaged by what he was telling us today. I think that I have known him well enough and long enough to know when his heart and mind are fully engaged in what he is saying. I think that he had to say what he said but, if I may say so, I do not think that he quite believed it.
	The truth isand we need to be truthful, as this is a big issuethat what has happened is an object lesson in how not to set up an inquiry. I do not say that with any pleasure, but it is simply the fact of the matter. The terms of the Opposition motion are entirely right, and the only thing that would constrain me from voting for it is the certain shamelessness on their part in putting it forward.
	With his usual ingenuity, the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) sought to explain what his party really wanted when it called repeatedly for a Franks-style inquiry. That, of course, was a private, Privy Counsellor, inquiry, but the right hon. Gentleman said that that was not what he actually meant and that what the Opposition really wanted was all kinds of other things.
	If I was confused by that, I am not surprised that my right hon. Friend Prime Minister was tooor that he might have thought that he was giving the Opposition what they had asked for. The Opposition, realising that a different political moment has arrived, now pop up and say that they were in favour of a public inquiry all along, but that is simply not the case.

Iain Duncan Smith: The hon. Gentleman's record on these matters is impeccable and I apologise for interrupting him in mid flow, but when I was Leader of the Opposition we called for a full public inquiry. That was before the Opposition adopted the present positionand, by the way, we did not use Franks as a caveat.

Tony Wright: Obviously, I was completely misled by what was said in the House at the time. I am sure that closer textual analysis would have revealed all the caveats in place then, but I am explaining why it is difficult to sign up to the Conservative motion today, even though I think that its terms are entirely right.
	I think that we have to do better with the inquiry's terms of reference; it is not satisfactory to have an inquiry with no formal terms of reference. The period that has been set out is the correct one, and there has been a statement about learning the lessons of what happened in that time, but we must do better in establishing the inquiry's formal terms of referencethat is, what its purpose is.
	Should the inquiry be public or private? Anyone who has thought about that for a moment will understand that, 30-odd years after Franks, it is not possible to announce that an inquiry of this kind on a central public policy issue could be conducted entirely in private. We have only to sniff the air to know that that is not doable any more.
	It is right to say that, after Hutton, some people will damn all inquiries even before they start. Yet the Hutton inquiry operated in public and had its own website: all the material was posted there for people to interrogate for themselves, and the sky did not fall in. Government did not become impossible, and in the present circumstances it was just not sustainableand nor should it beto announce an inquiry into the Iraq war and say that it would be held entirely in private.
	The composition of the inquiry is well worth attending to, as several hon. Members have noted. What is the best balance of expertise that will be required? How will the inquiry be conducted? There is much merit in thinking about segmenting the inquiry. The huge, dominant issue has to do with the run-up to the war and the decision to go to war, but a second issue is what happened with the preparation for after the war. What was the cause of all the trouble then?
	I can see that it would be possible to conduct the first part of such an inquiry in a much shorter time than the whole thing would need. It may well be that Sir John Chilcot will think that a sensible way to proceed, but he certainly could have been pointed in that direction.
	I want to repeat, very quickly, the point that I made in my intervention on the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), as the House needs to understand why it has been marginalised in these matters. I set out the position under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 because it inserted Parliament, albeit in a formal sense, in the centre of the process involved in setting up an inquiry. That process gave an inquiry all the powers of a High Court judge. All the procedural rules were in place, and the inquiry had all the authority of Parliament behind it. That was converted into a parliamentary resolution, with terms of reference. What we have done is to allow the Executive to remove Parliament's residual role from the process of setting up an inquiry.
	When our Select Committee looked at this, we were particularly concerned about circumstances where Governments did not want to set up an inquiry, but having one was in the public interest. In those circumstances, how could Parliament itself initiate the process of having an inquiry? For a time, that was the issue with Iraq. It looked as though the Government were less than keen about having an Iraq inquiry, and Parliament did not have any mechanism to bring one about.
	Now we have had the announcement on the Iraq inquiry, but Parliament has not been involved in the process of thinking about some of the issuesabout purpose, terms of reference, composition and so forth. That would have been the normal procedure until the previous position was abolished. I thus invite the House of Commons as part of its general project at the moment of reclaiming

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order.

Michael Ancram: I am grateful to be called, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I shall be brief, as many of the points I wished to raise have already been made, as is the nature of such debates.
	It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright). I listened to him with great care, but he was wrong on one point, when he said that he had not heard that we had been calling for some time for a judicial inquiry. In fact, the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) moved a motion on 4 June 2003, calling for such an inquiry, and I supported him on it. I moved a motion on 16 July 2003 and again on 23 October 2003, each of which called for a judicial inquiry where the proper rules of evidence could be applied. It was on that latter occasion when the then Foreign Secretary said, No, we cannot have one; it will take too long, and it will go over the election so the people will not be able to make a judgment. We also had a running motion on the Order Paper on every sitting day between July and October. We made our position quite clearwe wanted an open and comprehensive inquiry.
	If I may say so from the outset, I am a great respecter and admirer of Sir John Chilcot, who was permanent secretary in the Northern Ireland Office when I served there. I think he has tremendous ability, but we must not ask him to do the impossible. In some ways, by leaving the remit as vague and open as it is now, we are in danger of doing so.
	I want to see an inquiry that, after six years and despite those earlier calls, will finally bring closure to the issue of Iraq. We started to call for an inquiry so early not just because of the fog of war, but because of the fog of the nature of the evidence, which meant that there were disputes, disagreements and controversies about the actual truth. Although I and my partyor most of itvoted for the war, I felt that it was essential for the British people to understand what had happened. One way or the otherwhether I was right or those who argued against me were rightthe British people had a right to know. That is why it is so important that, on this occasion, we get this inquiry right. If we end up with another inquiry that leaves disagreements, doubts, confusion and upset, we will not have served the British people as I believe that we should.

Philip Davies: Flight-Lieutenant Stead was killed in the Iraq war when his Hercules did not have the proper suppressant foam. His parents, who live in my constituency, wrote to me to say:
	We would like to express our outrage... that the long awaited Iraq inquiry is to be held in private. To those of us who gave the life of a son or daughter to this conflict this is the biggest insult that he could have afforded both to them and to us. If our sons/daughters were willing to offer up their lives for Queen and country Gordon Brown owes it to them to display all the facts publicly.
	Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that for the people whose family members were killed, it is very important to hold this inquiry in public?

Michael Ancram: I absolutely agree, except obviously for particular matters where national security might be at stake. On that issue, and with respect to my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates), I hope that it is not left to the witnesses to decide what counts as a matter of national security, but that the committee itself makes that decision. I hope that the committee will apportion blame and I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary has agreed that it should be allowed to do so.
	Above all, however, I hope that the inquiry will be able to take evidence that will answer the key questions. There are so many that I cannot rehearse them all, but what was the extent and nature of the intelligence and the advice given to Ministers on which judgments were made before and the during the war? Was the equipment given to our troops during the warthis applies to the question asked of me by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies)sufficient for purpose? Were we doing what we needed to do for our troops or not? Was there ever a reconstruction plan for after the warone of the great disputed questions? In America, it is said that there was no plan; it was junked. When I asked the then Foreign Secretary about that before the war, he said that there was a reconstruction plan. If there was such a plan, why were we never told about it after the war? If there was no reconstruction plan, why were we assured before the war that there was such a plan?
	That is why the matter of evidence on oath is so important. We have already had a number of inquiries, but they have not settled those disputes, questions and uncertainties. None of those inquiries was conducted under oath. Even the Hutton inquiry, which had all the appearance of being a legal inquiry, did not have the power to take evidence under oath. The reason for taking evidence under oath is that if we are to satisfy people that they are hearing the truth, they must know that they are hearing, in terms of the oath, not just the truth, but the whole truth and nothing but the truth. If they do not hear it and if it can be shown that they have not heard it, there is a legal sanction that can be taken against the person who has misled the committee.
	If we are not to go down the road of a judicial inquiry, I say to the Foreign Secretary that we need to look very closely at the powers this House needs to give the inquiry that is set up. In my view, we need a short piece of legislation to allow this inquiry to summon witnesses and to apply the oath to them on the understanding that if anyone misleads the inquiry, the full sanctions of the law of perjury can be applied. We must make sure that on this occasion, the inquiry brings this matter to closure. If it does not, we will have missed an enormous opportunity and after so many people have waited for so long for this inquiry, I think they will feel incredibly betrayed.

Gavin Strang: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary rightly referred to the fatalities of the war, including the hundreds and thousands of Iraqis who have died. We are now debating the British intervention in the war. I shall not rehearse the figures on British deaths, but we need to take into account all the American deaths, too3,455 of the American armed forces. That figure rises to 4,318 if we include civilians, and to a total of fatalities among the coalition as a whole of 4,632. We know the scale of the military losses and the enormity of the loss of life in Iraq.
	I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) that although I recognise the scale of the civil war in Iraq between the Sunni and Shi'a and that issues of terrorism are relevant, the suggestion that those who still believe that it was right to oppose the war are in any way less opposed to terrorism than others is not at all helpful. My hon. Friend should understand that.

David Winnick: If I gave the impression that there are hon. Members who do not condemn terrorism, I am sorry and I apologise, but time and time again, those who opposed the war mention the hundreds of thousands who undoubtedly died, but do not give sufficient emphasis to the fact that those are due to terrorist action, certainly not to the killings carried out by the occupation forces.

Gavin Strang: We also have to remember that it is not just a matter of the deaths, as so many people have been injured and maimed as well.

Clare Short: Many of those who cautioned against the war said that there was a grave danger of the outbreak of chaotic violence. I think that passing off responsibility for bringing that aboutand all the deaths that flowed from itby saying that it is all due to terrorism is not good enough.

Gavin Strang: Yes, I think that there is a consensus there.
	The Government amendment makes explicit reference to the families, where it says
	recognises the importance of allowing the families of those who gave their lives in Iraq to express their views about the nature and procedures of the inquiry.
	That is fine. Families, and the organisations that represent them, are hugely important. Let us not have any doubt about the scale of the opposition to this intervention among the military. There is no question about that. People working at the Ministry of Defence demonstrated outside this place during our debates at the time. There was huge opposition in all the military services to the decision to send our troops to Iraq. I hope that in the inquiry we do justice to the families and their organisations, including Military Families Against the War.
	I have listened to the Opposition Members who have spoken with interest. The Opposition propose that the remit of the inquiry be broadened so that it goes back to 2001, and we welcome that, but I hope that there is not the slightest suggestion that the intervention in Iraq had some logistical follow-on from 9/11. The al-Qaeda presence was virtually non-existent. I say that as someone who had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee when the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, asked it to look into that issue, so I will not make too much of it. We know what happened: the US and the whole of the west looked strong after 9/11. It is a hard thing to say, but there was a sort of glow and invading Iraq destroyed all that. It was a huge boost to al-Qaeda and other forces.
	That is enough of the substance; I shall return to some of the points raised by the party leaders, who will obviously be important in the inquiry process. We certainly support the involvement of the military assessors. Obviously, all the services are heavily involved and it is important that they are consulted. We should pay tribute to the military; all the services fought for their country and anyone who dies for their countryno matter how they dieshould be treated with respect and as a hero.
	The committee membership is a bit small, however. There are a couple of historians. I have no problems about the inclusion of two historiansI was a scientist, but I recognise how important history is in determining where we are politically. We could even put another historian on the inquiry.
	The shadow Foreign Secretary mentioned that the official Opposition had managed to gain an addition to the membership after their dialogue with the Government, and that a woman would be added to the list. Obviously, I support in principle the addition of a womana member of the other place. I have no doubt that Baroness Prashar will be a diligent member of the committee, but who does she represent? She is the parliamentarian. Were the official Opposition consulted about the parliamentarian on the inquiry? Was there a deal only in terms of the sex of the person who would represent the British Parliament? Baroness Prashar will certainly not represent the House of Commons, so that issue is of interest. What is the position of parliamentarians in relation to the inquiry?

Bernard Jenkin: Excluded.

Gavin Strang: I asked the question in the context not just of our being Members of the House of Commons but of our role when people go before the inquiry. There have been quite a few losses in Scotlandin Edinburgh and elsewhereand as the Government rightly acknowledge, families will go to the inquiry. Can they take their Member of Parliament with them? Those are important issues.
	The question is not now about private or public. The concession has been agreed; the committee will meet in public and in private. It must always be accepted that in an inquiry of this nature not all the evidence and intelligence material will be put in the public domain. It is only sensible to recognise that. All the briefing and material provided in the run-up to the decision to commit British forces to the invasion was secret. Some more of that material may be made available, but no one can seriously expect that it will all come out.
	I do not know Sir John Chilcot, but I am sure he will be an excellent chairman. In fact, like most people, I do not really know any of the members of the inquiry, although we have read about them. The committee seems rather small, although we note the advances that have been made since the initial announcement and they are obviously welcome.
	The scope of the inquiry is probably fair. The Foreign Secretary made it clear that the scope has opened up across the board; the committee can pretty well look at what it wants over the whole time scale, which is importantbefore the invasion is particularly important. I do not want to rehearse everything, but there were a number of key votes in the House of Commons, including two big votes in 2003, in February and March.
	There are many important questions. Yes, this is about learning lessons. We all want to learn lessons, but we do not want a rerun of the debates and arguments. That will not help anyone. I am sure that there are people who are still as absolutely committed in their support for the invasion and the occupation, just as there are those equally committed the other way. The process is not about political point scoring. We need a report about which we can say, Yes, they really went into this thoroughly and made it as available as possible to Parliament and the British people. They made a judgment on the lessons for Parliament, which supported the Government who committed us to go to Iraq.
	The inquiry is not about getting Tony Blair to give evidence in public, although presumably that will happen. It is taken as read that Ministers will give evidence, and some of it may be in public and some in private. The issues are important. We have to be clear in our minds that we are setting up an inquiry that really will take things forward constructively.

Malcolm Rifkind: The hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) put his finger on it when he said that 30 years after Franks it was inconceivable that anyone should have thought that such an inquiry could be held in private. He knew that, I knew that and the whole House knew that, so it prompts the question why the Prime Minister was of a different mind. Given that he had months to determine the announcement he would make, why did he ever conceive that the inquiry would be acceptable if it was heard in private?
	Who did the Prime Minister consult beforehand? We know it was not the armed forcesthey have made that clear. We know they wanted to give their evidence in public. I do not say this in a partisan way, because ultimately the Prime Minister is a rational person, but one has to conclude that there was only one rational explanation for his hoping to get away with it, and the House must forgive me for saying it: we will be having a general election within the next 11 months. If it was possible for the evidence to be heard in private, the media would have no way of maintaining interest over that period. There would be interest only when the inquiry eventually reported, with the election having gone one way or the other. Now that the inquiry is to be in public, there will be constant opportunities, as witnesses come forward, to report anything of newsworthy interest. As there is no other rational explanation, I can only assume that that is what the Prime Minister had in mind.
	In the Prime Minister's statement, he told us that there were national security reasons, but of course we all know that any genuine national security considerations can be heard in private in any event, and will be, under any scenario. We were told that the armed forces would not wish to give their evidence in public, yet a series of generals, air marshals and admirals made it clear that that was not remotely their view.
	The Prime Minister then came up with a splendid remark: public inquiries mean lawyers, lawyers and lawyers. I have to declare that I do not have an interest. Although I have a legal background, I have not practised as a lawyer since 1978, and if I needed a lawyer, I would not instruct me. However, the question of lawyers depends not on whether an inquiry is public or private, but on whether evidence will be given on oath, because that is the only basis on which anyone would wish to be accompanied by a lawyer. When I gave evidence to the Scott inquiry on so-called arms to Iraq, I did not find it necessary to be represented by a lawyer. The idea that lawyers are necessary if there is a public inquiry is not remotely correct.
	As we have heard, the Prime Minister then had to go into reverse, and we have not seen such a retreat since Napoleon's from Moscowwe should remember that that eventually led to his Waterloo. Even in retreat, however, the Prime Minister was very foolish. He started by allowing his spokesman to say that the issue was not theological. He then said that the matter was for the chairman of the committee to decide, but that was not the case. The fundamental question of whether an inquiry should be public or private is for the Government to recommend to the House so that a decision may be reached accordingly, with the chairman of the committee no doubt accepting that view.
	We then saw the somewhat sad statement in a letter to Sir John Chilcot, when the Prime Minister was beginning to move ground, that it would perhaps be appropriate for the bereaved to give their evidence in public, if they wished. Perhaps they will but, as we all know, whether the bereaved give their evidence in public is the least important issue. The crucial consideration is whether those who sent the relatives of the bereaved to fight in the war give their evidence in public.

Lynne Jones: If Sir John Chilcot had been uneasy about the Prime Minister's decision that the inquiry should be conducted in private, it must have been possible for him to refuse to chair it, especially as we now hear that he has changed his mind.

Malcolm Rifkind: I am not entirely convinced that Sir John Chilcot has changed his mind. I have no doubt that, as the chair of the inquiry, he had to accept what the democratically elected Government of the day decided.
	I turn to the question of composition. I agreed with what the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang) said. I have nothing against Baroness Prashar and I am sure that she is an impressive lady in her field. However, no one with military experience will sit on the committee, although the whole purpose of the inquiry is to examine a war and the provision made for fighting it successfully. Baroness Prashar's biographical detailschairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, chairman of the Parole Board for England and Wales and director of the National Council for Voluntary Organisationsare no doubt those of an impressive person, but they are not remotely comparable to those of a former Chief of the General Staff or First Sea Lord, or a person with military skills.
	All the Government have been able to say, even when they began their retreat, is that assessors will be available to assist the committee. However, we have not heard why, in the Government's view, it is inappropriate for someone with senior, serious military experience to sit on a committee that is examining what happened in the run-up to a war, during that war and in its aftermath. It is disgraceful that the Government have not only failed in that respect, but have not even provided an explanation to the House. Although the Minister for the Armed Forces might not have the authority to do so, I ask him to ensure that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary examine the matter again, because if the inquiry is to carry credibility with the armed forces, which is as important as its credibility with any other sector of the community, it is crucial that they are represented on the committee.
	My final point relates to the question of blame. The Prime Minister's original statement was quite clear:
	The committee will not set out to apportion blame.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 24.]
	His clear intent was that the committee should reach conclusions on the facts and make statements about what happened, but not criticise Ministers, officials or anyone else involved. I welcome the fact that the Foreign Secretary set out today, at the Dispatch Box, that that is no longer the Government's position. The Government know that they could not sustain such an intolerable position. A lot of reference has been made to the Franks committee, but that was not so constrained, because it was for the committee to decide whether to criticise the Government. It concluded that it should not, but that was its decision, not one that had been imposed on it. It is highly desirable that such a situation should apply now. I cannot recall the number of occasions on which Tony Blair said, I accept full responsibility for the war, which implied a major concession, but then went on to defend everything that he had done. Let us see whether he was entitled to do that. If the committee takes the view that he was not, it would be improper to prevent it from expressing that judgment.
	The Government have moved on a number of important issues, but each time they have done so grudgingly and unconvincingly, while giving explanations that do not hold water. As several hon. Members have said, the process has been carried out not through statements to the House, but through the entirely artificial device of letters between the Prime Minister and the chairman of the committee.
	I am conscious that many hon. Members wish to speak, so I shall conclude by reminding the House of a statement made by Edmund Burke in 1780:
	If there is one eminent criterion which above all the rest distinguishes a wise government from an administration weak and improvident, it is this'Well to know the best time and manner of yielding what it is impossible to keep.'
	The Government, by both their timing and manner, show that they have a lot to learn from the wise remarks of Mr. Burke.

Mike Gapes: When we heard last week's announcement that there would be an inquiry, I had two concerns: first, about the intention that it would be held in private, on which many hon. Members have commented; and, secondly, about its scope. I welcome the Government amendment, which goes a considerable way towards answering the first of my concerns, because it makes it clear that a substantial part of the inquiry will be held in public. I hope that the relevant parliamentary committees that there is a commitment to consult will include the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee, both of which carried out inquiries in the previous Parliament and made relevant observations that could be taken into consideration.
	I am still worried about the focus and scope of the inquiry, however, and I wish to discuss the eight years that the inquiry is supposed to cover. Why does the period start from 2001? Why will no account be taken of the reason why there was a problem with Saddam's Iraq? The inquiry will have to look at that context, so it is wrong that there is an arbitrary date of 2001. I questioned the Prime Minister about that when he gave his statement. He said that it would be for the inquiry to go back, if it wished to. I make a strong plea that it does so.
	I make my plea in the context of important remarks made by the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), who said:
	May I express, on behalf of the Opposition, our full support for the action that has been taken by the Government and the United States, while regretting that it has been made necessary by the persistent failure of the Iraqi leader to keep his word or honour international obligations?
	On the same occasion, the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) said:
	Does the Prime Minister understand that he enjoys Liberal Democrat support for the action that he has taken in deploying British forces against Saddam Hussein?[ Official Report, 17 December 1998; Vol. 322, c. 1102-04.]
	Those remarks were made not in 2003, but in 1998, in support of the bombing of Iraq by British forces in December that year, without a United Nations Security Council resolution specifically to authorise it. That action was defended in this House by the late Robin Cook, then Foreign Secretary. That has to be taken into account as part of the context.
	We cannot have an inquiry that focuses simply on events from 2001 until 2008 or 2009, and that does not take account of the fact that we were operating a no-fly zone over Iraq and imposed sanctions against Iraq for 12 years. It was alleged that 500,000 children died as a result of those sanctions. The context was a policy of containment. There has to be an assessment of why, when action was taken in 2003, there was support for it in some quarters but opposition in others, including opposition from people who had been quite happy to support the bombing of Iraq without a Security Council resolution in 1998, yet who, in 2003, suddenly found that to be a resigning matter. We need that context because we need to be honest.
	I hope that when the committee calls its witnesses, it will call Iraqi Kurds who suffered as a result of chemical weapons being used against them in Halabja. I hope that it will call the democratic Iraqi opposition, and the peoplemillions of themwho were forced to go into exile by Saddam's regime.
	It is not sufficient simply to look at events in the context of the period from 2001 until now. We need to look at the issue in the round and understand why, despite all the difficulties referred tothe tens or hundreds of thousands of people who lost their lives, and the members of the coalition forces who suffered and died as a result of action following the liberation of Iraq from Saddamtoday we have a democratic Iraq where the Iraqi people can determine their own future. I hope that the inquiry will consider the issue in the round, and not narrowly focus on certain issues relating to 2002 and 2003.

Iain Duncan Smith: First, I draw attention to my declarations of interest and apologise to the Government and Opposition Front Benchers for not being able to be here for the opening speeches. I am grateful for your tolerance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in allowing me to speak in the debate. I was at a meeting with a charitable foundation that could not be changed. My apologies to the House for that.
	May I say at the outset that I fully support, and have always supported, the idea of a full, public inquiry? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram), who is not in the Chamber right now, pointed out that on two occasions in 2003, we tabled motions calling for, and we voted for, a full inquiry based on the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. A tribunal held under that Act is not allowed to refuse the public, including the press,
	to be present at any of the proceedings of the tribunal unless in the opinion of the tribunal
	and solely in its opinion,
	it is in the public interest
	to do so, for various reasons. My right hon. and learned Friend made that clear at the time. We also had on the Order Paper, in July of that year, a motion calling for just such an open inquiry, so although there is now debate between the Government and my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench about whether the terms were those of the Franks inquiry, we called for a full, public inquiry. I hope that that is established once and for all, and that we get away from this rather silly game-playing about what one group called for and another group did not.
	I speak today as a continuing supporter of what we have done in Iraq. I find that position perhaps a little more lonely these days than it was originally, but it is always best to be honest with oneself and one's colleagues. I remain of the opinionthis does not affect my reasons for why there should be an inquirythat ultimately, when we look back, we will recognise that what happens now in the middle east will have been dramatically affected for the better by what we did at the time. Of course, that is not to say that everything is therefore forgiven; that is the point of the inquiry.
	The British public have, for various reasons, come to lower their belief in and respect for politics. They feel to this day that they were never quite given the truth about what we were doing and why we were in Iraq. The question is not whether we should have gone to war, but how the British public came to understand the reasons why we were in Iraq, and so could give their consent or not. That is the importance of the inquiry. It is timewe should have done it earlierto clear the way on that, to get at least some closure for all of us, and to start rebuilding politics. We are suffering from the need to do so, as a result of other issues that have been around us in the past few weeks.
	As my right hon. and hon. Friends have mentioned time and again, and as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said categorically, the Prime Minister in his announcement last week made some very clear statements of limitations to the inquiry. That is the problem. Since then, in the past seven days, we have seen those statements unwind in front of our eyes. That is an important factor, because the issue is not just about the inquiry. We have a crisis in this Chamber. We have so given away the idea that we Back Benchers, rather than the Front Benchers, should control what is done that we have handed everything over to the Executive, whatever party is in power. I think that we are beyond the point where we can play party politics.
	The fact is that we should have sat down and considered the matter properly, and we should have come to the conclusion that in this day and age, it is not feasible, as the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) said, for us to hide anything away from the public. If we have learned anything at all in the past three to four weeks, we have learned that, now, anything other than openness simply will not wash. The days of deference and respect, and the belief that politicians behind closed doors will always come to the right decision, will no longer wash with the British people. The only way for us to clear the air is to have the inquiry fully in public. The default mechanism of the inquiry should be, Everything in public, unless, and the unless needs to be reasoned.
	I am concerned that we are leaving it to somebody who is not elected to make a decision about what the inquiry will do, which is fundamentally wrong. Have we in this House so lost a sense of ourselves that we do not want to put an elected Member of Parliament on a committee of inquiry into a war that we voted for in this Chamber, and for which all of us, myself included, have to answer? Why do we not have a politician, or two politicians, on the inquiry? Why are we so ashamed that we give way to a baroness? Whatever her credentialsmy right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea mentioned themshe is not elected. We are elected. We are the ones who have to be accountable to our electorate. Why are we not on the committee? We have nothing to be ashamed of. We should be on the committee because it would give it a cutting edge. I hope that the Government will think again about that. It would be an opportunity to rebuild respect in Parliament if somebody from this place went on that committee and made a statement about the passion that Parliament feels on the issue. That is very important.
	Beyond that, I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend and other learned Members who have said that the composition of the committee is simply not good enough. Three issues need to be looked at by the committee. The first is the reasons for the war. The hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, wants to take the inquiry much further back in time, and there is an argument for that, but I have to say that the number of people whom he wanted to be called might mean that it went on for another 15 years, and I do not think that we want to go down that road. That is a little caveat. The political reasons for the war are critical and need to be looked at. That is why we need politicians on the committee.
	The second issue that needs to be considered is the military, its equipment, and whether there were sufficient resources for the task. Without a member of the military, or even someone who was recently in the military, it will be impossible to reach a proper conclusion. Witnesses are not good enough; we need some interpretation on that committee. That is why a military person or ex-military person should be on it.
	The last issue is the aftermath and reconstruction. On that issue, we should perhaps draw on people from the Department for International Development and others who were involved. I remember that when I was Leader of the Opposition, we had a debate or two about the plans for the aftermath. The composition of the committee is not good enough. We need to reinforce it from the House and from the military.
	My second point is about the oath. We need to take back the power to set up an inquiry that has the power to take evidence under oath. I would be happy to give such evidenceeverybody should be. The public now believe that unless something is said under oath, it is not necessarily to be trusted. We must do everything we can to make sure that the inquiry's findings are demonstrably evidence that can be trusted, otherwise there will be more cries that it has not worked.
	Before closing, I make the point to my colleagues that in all this, we should default to openness. Without that, we will not have credibility. The issue is as much us and our weakness in this place as it is the inquiry. It demonstrates to us more than ever before that we need to draw back powers to the Chamber, the House and the Back Benches so that once again we stand as the elected representatives of the British people, so that their anger, fear, vexation and concerns can be represented in the Chamber. The terms of an inquiry should not be dictated by an Executive who may have political motives for deciding that it should or should not take place in certain circumstances. I hope the Government will rethink the matter.
	Ultimately, we must allow the British people to decide whether the war in Iraq was worth while, whether it should have been undertaken, and whether that was done for the correct reasons. If they can reach a good conclusion on that, respect for politicians will rise and we will have reached a point where we can close the issue and move on. Like justice, politics cannot just be done. It must be seen to be done.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Many art forms thrive as a result of warfare, but none more, as a result of the Iraq war, than the art of sophistry. The ancient art of the sophist took apparently wise and irrefutable statements which, when they are carefully examined in the context in which they are made, turn out to be utterly without reason.
	There was no better example of that than the words that fell from the Prime Minister's mouth when he announced the setting up of the committee. He said that the committee was to be set up in order that we should learn the mistakes and benefit from learning the mistakes that were made, and that they should not be made againapparently wise in itself and, in the context of what the Committee must consider and decide, utterly without meaning.
	The central issue for the committee must be whether the House and, through it, the British people were misled and deceived into support for an illegal war. That is the central issue. There are other tangential and peripheral issues that need to be considered. I also would like to know about the aftermath. I would very much like to know about the role of Halliburton and other companies in the so-called reconstruction of Iraq. I would like to know many of the things that have perplexed the House as to what has happened since the war, but the central issue for those who were here and voted or did not vote for the war and took that awesome responsibility is whether the House at the time was deliberately misled into an illegal war.
	In that essential question two things stand out above all and must be discerned. The first centres on the so-called Downing street memorandum in July 2002, many months before the war began. It is a clear minute, and it shows that our manQwho was at the time in Washington, Richard Dearlove, reported to the then Prime Minister in these terms:
	Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
	That was the clearest possible statement, which was echoed in the House almost exactly word for word, although he did not know of the minute, by Robin Cook at the time that he made his resignation speechthat what was happening was that the facts were being fixed around policy.
	That is the first thing that requires the Prime Minister of the day to go before the committee on oath and without immunity in order to be cross-examined about that, because he came to the House almost immediately afterwards and not a word of that reached the ears of those who were listening to him and were deciding on the issue of war. It is not the only internal memorandum, but it needs to be answered.
	The second matter is the legal advice that was given to Cabinet, to the House and to the House of Lords. On 7 March, the Attorney-General produced an opinion that has now, like drawing teeth, been made public. That opinion was hedged with doubt throughout on whether the war was legal. Any lawyer reading it would read both between and on the lines that the Attorney-General had the gravest possible reservations about the legality of war without a United Nations resolution. Seven days later a completely different opinion was given to Cabinet and subsequently was given in the House of Lords.
	If the first opinion had been made public at the time, it is highly unlikely, in my viewwe have one distinguished member of that Cabinet in the Chamber, and she will be able to tell us herselfthat that Cabinet universally would have voted for war in those circumstances. That is the second matter that requires investigation.
	Neither of these matters requires phalanxes of lawyers. Neither affects national security in their investigation. Both are absolutely central. They can be dealt with without months of preparation, on oath and in public. There is no lesson to be learned here. The lesson of whether or not to mislead the House is a lesson very quickly learned, and the answer is simple: do not mislead the House when dealing with the intelligence and the background to war. That is what we need to decidenot the lessons for tomorrow, but the facts of the past.
	The mistakes that were made have already been visited, of course, by Lord Butler and his committee, but he was constrained. Those who read the Butler report can feel the frustration that comes out of those pages that he was constrained in his brief by looking only at the intelligence, and not at the use that was made of that intelligence in the dossiers and the information that was given to the House. The frustration that his committee obviously felt was manifest in what he said in the House of Lords in an extraordinary departure from normal protocol, when he also said that the inquiry must be held in public in order to deal with the issues.
	In a sense, Lord Butler has no one but himself to blame because the Butler report was written in mandarina language in which Robin Butler is fluent and of which some of us have a passing knowledge, but it is a foreign language to the fourth estate. So, of course, the Butler report was taken as a vindication for what it most certainly was notthat is, the political reasons and the basis for war.
	May I have my three ha'p'orth of where all this sits in the events of the past weeks that have affected the House? One of the problems that lies behind the expenses debate is not that it has thrown up serious mattersit undoubtedly haswhich require investigation and answer. It has also been responsible for a wave of matters that are in themselves trivialbath plugs, paperclips, and the like. What is the reason for that? One reason, undoubtedly, is to portray this House in a Lilliputian light: to trivialise its very existence. That is it. If we allow that to happen, we deserve to be portrayed as a Lilliputian assembly, unable to control our own destiny.
	It is we who were misled, many of us believe, in the preparation for the Iraq war. It was this House that was misled.

David Winnick: indicated dissent.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: My good and hon. Friend shakes his head when I say that, but let us have an inquiry to find out, and then, at least, something that has passed between he and I will be laid to rest. It is we who were misled, if we were misled, and it is to us that the inquiry must answer and it is to us to set the terms of reference of that committee. The terms of reference are not in themselves a matter of deep jurisprudence, because they are perfectly simple: the inquiry should be open; on oath and without immunity. What is more, those against whom criticism or indictment may be made must be warned of that fact and must be representedyeswhen they give evidence before the committee.
	None of that is difficult to understand; it was all enshrined in the committees that were set up under Lord Salmon and the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) pointed out, was the point at which we divested ourselves of such authority. Now, we must retain it and we must regain it. That is one reason why, if the House divides, I shall be on the Opposition side, not because I wish to vote with the Tories, but because I wish to vote forforan inquiry in the terms that we require it.

Menzies Campbell: Not for the first time, I find myself in complete agreement with the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). I believe that the decision to join the United States in an illegal war against Iraq was based upon a flawed premise and has done catastrophic damage to British interests. That may well disqualify me from membership of a committee of investigation, but it most certainly does not prevent me from passing judgment on the form of that committee and its composition.
	The Government have been partially saved from themselves by Sir John Chilcot, by General Sir Mike Jackson and by the many people who have publicly said that they accepted and, indeed, wished that proceedings in which they might feature should be in public. This evening, Parliament can save the Government further by passing the motion that stands in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, because the responsibility for the establishment of the inquiry should rest with this House. Anything else is a dereliction of our duty.
	There are no precise terms of reference. That issue has been somehow brushed aside. How will we test the committee's success unless we test its conclusions against the terms of reference? There are no members with military experience. Who understands the pressures of command when sending 40,000 young men and women into the middle eastwith the prospect at least of casualtiesat the same time as following the established principle that one takes one's instructions from one's political masters? No one does, other than someone who has had to discharge those responsibilities.
	Who understands the political responsibility other than someone who has been associated with a decision to deploy British forces in circumstances where they may lose their lives or be injured? Assessors are no substitute for this reason: assessors advise; they do not decide or take upon themselves the responsibility for the decisions that are made. Parliament tonight should assert itself; it should assert itself to own the process; and it should set the conditions for the inquiry. They should include, in order to put aside any questions of uncertainty, a specific power to compel witnesses to attend and to put them on oath.
	There is now no dispute but that the most sensitive material touching on intelligence cannot be heard in public. However, we should have a presumption that everything will be heard in public unless the national interest demands it. Government embarrassment and national interest are not synonymous with each other; they are wholly separate and distinct.
	I shall set out some questions that I hope the inquiry will address. What was the then Prime Minister's motive in establishing a policy of standing steadfastly by the Bush Administration? Did the Cabinet agree with that policy? Did the Cabinet ever discuss that policy? Is it the case that by July 2002 at a meeting in Downing street, the minutes of which have been leaked, as it happens to  The Daily Telegraph, Mr. Blair was committed to military action along with the United States? Is it the case that by that meeting Mr. Blair was committed to regime change?
	When did the Cabinet first discuss military action? When did the Cabinet first discuss regime change? And on how many occasions thereafter did it discuss either or both implications of Government policy? Why did the Cabinet not see the Attorney-General's full opinion of 7 March 2003, before military action commenced? Who took the decision that the Cabinet should see only the one-page answer to a question no doubt placed by arrangement in the other place? Why did the Chief of the Defence Staff insist on specific legal advice on the legality of what he was being asked to do? Was the Cabinet advised that the intelligence assessment was that war against Iraq would increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom? If not, why not? Was the Cabinet informed that the 45-minute claim related only to battlefield nuclear weapons?
	What do those questions have in common? None raises an issue of intelligence sensitivity. They can all be asked and they can all be answered in public, and they should be so.

Paul Flynn: The main reason for my vote tonight will be based on whether Parliament is going to assert itself in this matter. I was very struck by the speech by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), the former Leader of the Opposition, on that point, but I disagreed with the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), who said that it is a matter for the Government to decide. It is not; it is for Parliament to decide. We have allowed our powers to be usurped by successive Governments.
	As a Government Member, I feel embarrassed by the bungled way in which the inquiry has been launched; I cannot think of a worse way in which to handle a matter of such sensitivity and importance. The last time that I spoke in a debate about Iraq, I took up my 10 minutes to recite the names of the 179 people who have fallen, and they are the main reason why we need this inquiry and why their loved ones are crying out for closure. There are, in the main, two groups: those who believe that their relatives died in a noble cause and possibly resent the idea of it all being churned up again; and a great grouppossibly a majoritywho are tormented by the idea that their loved ones died in vain, and that there was no reason for us to be involved in that war.
	The Public Administration Committee had those people in mind when we put up the idea, which I wish the Government would consider, of a two-tier inquiry. Yes, we could look at all the historical issues, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs suggested, but that inquiry, like the Saville inquiry, would go on for many years. It is not our job to do the work of the historians of the future; our job is to answer the question of whether we, in this House, were deceived when we took our decision in March 2003. It was an extraordinary decision, perhaps the most important of our political lives. For the first time ever, Parliament was deciding on whether we went to war. Every one of us who was a Member at the time takes the responsibility for that decision and its consequences, which included the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
	Our responsibility was not about whether the war would have taken place anyway; we know about the feeling in America, which was deluded by the neo-cons, the religious zealots and the project for a new American century. There was an idea that the country would rule the world for the foreseeable future and have a series of multiple wars, which were described in the document outlining that project. There was talk of the American army being the new cavalry, of boundaries that stretched to the great wall of China. It all seems such a fantasy now, but the Iraq war was planned on that deluded basis, and not in 2003the intention was there long before that. Sadly, our supine Prime Minister went along with it, and

David Heath: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am very sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman in the course of his speech, but it seems extraordinary that not a single departmental Minister is here during a debate of such consequence.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: As I am sure the hon. Gentleman realises, the Chair cannot comment on that matter. There is a representative on the Treasury Bench. The House will have heard the hon. Gentleman's point.

Paul Flynn: We all remember well the day of the vote itself. To their great credit, six Conservative Members voted against their three-line Whip; on the Labour side, 139 Members voted against a very tough three-line Whip. However, as has been recorded in a book by Philip Cowley, 80 other Members had already signed early-day motions or other motions against the war, but they were bullied, bamboozled and bribed into voting the other way or abstaining. If they had been told the truth on the 45-minute threat and the deceptions in the two dossiers, they almost certainly would not have voted with the Government. Many of them bitterly regret their votes now.
	Those Members, and Parliament, deserve the truth. We can get at the truth if the inquiry is divided into two tiers. The other, long inquiry into what happened for years before and years afterwards can go on. We should also have an inquiry that focuses not on whether the war was going to take placeit was going to happen anywaybut on why Britain was a collaborator in Bush's war. Why were we involved?
	To his great credit, Harold Wilson kept us out of the Vietnam war. We should have used our opportunity and voted for non-involvement in the Iraq war; if we had, those 179 brave British soldiers would not have lost their lives. The Public Administration Committee believes that the crucial issue of why we were involved should be considered first. Such an inquiry could be conducted in a matter of a few months. As we on the Committee put it:
	We recommend that consideration be given to splitting the inquiry into two stages: the first stage to concentrate on the British decision to go to war; and the second stage to consider the broader lessons from the conflict and its aftermath.
	The other point, made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) this afternoon and not answered by a Front Bencher, is whether the issue ends today. Will a vote for the Government amendment be interpreted as approval by Labour Members of the idea that the matter is over? Will it mean that we do not have to look at the decisions taken on the shape of the inquiry and that we abandon our rights as parliamentarians to decide on how the inquiry should go forward?
	I accept what Government Front Benchers have said about the element of bandwagonism on the part of the official Opposition. They are trying to score political points, and I am reluctant to vote with them for that reason. I think, however, that I will do so because otherwise I would have to give full approval for how the Government introduced the idea of the inquiry and for how they are mishandling the issue now by trying to put Labour Members into an armlock and make them agree to something to which we do not agree. We want another look at the issue. We want a substantive motion before the House, another debate and a chance to decide; as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, we decide on so little.
	The two worst decisions that this country has made in my lifetime have been to do with the Suez crisis and the war in Iraq. However, we made an awful mistakewithout there having been a Division on the matterin deciding to send troops in a surge into Helmand province. We had a debate on the subject, but in Westminster Hall. At the time, only seven soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan. As a result of the surge, there was also a surge in casualties; now not seven but 169 soldiers have died, and the number is increasing every week as part of a war that is going nowhere.
	During the brief debate, the futility of the decision to go into Helmand province was compared to that of the charge of the Light Brigade. Now more soldiers have died in Helmand than died in the charge of the Light Brigade. Surely we need to debate that issue as parliamentarians. Surely we need to say that, in respect of future and current conflicts, Parliament should assert itself. We should cry out, For goodness' sake, can you justify this war? Can you justify a future conflict, possibly led by America, against Iran or wherever else? Obama is now President of the United States, so there is hope that good things will come. The man is an intellectual, far removed from his predecessor. I believe that he has great ideals and a clear vision of world events. It is hoped that the rest of the western world will follow in the slipstream of the path that he is taking.
	This week, we parliamentarians have heard a lot about the weakness of our position. The decision that we took in March 2003 haunts many Members here now. We will make decisions in the future, but we have to make them in a way that reflects the views of our constituents. There is talk of this inquiry being similar to the Franks inquiry. Despite the problems of the Belgrano, that inquiry was into a war that generally united the nation; the nation was generally behind the Falklands war. The Iraq war, however, bitterly divided the nation, probably as no war has in our historyno previous war brought out 2 million people on to the streets.
	We saw a deluded Government, led by people who almost certainly had done a deal with the American President to go ahead with the war. As has been said, they decided to fit the facts around the policy. That was the position that we were in. We have only to look at the two dossiers to read the exaggerations, lies and mistakes. As a Parliament, we were fooled by those dossiers and the Front-Bench speeches. The issue must be fully investigated and illuminated, and that must happen rapidly.

Michael Mates: I am not going to follow the line of public versus private, oath versus no oath. Those foxes have been comprehensively shot by the strength of opinion that has been expressed on both sides of the House. I am perfectly certain that if the Government wish to survive, they will have to listen to what has been said and do something about it.
	I have had the privilege of being part of two inquiries into Iraq, first the Intelligence and Security Committee's inquiry and then the Butler inquiry. Both were constrained by the fact that it was our business to examine the use, gathering and consequences of the intelligence that we got, rather than the bigger picture. However, as I shall explain, we were shown very much more than was covered by those narrow parameters. The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) is absolutely right that there was a lot of frustration about what we had seen but were unable to report on because of the terms of reference that we had been set. That reinforces the point about terms of reference needing to be properly set by the House so that Sir John Chilcot, whom I wish well and with whom I worked on the Butler review and before that in Northern Ireland, is not in any way hamstrung by not being given adequate and full instructions and conditions under which he can do his job properly.
	I turn first to the military aspect of all this, which is probably the least complex, although obviously it is very important. The operation itself was largely successful. There will be lessons to be learned, and they can all come out. For instance, issues relating to logistics, the lack of the right equipment and equipment not arriving on time must all be thrashed out.
	Perhaps most important and controversial of all is the reconstruction phase. I remember my noble Friend Field Marshal the Lord Inge chuntering away beside me, as we were going through the motions in the Butler review, about how there had been no plan for what we did when we had beaten the Iraqis and won the war, as was obviously going to happen.

Clare Short: The military keep implying that it was the fault of the humanitarian agencies that there was no reconstruction, but if the military occupy a country, they have to prevent disorder from breaking out. That is a military task, and I underline that their trying to pass the buck as though disorder were the fault of the UN or the Department for International Development really is not good enough.

Michael Mates: That is not what I was saying. I was saying that there was not a comprehensive plan as to how to handle Iraq once the war was over. That was largely in the hands of the United States, which was taking the lead in all this, and I know that some of our Ministers tried manfully to get the US to focus on the matter. All of that needs to be examined in the Chilcot inquiry. Our inquiry saw quite a lot about that peripherally, but it was not actually our business.
	That brings me to the point that others have forcefully made. Why is there not somebody with military expertise as a member of the inquiry? It is not good enough that there are advisers, assessors or whatever we like to call them. We had an army of them behind our inquiry, but it is no good having a senior retired military commander giving advice if he cannot put pertinent questions from his own area of expertise the moment the subject comes up. That gap in the composition of the committee ought to be filled.
	I am pushed for time, because I have much to say, so I shall move on to the legal aspect. The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) asked a number of questions. I know most of the answers, because we were shown all the evidence. We had to go into the legal aspects of the matter from an intelligence point of view, and we reported on that. However, we were constrained from reporting on them other than from that point of view. I remember that when we asked the Attorney-General a specific question, he said, Well, there was no intelligence aspect to that question, so I do not have to answer it. Sir John must have a broad canvas to work on.
	I have seen advice from the Attorney-General that I do not believe the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) has seen, because it was not shown to the Cabinet. Some of it was leaked, and all of it was given to us, but we were constrained from reporting on it. That was not for reasons of national security but because if we had tried to, someone would have said that it was none of our business. That needs to be put right so that the Chilcot inquiry can examine all the matters that I have mentioned.
	Regime change loomed large in the arguments about the legality of the war, as did resolution 1441. Papers laying everything out have flown between very senior Government representatives and Ministers, which will make certain people's eyes water when they see them. Our inquiry saw all those things, and the Chilcot committee must see them and be able to report on them. Five or six years on, it is not a question of national security any more. It is about what advice was given to Ministers and what their reaction to it wasdid they accept it, or did they ignore it?
	One issue to consider is the resignation of a legal adviser to the Foreign Office, who was not content with the Attorney-General's advice. That is in the public domain, but the reasons behind it are not. That may explain why the FCO was largely excluded from the latter stages of the discussions and the decision taking, most notably when Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, met President Bush in Washington with his coterie of No. 10 advisers and Sir Christopher Meyer, our ambassador there, was excluded from the meeting. If it is not the job of Her Majesty's ambassador to be there to report from the American perspective, I do not know what is, but he was not permitted to go to that meeting. I shall not repeat myself, but we have seen the accounts of that meeting, whereas others who should have seen them have not. Sir John must be able to bring all that out.
	Why is there no one with some legal expertise on the committee? We need that sort of expertise among its members, so it seems strange it is missing from those people who have been chosen, although, like others, I am in no way criticising them.
	My last point is about the intelligence, political and machinery of government aspects that led to the way in which the decisions were taken, which we were able to report on more substantially. In fact, our comments on that were perhaps some of our most trenchant. Perhaps the hon. and learned Member for Medway did not get the bit in mandarin, because we were highly critical of the style of government that had led to no notes being taken and no record being made.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: The passage to which I think the right hon. Gentleman is referring is exactly the mandarin passage that I had in mind, when Lord Butler said that, taking everything together, the committee was surprised that none of the intelligence being placed before the Government was reflected in the statements being made. The word surprised in mandarin does not mean: Good Lord! Is that the time? It means: It is absolutely inconceivable that anything like this could happen.

Michael Mates: I will leave the interpreter of mandarin to draw his own conclusions.
	The whole UK-US relationship must obviously be examined too. There are reams of papers that explain and reveal how the two were interacting in that relationship and how that led to certain decisions being taken that, if they had been presented differently, might have been taken differently. There were crucial reports of the key moments in the decision-making process. First, there was the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President in Texas, at President Bush's ranch in Crawford. Then there was the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President in Washington from which Sir Christopher Meyer was excluded. Then there is a series of documents written by Sir David Manning, the Prime Minister's adviser on overseas and foreign policy. Those documents are crucial to understanding the way in which all the decisions were made. The press have speculated about themsometimes correctly, sometimes incorrectlyand some have been leaked. Having seen them all, I know how crucial those documents are for the Chilcot inquiry to be able to do its job properly.
	Last of all, if ever there was a war in which politicsthat is, in the decision to go to war, not the war itselfplayed such a major part, it was this one, given the political decisions taken here and in the United States. As I speak these words, I can hear colleagues saying, He would say this, wouldn't he? Why are there no politicians on the committee? That point was made very well by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) and the hon. and learned Member for Medway, as well as by others, from all round the House. The reason the Prime Minister gave us was this:
	the membership of the committee will consist entirely of non-partisan public figures acknowledged to be experts and leaders...There will be no representatives of political parties from either side of this House.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 24.]

David Davis: I commend my right hon. Friend for making an astonishingly informative speech. To reinforce his comment about politicians being involved, everything that he has described is mirrored in similar failuresconstitutional, structural, governmental and decision-making failuresin the United States. They have come out recently because of the torture issue and how legality was bypassed, so it is doubly important that politicians should be involved.

Michael Mates: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Let me finish by saying that it is rather an insult to us as professional politicians to be told by a Prime Minister that we would be partisan if we took part in such an inquiry. I had the pleasure of chairing the Select Committee on Defence for six yearsI was a member of it for 12 yearsand I chaired the Northern Ireland Committee for four years. I have also sat on the Security and Intelligence Committee for 15 years. Never, in any of those Committee deliberations, has party politics played a part, other than as a joke at the periphery. There was never a vote taken in any Committee that I chaired; had there been a vote taken, I would have considered that I had failed in my job.
	We are perfectly able to serve in a non-partisan way. More importantly, we are able to bring our political expertise to a committee that, however good and worthy it might be, does not have such expertise. Nor does it have military or legal expertise. Simply to say that it will be able to get the necessary advice from the second row of the stalls is not good enough. The question of its membership must be revisited.

David Winnick: If one consensus has emerged, it is that the inquiry should be far more public than private. If the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) is not on the committee, there is no reason why he should not give evidence to it. It is quite likely that he will wish to do so. The Government have been criticised for giving an impressionmore than an impressionlast week that the inquiry should be held in private, and they were wrong. Surely it is all to the good that they have now shifted their position. They stated something that Members on both sides of the House considered unacceptable, but they then moved. That is hardly a matter for criticism.
	Last week at business questions, I said that a committee whose remit was to look into the most controversial war that we have engaged in since 1945 should obviously not sit in private. I am sure that many Labour Members said the same thing more privately. I want to see the committee sitting far more in public, and only in exceptional circumstances should evidence be given privately. Those circumstances would have to involve security grounds.
	I would like to see a widening of the membership of the committee. I doubt that that will happen, however; I am not sure whether we can move the Government in that direction. I am not necessarily calling for Members of Parliament to sit on the committee, but it should nevertheless have a broader membership than is proposed at the moment. I also accept the obvious statement that there should be public trust in the committee. The many people who have lost family memberssons and daughters, for examplein warfare in Iraq should be able to feel reassured that the committee will try to get as close to the truth as possible in asking why we went to war and what all the consequences were. Some of the families blame the Government for the loss of their loved ones. Others, however, have said publicly that they are proud of what their close relatives have done, and that, too, should be borne in mind.
	Having listened to today's debate from the beginning, I have not heard any differences in opinion from those that were being expressed six years ago. There do not seem to have been any changes of mind. The critics at the time have put forward their point of view once again, and those of us who took a different position and supported the Government are to a large extent reiterating what we said then.
	The right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) said that he hoped that the inquiry would lead to closure. I have to say that the possibility of closure on this issue in our lifetimenot only in my lifetime, but in that of those who are rather youngeris rather remote. I said earlier that this was the most controversial war decision in 64 years, and I find it difficult to believe that the committee of inquiry will be able to change anyone's mind, no matter how fair-minded, thorough and exhaustive it might be. Those who were in favour of what occurred will remain so and the critics will remain of their opinion.
	For example, when listening to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) and my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Paul Flynn) or to those who feel as strongly as they do that the decision was wrong, it is difficult to think that they will change their mind if the committee reaches the view that, in all the circumstances, it was right for the Government to do as they did six years ago. It is a possibility, but it is very remote.

Mohammad Sarwar: Is my hon. Friend willing to concede that there are Members in the House who would accept that if the information available to them now had been available to them at that time, they would not have voted for the war?

David Winnick: Yes, I accept that some have changed their mind, but having listened to today's debate I believe I am right in saying that my hon. Friend is the first Member to say that he has changed his mind about the decision and the vote he made six years ago. No one else has done so. Members have not crowded on to these Benches to say that they regret one way or another the way that they voted. They, like me, obviously took a decision at the time based on what they believed was right.
	I will not blame my vote in 2003 on the former Prime Minister. I will not say, Well, he misled us and didn't give us all the factsit's all his fault. If only he had spoken differently, I would have voted differently. That is not grown-up politics. We are Members of Parliament. We can make up our own mind. If we believed the Prime Minister of the day was giving us information that seemed to be wrong, we should have voted accordingly.
	I asked the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) whether he stood by his vote because I wanted to find out whether he had changed his mind about how he voted. Very honestly, as one would expect of him, he said that he stood by his vote, as I stand by mine. It was a very frank answer.

Angus MacNeil: I fail to see the relevance of the argument of the vote. Quite a number of us were not Members of the House in 2003 and came in only in 2005. We were part of the millions outside who were against the war. Does it really matter how people voted six years ago? What matters is the business before the House and the inquiry.

David Winnick: I have already said that I recognise the necessity for an inquiry that should be far more public than private. If the hon. Gentleman had been a Member of the House, there is no doubt, as he has just suggested, that he would have voted against. However, few Members have changed their mind and the vote is importanthe is wrongbecause, as the critics would say, it was the vote in the House of Commons that legitimised our military intervention. That vote was crucial.
	The background to the vote in 2003 was the Saddam regime's refusal to give the impression that it was complying with the United Nations Security Council resolution on the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. In my view, that is very relevant: if the chief weapons inspector, Dr. Blix, had issued a report stating clearly that he and his team were satisfied that the weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed, there would have been no basis for going to war. Yes, he wanted more time, and I am not suggesting for a moment that he wanted military intervention then, but I am saying that, at the time, such a report was not forthcoming.
	Saddam had a history of playing cat and mouse with the weapons inspectors. We know that the weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed, but he had used them before the invasion of Kuwait. Let me say this about Kuwait: some Membersnot those on the Conservative Benches, but some of my hon. and right hon. Friendswho were so much against the vote to go to war in 2003 were equally opposed to the liberation of Kuwait. Although it had been authorised by the United Nations Security Council, and although Saddam had committed an act of blatant aggression, they opposed the military action taken in 1991. I took a very different position. Some would say that it was unfortunate that the whole of Iraq was not liberated at the time, but most of us understood the reasons why it was not.
	The accusation about regime change suggests that any reference to it must be derogatory. However, there are those who recognise, as I did, that Saddam ruled over a terrorist regimea totalitarian dictatorship, brutal and murderousand that sanctions were not working, but were undoubtedly inflicting great damage on numerous people in Iraq. That is what the critics said at the time. Not only were they against military intervention; they were against sanctions, which they said should be dropped. I had to concede that sanctions were causing great hardship. The question that arises for us is how such a regime can be changed. I entirely accept that there was no authorisation and no legitimacy for regime change unless there was justification in the form of weapons of mass destruction.

Michael Mates: I was not trying to argue either for or against regime change. What I was saying, and what I think the Chilcot committee needs to consider, is that it is illegal in international law. That is a fact. The question is, was it driving the policy, or was the policy driven by something else?

David Winnick: I do not deny that regime change is illegal. However, in 1979 both Cambodia and Tanzania were liberated from the outright tyranny of the Pol Pot regime and Amin. That was regime change, and I do not recall any Member condemning it 30 years ago. What happened in Kosovo was a form of regime change, and was outside the authority of the Security Council. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway, who is not in the Chamber now, was strongly opposed to it, but I was in favour. I urged that action be taken against Milosevic and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and I would hardly start apologising for that now. There is a problem over regime change, and how we can help people who are suffering under tyranny and murderous oppression.
	As I said at the beginning of my speech, I doubt that the inquiry will change anyone's mind, but it is crucial for it to undertake the work that it has been given.

Clare Short: In the short time that is availablelet me put on record that I still resent the guillotining of everything, and believe that it is one of the reasons for the diminution of the authority of the House of CommonsI want to focus on why we need an inquiry. I shall argue that the reasons are so profound that the inquiry must take place in public, the inquiry team must be strengthenedas has been argued, it should contain military and legal representatives, as well as a senior politicianand witnesses must give evidence under oath.
	Some have commented that we do not need an inquiry because the books have been written, the documents have been leaked, America has changed its policy, and there is therefore nothing new to be said. I agree that those who have read the books and scrutinised the leaked documents already know the truth. Nevertheless, it would be deeply shameful if the House of Commons never required an official inquiry, with the aim of putting on record the truth of why we went to war and reflecting on what that says about, first, the unreliability of the British system of government and, secondly, the obsessive focus on staying close to the United States of America, which dominates the foreign policy thinking of both new Labour and the official Opposition. Even the Liberal Democrats, despite their honourable record on the war, are not entirely free of it. That is the explanation of the error, and if we do not attend to those matters, similar errors will be made in future.
	I believe that because of the nodding donkey approach to American foreign policy right or wrong, the United Kingdom's contribution to resolving some of the complex and fearsome problems of the coming decades will be extremely limited, and I think that that humiliates us. This is an enormously profound and serious question. As I believe the inquiry will show, if we went to Iraq because we wanted to please President Bushor because Tony Blair wanted to please himthere is a danger that that error will be repeated. Happily, America, after a big semi-revolution, has changed its President and completely changed its policy, and Britain follows along with the new President. I prefer the new President, of course, but we did not even have a debate or discussion about whether we should change our policy. How humiliating is that?

Tobias Ellwood: I made an intervention earlier in which I stressed the importance of the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development and mentioned that the British forces were concerned that there might be no plan involving DFID. Can the right hon. Lady confirm that in March 2003, when she was responsible for that Department, she sent a diktat out to all the directors in the Department advising them not to get involved and not to participate in the planning, because she thought the war might be illegal?

Clare Short: I cannot confirm that date, but I can confirm that when I heard the rumourbut did not see the legal documentthat the Attorney-General doubted the legality of the war, I warned my staff of the consequences of that, which I think was entirely proper. That is part of the shame of it all, but I shall come on to the preparations. There were preparations that were then all junked, because of the hubris and deceit that went into preparing for war.
	I believe that a proper examination of the untruths, the constitutional manipulation and the outcome must lead to a re-examination of the UK's role in the world. That is a very important consequence of the inquiry that needs to flow to the House of Commons. I do not advocate hostility to the United States, of course. Indeed, I think that if we had spoken truthfully to the United States at the time, we would have been a better friend. I yearn, however, for an honest appraisal of the dangers the world and the UK face and an intelligent discussion of the contribution we could make, working with others, to the establishment of a more equitable and just world order, capable of dealing with the disorder that will come to us because of climate change. It is also my view that if we do not do better in bringing justice to the middle east, the capacity of the international system to co-operate to deal with these challenges will be broken and weakened, with desperately serious consequences for all of us.
	We need an inquiry that forces all parties and the public to face up to the fact that we got involved in Iraq because George Bush and the neo-conservatives wanted to overthrow the unpopular regime of Saddam Husseinregime changeand establish a friendly power in Iraq, so that they could relocate American bases in the middle east, dominate the Gulf and have close relations with a country that contained a large proportion of the world's remaining oil. As has been said, all of that is laid out for all to read in the documents published by the Project for the New American Century, which many of those who became senior figures in the Bush Administration had signed up to.
	Of course, the US expected the invasion of Iraq to be popular with Iraqis and therefore thought that it would help to stabilise the middle east. The only problem was that international law, laid down after the second world war under the leadership of President Roosevelt and with the support of Prime Minister Churchill, did not permit that, and thus the lying became necessary in order to do what the neo-conservatives thought to be right.
	I did not know that Tony Blair had the published documents of the Project for the New American Century drawn to his attentionthey were certainly not drawn to the attention of the Cabinetbut I think that he was desperate to be close to George Bush and worried that he would not be because of the closeness of his relationship with President Clinton, and that he therefore gave his word early on that Britain would be with him in the planned invasion of Iraq. From that, it all flows: the exaggeration of the threat from weapons of mass destruction to give an excuse for war, because regime change is not legal.
	The Butler report and the various leaks from our intelligence agencies have shown that the intelligence was being fixed around the policy. Hans Blix started out believing that there were WMD in Iraq, but when he found and reported that there were nothe reported to the Security Council what he had found, and also achieved the dismantling of large numbers of ballistic missileshe was briefed against and smeared because his truthful findings were obstructing the excuse for war.
	In the matter of international law, the neo-conservatives had no concern. They repeatedly made clear their profound disrespect for the United Nations and the constraints of international law. They wanted to keep the UK with them because the majority of US citizens said yes to war in coalition, but not alone. The UK had to pretend to respect international law, and that led to the game that was played at the United Nations. We should all remember that the UK ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, whom I like and admire enormously, gave a shameful undertaking on behalf of the UK when the first resolution was passed that there was no automaticityno authority for warwithout another resolution. However, the UK went on to argue later that the first resolution gave authority for war. That was deeply shameful.
	I remain deeply shaken by the way in which the interpretation of international law was manipulated to fit the policy. The first legal opinion, which was leaked and is now a matter of public record, was kept from the Cabinet. That was a complete breach of the ministerial code, but who enforces the code? It is the Prime Minister. The second legal opinion was concocted at the last minute by an Attorney-General who was a crony of the Prime Minister, put into the Lords by the Prime Minister and made Attorney-General by the Prime Minister.

Michael Mates: I am not following the right hon. Lady in her criticisms, but if memory serves me correctly, there were 44 meetings of the Cabinet between September and when we went to war. The Attorney-General attended only two of them. Did the right hon. Lady, who was there, find it strange that in that legal morass, the Government's legal adviser was never there?

Clare Short: All the Cabinet meetings were little chats: they were never a proper consideration of all the options. That is terrifying, but true, and it means that our political institutions are unreliable and incapable of making proper, considered decisions.
	When the Attorney-General came to CabinetI remember him coming only once, right at the endI was stunned by the opinion that he brought to the Cabinet, but I accepted that in such a matter, the Attorney-General would not bring a concocted opinion. I now know that he did, and I conclude that the arrangements that we have for ensuring UK compliance with international law are unsafe. The way in which the Attorney-General is appointed is unsafe, and our constitutional arrangements need restructuring. That is one of the important issues to which the inquiry must attend.
	It is often argued that the invasion of Iraq went well and was welcomed by all, but then went wrong, and that what went wrong, as the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood), who was previously in the armed forces, suggested, was that no proper arrangements were made for post-conflict Iraq. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that because of my doubts about the war, I prevented such preparations from being made in the Department for International Development, although how I could be responsible for US policy I am not sure. That claim is completely untrue, as a proper scrutiny of the historical record will demonstrate.
	Careful and detailed preparationsvolumes of themwere made in the US State Department. Louise Frchette, the deputy secretary-general of the UN, also made detailed preparations to bring together the international effort that would be required to rebuild Iraq. My old Department made preparations, liaising carefully with the State Department, the UN and other international actors. Then, just a couple of months before the planned invasion, President Bush passed responsibility for post-war reconstruction to the Pentagon and set up the new agency, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian AssistanceORHA. All the State Department preparations were junked. There was no liaison with the UN or with the international community.
	At the time, Andrew Natsios, then head of the US Agency for International Development, said that the danger in post-war Iraq would be chaos, and if we sacked everyone in the Ba'ath party, no institutions would function. He said that it was crucial that only the top people went and everyone else was left in place. That advice was wiped away and we got exactly what he predicted. That was incredible. In the run-up to the war, I thought, This cannot happen in a nation like the USthey have Harvard, Yale and Princeton-educated people. We cannot make such an error. But the hubris was such that it was believed that the invasion would be welcomed and that there was no need for international co-operation. Because of the deceit that went into the purpose of the war, we got the chaos of the aftermath.
	These are serious matters, but they are the true record of what happened, and the inquiry must bring them out. Britain must decide what sort of country it wants to be. Do we want to adhere to international law, or do we want to junk it? Israel is junking international law in the occupied territories. Do we want a future in which international law no longer has any authority? It would lead to chaos and instability.

Iain Duncan Smith: I am grateful to the right hon. LadyI do not think that she will lose any time by taking this intervention. On one of the big questions about the row between the State Department and the Pentagon and what was going on at the White House, was she aware at any stage that the Government made strong overtures about what was going on explicitly to require that a different system be put in place after the war in Iraq? I could never quite understand what our influenceor lack of itwas in the whole process. We had a vested interest in getting it right, but somehow seemed not to have any view on it. I am not saying that the right hon. Lady did not, but that officially the Government seemed to have no view on that point at that time.

Clare Short: The answer is that because this was being drivenI am running out of timeby the Prime Minister on the phone to the White House, British systems were breaking down. One part of the Government was giving that advice, and another was not.
	My final point is that because of the deceit, proper consideration was not given to all the policy options. There were other ways of bringing down Saddam Hussein. We could have got rid of the sanctions, or indicted him like we did Milosevic and let the Iraqi people help to do it. None of the other options were considered. This is a disgrace to our history and it shows that our institutions do not work. We need an inquiry that will lay out everything from which we can learn the lessons about decision making and our role in the world, so that we never ever again engage in such actions, which have left terrible destabilising effects on the wider middle east.

Gordon Prentice: I remember being here on 15 June, when the Prime Minister made his statement on Iraq. I felt angry and upset, and I told him and colleagues that a secret inquiry was not acceptable. Why did I say that? The previous Thursday, I attended a seminar held under the Chatham House rule with my friends for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) and for Newport, West (Paul Flynn) and other colleagues in the Public Administration Committee. A galaxy of stars were there: Lord Hutton, Lord Butler, Geoffrey Howe, Lord Hurd, and the Conservative academic and constitutional expert, Lord Nortonpeople like that. The seminar concluded and, because I know how things work, I came across from that seminar in Portcullis House and tabled a question in the Table Office. My question to the Prime Minister was whether he
	will make it his policy to consult...the leaders of opposition parties represented in the House and...the Chair of the Public Administration Select Committee before announcing...the terms of reference and...the composition of an inquiry into the Iraq war?[ Official Report, 18 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 452-453W.]
	I got a big raspberry a few days later, on Monday.
	To this day, I do not know what persuaded the Prime Minister to take the line that he did. If he had consulted with colleagues in all parts of the House, consensus would have emerged and we could have gone forward. What are we trying to establish? We are not trying to put Tony Blair's head on a pikestaff. We are trying to establish the truth. In the Public Administration Committee's report, which Members will have read, we go on to say that apart from establishing the truth, we want to
	ensure that the executive can be held properly accountable for its decisions and conduct in relation to Iraq.
	That is what we wanted.
	We were trying to get consensus on the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry into Iraq because we knew that, until very recently, the Government did not want to act. They did not want an inquiry into Iraqit was a radioactive issue. That is why we, as a Select Committee, came forward with our proposals. No. 10 and the Government knew exactly what we were doing. They knew about the seminar and the meetings we were having, but despite that we got the crass statement from the Prime Minister on that Monday.
	What did we want as a Select Committee? In our report, we called for a debate and a free vote in the House of Commons on the proposal for an inquiry. I will vote with the Government today if Ministers can tell me that there will be an early occasion when they put a substantive motion before the House on the inquiry's terms of reference. That motion should set out its membership, composition and so onin other words, all the matters of concern that have been raised in the debate. If I get that assurance in an hour or two's time from the Front Bench, then I will vote for the Government: if not, I will vote with the Conservatives.
	I have one or two other points to make that have been prompted by what has come up in the debate. Clearly, we need evidence to be given on oath. Until the Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) spoke, I did not appreciate that the inquiry as currently constituted may not have the power to require people coming before it to swear an oath. That needs to be cleared up.
	My friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) spoke about the legal advice. Of course, we did not get the full legal advice until 2005, two years after the conclusion of the war. The minutes of the crucial Cabinet meetings of March 2003 need to be released, but so do the notes that were also taken at those meetings. I have discovered that two sets of notes are taken of what is said at Cabinet meetings. They are, presumably, distilled into formal Cabinet minutes. We need all that information.
	It is absurd that an inquiry into our biggest military engagement since the second world war does not feature a senior military person. I was completely gobsmacked to read that the head of the Army, General Dannatt, had not even been consulted by No. 10 on the terms of reference.
	We should also encourage civil servants who feel that they have something new to say to step forward, and we should give them all the protection that they need to speak candidly and truthfully. I say that because the PAC held a sitting on leaks and whistleblowers back in March, at which a Foreign Office diplomat, Carne Ross, appeared before us. He was our man at the UN for four and a half years and is an expert on the middle east and Iraq. Talking about the experience of many people in the civil servicein the bureaucracyhe said:
	There are many other people involved who have yet to tell their story...There are many documents that should come to light.
	That was said by a civil servant on the edge of great things who resigned from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because of what he felt was mendacity on the part of the Government.

Iain Duncan Smith: I want to follow up on one point about which the hon. Gentleman has not spoken. I and others noted earlier that the political representative on the committee is from the other place. Does he think that an elected Member of Parliament or two should be on the committee, so that the opinion of the Chamber can be represented? After all, we voted on the matter. Why should someone from the other place be our representative?

Gordon Prentice: I could not agree more about that. Indeed, my friend the Member for Cannock Chase said in a letter to the Prime Minister:
	There needs to be a process of engagement on the inquiry's purpose, terms of reference, membership and procedures...it would be appropriate for the Government to seek formal parliamentary endorsement of the inquiry's terms of reference and membership.
	We need that, because that would cover the point about senior parliamentarians having an input. It would also deal with the point that I and others have made about the committee having a place for a military person. That person should not be below the salt as an assessor, but a full member of the inquiry team.
	One final thingor have I had a final thing already?

Jeremy Corbyn: There are no limits in Parliament to final things.

Gordon Prentice: My views will not be changed by the Minister's big, broad smile, but I want to say something about documents. I attended a meeting a week or 10 days ago that was addressed by Philippe Sands the human rights QC. He spoke about a note from President Bush to the former Prime Minister Tony Blair on 31 January 2003. President Bush allegedly said, Put up the planes; fly the planes over Iraq; paint them in UN colours, and when Saddam shoots them down, that's the pretext to go to war. I do not know whether that is fantasy land, or even whether that document really exists, but the inquiry should be able to subpoena all the documents, if that is the expression; it needs to get to the truth.
	Let me restate my central point. I want the Government to concede and to bring forward a substantive motion allowing the House to consider the new terms of reference and the composition or membershipcall it what you willso that the House can vote on it and give the inquiry its parliamentary imprimatur. If I do not get that, I will vote with the Conservatives.

George Galloway: With respect, Mr. Deputy Speaker, 10 minutes of most Back Benchers is more than enough, but there are odd occasions when it is not enough. The speeches of the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) who has vast experience and of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) should have been extended. They were extremely important to this debate and this 10-minute rule should give you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, the flexibility to allow a moment or two for important, decisive speeches in a debate. I have now given away 30 seconds of my time, but I thought that that was worth saying.
	The Government just do not get it. That is evident again this evening from the languid complacency with which the Foreign Secretary spoke, which led the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) to say that he felt that the Foreign Secretary's heart was not in it. It is evident from the period of time when there was not a single Government Member on the Front Bench and from the body language of the two Ministers who now are on it when the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood was speaking. They were sneering and nudging, utterly oblivious to the fact that her speech will be listened to and read by millions tomorrow and given real weight, while what they have to say will be treated, if they are lucky, with derision.
	The Prime Minister's initial prospectus for this inquiry proved that the Government just do not get it. When, in 2005, I was elected as the first left-of-Labour Member of Parliament in England for 60 years, I was elected because of Iraq. The Labour party's membership has halved because of Iraq. Millions of Labour voters have left them and new partiessome of the left and some of the rightare proliferating and strengthening, in substantial part because of Iraq. That has happened not directly, but indirectly because of the poison that the Iraq question has caused to pulse around the British body politic. The lack of credibility of the British political class has also been the result of Iraq.
	The Government still do not get it. If they did, they would have used this opportunity for a grand catharsis, to turn the page and finally leave Blairism behind and call for the kind of inquiry that has been repeatedly demanded in the House this evening.

Jeremy Corbyn: Will the hon. Member also concede that it is not just British politics that has been changed and shaped by Iraq, as the issue has had an effect across Europe, all over the world in respect of the anti-war movement, but also particularly in the United States? For all his support for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama basically owes his position to his opposition to the Iraq war and his initial victories in the Democrat primaries because of that opposition. American politics has also been delineated by Iraq.

George Galloway: Indeed. There has been a holding to account in the United States of Americathere has been catharsis. Those responsible for the disaster have been cleansed away and there is the sense of a new beginning.
	Of course, we do not have that option. Some of us recall only too vividly the iron-clad consensus between those on the two Front Benches in the run-up to the war. The then Leader of the Opposition differed from the Government only in that he wanted the war faster, and more brutal and overwhelming. We have no chance for that catharsis, because either Tweedledee or Tweedledum will rule the country when the general election comes. That is a disaster for us, and it makes the inquiry much more important than it might otherwise have been. That is why we ought to have a real inquiry.
	I am a founder and the vice-president of the Stop the War coalition, which organised the demonstrations of millions that have been referred to this evening, so the House must forgive me if I am a little more rebarbative than some of the politesse we have heard today. I seek to speak for the millions who were on the streets of this country.
	People have queued up to say they have nothing against the membership of the inquiry. Well, I do. The more the Foreign Secretary adumbrated their distinguished characteristics, the more I saw a parade of establishment flunkeysSir Humphrey This and Sir Humphrey That. Those who are not just grey blurs are in fact partisans. Freedman is one of the authors of the intellectual case for the war. He and his neo-con friends were the people who made the then Prime Minister's bullets for the war. Gilbert hailed Bush and Blairimagine, they are already two of the most discredited political figures in the world, and history has not even started on them yetas akin to Roosevelt and Churchill. Yet both Freedman and Gilbert are among the very small group of people who will conduct the inquiry.
	Why can we not have real politicians on the inquiry? Why cannot the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews)forensic, learned, legalbe on the committee? Why cannot the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), with all his experience, skills and training, be on the inquiry? Why cannot the former Foreign Secretary Lord Hurd, with his vast knowledge of international affairs, be on the inquiry? Why should Parliament be represented by a woman I have never heard of? I have sat in this place for 23 years, and I doubt whether anybody here, other than those with the privilege of knowing the lady personally, could tell us anything that she has ever done. How can she represent Parliament in this great debatethis great inquiry? There are no military men, no men or women of legal eminence and no politicians except a non-political peeress of whom none of us has heard. This inquiry team has no credibility out there among the public.

Gordon Prentice: rose

George Galloway: I cannot give way, because I shall lose the timeI have no extra time. I am sorry. The House must forgive me; I am one of those who is worth more than 10 minutes. I cannot give way[Hon. Members: You can.] In that case, I apologise. I give way.

Gordon Prentice: I think it is completely out of order for the hon. Gentleman to traduce Baroness Prashar from the other place. She was a distinguished civil service commissioner. Just because he has not heard of her does not mean that colleagues elsewhere have not.

George Galloway: Quite so. A distinguished civil servant, just as Mr. or Lord Chilcot, Sir Chilcot or whatever he is called, is a distinguished former permanent secretary. That is the point. How very British. How very Yes Minister. How very Sir Humphrey. This has to be a real inquiry, of the kind the Americans would holdwith forensic experts on it who can root out the truth.
	Some of the stuff we have heard this evening has been almost laughable. The Foreign Secretary said that he cannot put a percentage on which parts will be in public and which in private. Well, given how loth most people in the country are to believe anything the Government say, that ought to be a significant warning signal. They say that Chilcot can look at the scope for making people take oaths, but without oaths the whole thing is meaningless. Tony Blair is right that he answers questions on Iraq all the time. It is the truthfulness of the answers that is the problem, not the fact that he has the brass neck to answer. His problem is the punishment that he would have to face in this life if he answered questions untruthfully under oath. This is not worth the paper it is not written on unless there are legally enforceable powers to subpoena, to bring witnesses and documents, and to force people giving evidence to do so under oath.
	The reality is that some of us smell a crime in this whole affair. That it was a blunder is now conventional wisdom, although one or two almost extinct volcanoes on the new Labour Benches are still prepared to chunter about how proud they are of an enterprise that killed a million people, that killed hundreds and maimed thousands of our own people, that radicalised and fanaticised hundreds of millions of Muslims throughout the world, and that caused fanaticism to come to our very own country and harm innocent people in London, including in my constituency. Although a few semi-extinct volcanoes are prepared to identify themselves with what they did, that this was a blunder is a conventional wisdom that is shared if not in this building, then among the vast majority of the population as a whole.
	Some of us say, to reverse Talleyrand, that this was worse than a blunder; it was a crime. If the inquiry is to mean anything, it will need to be able not only to apportion blame but, if blame is apportioned, to signal what legal avenues should be pursued. I know that we do not like that sort of thing in this countrythings are usually swept under the carpet and finessedbut this is new territory. Events such as the expenses scandal have left the country seeing our House with such odium, and this country's political class so naked, that the old ways will not do. If the inquiry finds people guilty of misleading Parliament, the Queen, the armed forces and the public, they will have to be held accountable. There will have to be a trial, which will have to be held under oath, and that will lead to punishment if there are convictions at the endnothing less will do.
	We can faff about here in our parliamentary way, with fey exchanges between those on the two Front Benches, but that will not cut any mustard out there [ Interruption. ] It will not cut any mustard with the people who were against the war in their overwhelming number in constituencies such as that of the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), who is speaking from a sedentary position. They will be looking to see whether she votes to continue the cover-up, or votes for the kind of candour that will be required to return credibility to the House and our political system. This does not cut any ice with the millions of people who used to vote Labour but can now hardly think of themselves doing so again, even when the alternative is the rancid hypocrisy of Conservative Front Benchers.

Mohammad Sarwar: I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak in this important debate, which is of great interest to my Glasgow constituents, the British public and the wider world.
	I remember that the House was told that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that he could launch nuclear missiles at 45 minutes' notice. We were also told that he had links with al-Qaeda, but we now know that the only link was that al-Qaeda tried to kill him. We were given those reasons for going to war, but what we have learned since then has proved our fears and concerns right.
	I remember attending an anti-war rally in Glasgow that was one of the biggest rallies in the history of Scotland; 70,000 people participated in it, and they were all angry. They all felt that the war was unnecessary, unjustified and probably illegal. I also saw more than 1 million people marching on the streets of London, opposing the war. The inquiry must answer the question: why did the British public better understand the crisis and get it right, while our Government got it so wrong, despite having access to both UK and US intelligence services reports, on top of several UN reports, including the investigation by the respected Hans Blix?
	The inquiry must help to answer the unanswered questions raised during the years of the war. It must be an inquiry unlike any conducted before, with full access to all Government papers and the ability to call any witness. Crucially, it should be fully independent of the Government, and its remit should cover more than just the period of conflict; it should also cover the periods that led up to it and followed on from it. I welcome the indication from the Prime Minister that that will be the case.
	The proposed inquiry has been severely criticised on the grounds of timeliness, committee membership, and transparency. With regard to timeliness, although the committee is not due to report back for a whole year, I firmly believe that a job as large as the one that it has been tasked with is not something that we can afford to rush into. After all, we have already seen the terrible consequences of having rushed into the war. I am sure that no one will argue that it is in the interests of the House or the public that the committee should be hindered in any way while conducting as detailed and as accurate a report on the Iraq war as is possible, least of all by having unnecessary time constraints imposed on its work.
	With it initially having been proposed that the inquiry should take place entirely in private, it is the issue of transparency that has attracted the most debate, both within and outside the House. I accept that it is difficult to strike a balance between the interests of transparency on the one hand and national security on the other. None the less, I share the concerns of hon. Members on both sides of the House who have called for a presumption in favour of proceedings of the inquiry being held in an open and public manner.
	The inquiry represents a vital opportunity for the people of Britain to come to terms with one of the biggest foreign policy mistakes made in their namean opportunity that we simply cannot afford to miss. Crucially, the inquiry should not only highlight our interests, but show a genuine interest in the well-being of the Iraqi people. It is not enough to analyse what went wrong during the war, nor is it enough to report on its aftermath. The only way for so detailed an inquiry to be truly beneficial to this House is for it to include recommendations on the various ways that we as a nation can help to improve the living standards of ordinary Iraqi citizens. The inquiry must look at the huge humanitarian problems created, such as the millions of refugees who were forced to flee to neighbouring countries, the terrible human rights abuses that occurred in Abu Ghraib and the alleged cases of extraordinary rendition. I cannot stress how important it is for all those issues to be investigated as part of the inquiry. We cannot allow them to overshadow all the good that has been done in Iraq with regard to humanitarian assistance, infrastructure and economic projects, and, most importantly, democratic government for its people.
	I welcome the debate today brought by the Opposition, but they should also be asking serious questions of themselves. Although I recognise that it was a Labour Government who took us into war, let us be under no illusion that while 139 Labour MPs opposed the war, the Tories almost unanimously supported it. The Leader of the Opposition has already stated that, even knowing what he knows today, he would still have gone to war with Iraq. The motion alone will not hide their complicity in the conflict.
	The inquiry must also look into the so-called special relationship between the UK Government and the Bush Administrationa relationship that made us look like we were blindly following Bush into a conflict on which he had already made up his mind. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice once said on the issue of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that our answers to these threats will determine the stability of the world for years to come, and he was right. Those choices have affected the world and will no doubt continue to do so, as this war will be remembered by all as having been waged without just cause, against the wishes of the international community, particularly the Muslim world.
	There is no doubt that one of the consequences of going to war is an increased risk of terrorism, the effects of which we have already seen in our country with the 7/7 bombings. The inquiry must help to break the propaganda used by radical groups to incite hatred against Britain and British people.
	The inquiry must be an opportunity for the Government to show that they recognise their mistakes, that they are willing to apologise for them and, most importantly, that they have learned the lessons. The fear that many opponents of the war will have is that the inquiry will again be some kind of whitewash. The inquiry must begin to rebuild the trust and respect of the British people in the Government, and the trust and respect that we once held in the international community.

John Baron: The justification used by Government and others since the war has been varied. We have heard explanations that Iraq is a much better place, and that there was a need for regime change, despite the fact that regime change is illegal under international law. But we cannot get away from the fact that the main justification for war at the time was weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore blatantly obvious to the majority of people outside this place, if not in this place, that we went to war on a false premise. There were no weapons of mass destruction. The reason why the UN weapons inspectors could not find such weapons is that they did not exist.
	I mention that for two reasons. The inquiry should focus on how the decision was made to go to war, given the lack of concrete evidence as to the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Also, I agree with other Members when they say that the Government simply do not get it. They have completely missed the point. Outside this place, there is a real sense of anger and of betrayal that the country and Parliament were misled when it came to justifying, at the time, the case for war. That sense of betrayal and anger has been reinforced by what is now, subsequently, seen as the enormity of the folly.
	There can be no doubt that Iraq was the biggest foreign policy disaster since Suez. It was flawed in conception, execution and legacy; it brought about the death and/or displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq; it radicalised parts of the Muslim world against us to the extent that it has increased the risk of terrorism against residents of this country; and it brought about, within Iraq, the penetration of al-Qaeda, which had not been a presence there prior to the invasion. The west has suffered an historic loss of political and moral prestige, not just through the invasion, but through such issues as Abu Ghraib, which has not helped our cause.
	Last but not least, the enormity of the suffering that the death or injury of so many of our troops has caused is now clearly focused in people's minds. The troops did everything that was expected of them; my hopeour hopeis that the inquiry will explore whether Parliament did everything that was expected of it. It must not only find the truth, but be seen to find the truth. That is why I, for one, believe that only a fully public inquiry will purge that anger and sense of betrayal, which is so keenly felt outside this place and in this Chamber.
	I believe that there cannot be any private sessions. History shows that sessions in secret do not necessarily reveal the truth; difficult questions do not get answered. A clear example is the 45-minute claim. At the time, the then Prime Minister made great play of the fact that our forces were within 45 minutes' striking reach of chemical weapons. We still do not know to this day how that claim was inserted in the dossier itself, but we do know that the intelligence services did not think that the evidence and intelligence warranted the claim's inclusion in the draft dossiers leading up to the first official draft dossier of 10 September 2002, when it was included.
	We do know also that at a meeting on 9 September 2002, spin doctors were present, and that, subsequent to it, the 45-minute claim was included in the draft dossier. When the Foreign Affairs Committee asked questions in 2003, the evidence was taken in private and, during the course of that and subsequently, the Government requested that the names of the spin doctors be deletedor redacted. We still do not know to this day whether it was spin doctors

Andrew MacKinlay: Or spooks

John Baron: Or spooks who actually upgraded the 45-minute claim and made sure that it was an integral part of the dossier.

Barry Gardiner: rose

John Baron: I shall take an intervention, because I think that I get an extra minute.

Barry Gardiner: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman and shall be as quick as I can. Does he recall that on the afternoon of 10 September 2002, the  Evening Standard, in response to that dodgy dossier, made it quite clear that that information had previously been in the public domain through the International Institute for Strategic Studies and was not worth the paper that it was written on? In the subsequent six months to March the following year, therefore, it did not form the case that we decided upon in this Chamber on the 18th of that month. That was not the case at all.

John Baron: With respect, I think that the hon. Gentleman has missed the point; the point is that the intelligence services themselves did not think that the issue merited inclusion in the dossier. At the meeting of 9 September, at which spin doctors were present, the decision was made to upgrade the claim, despite the lack of evidence. The strongest word that the intelligence services could bring forward was indicatesin other words, there were indications. That was vastly firmed up and included in the dossier after that meeting.
	However, we still do not know what happened for sure, because the sitting took place in private and names were redacted. That is why I firmly believe that there should be no private sittings during the inquiry. If we do not know what the questions are and we get answers that are largely redacted out, that will not satisfy the public anger and sense of betrayal about the war and the reasons why we went to war. If the Government are to purge that sense of betrayal, they have to do everything that they can to put the sittings into the public domain. Even written parliamentary questions to the Cabinet Office about who was responsible for including the 45-minute claim met a blank refusal. We want to know the answers, because the claim was an integral part of the case for war at the time.
	There are two key questions that the inquiry needs to answer about how the decision to go to war was made. The first is about how the entire political structurethe system, the constitutional arrangementsfailed to check the deluded ambitions, folly and hubris of one man. The second is about how the evidence of weapons of mass destruction came to be so exaggerated.
	We all know that war should be the weapon of last resort, but on this occasion it was not. Why were the UN weapons inspectors not given more time? Many believe that the decision to go to war was taken well in advance of our vote in this place in March 2003. Many papers are availablesome have been alluded to in this debatethat suggest that the decision was made by President Bush and the then Prime Minister Tony Blair back in April 2002 in Crawford.
	There are minutes and briefing notes for Ministers with regard to that meeting, dated July 2002, that clearly make the point that the decision had been taken and that the question was about how it would be justified to the public. The point that the then Prime Minister was making was that he had to justify the decision and that the WMD claim was perhaps the route to take. Those documents have never been denied by the Government. Again, it all begs the question how the political system and constitutional safeguardsparty control, collective government, parliamentary democracy itselffailed so spectacularly on that occasion.
	The other issue on which the inquiry should remain firmly focused is how the evidence was sexed upto use that unfortunate phraseonce the decision had been taken. We must remember that previous inquiries did not fundamentally address that point. The Hutton inquiry, for example, cleared the Government of sexing the evidence up because it believed that the dossier was at all times under the control of the Joint Intelligence Committee. However, all the evidence since, which we have had to drag from the Governmentthrough freedom of information requests or the intervention of the Information Commissioneris that spin doctors were at the very heart of the drafting process.
	The fact that a spin doctor produced the first full draft of the dossier, one day before John Scarlett's official draft of 10 September 2002, is evidence of that. Scarlett himself acknowledges that he had considerable help from John Williams, the senior press officer at the Foreign Office at the time. Such questions need to be answered by the inquiry. But they will not be truly answered, and the sense of betrayal cannot be purged, unless the inquiry is made fully public.

Alan Simpson: I welcome the fact that there is going to be an inquiry, but I share the feeling expressed by other hon. Members that in reality, it is not the Prime Minister who is on trial in this debate but this House. I am quite happy to acknowledge that the terms of reference that the Prime Minister has set are unnecessarily and unhelpfully restrictive, both on the membership and make-up of the inquiry team and on its remit. However, it will be down to this House to determine whether we collectively are willing to run with something that, at the end of the day, will only add to the discredit and disbelief among the general public about the standing of the House. It is we collectively who are on trial, and I hope that Members will think carefully about that when they decide how to vote on the motion.
	My own belief is that the terms of reference of the inquiry are both too narrow and too wide. I agree with the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) that we could quite legitimately separate questions about the conduct of the war once we were in Iraq from questions about how we came to be involved in that war in the first place. It does not help any of us for such a wide remit to be set that it becomes impossible for the committee to report before the next general election. It is crucial that clarifying how we came to be involved in the war in the first place is the central issue under investigation.
	I find it absolutely incredible that the terms of reference should have been set so that the committee is to be precluded from either making recommendations or attributing blame. It is as though there were to be an inquiry into the great train robbery but no one could be found guilty of it, prosecuted or sent to prison. It is absolutely astonishing that the committee should be manacled in that way even before it starts.

Jeremy Corbyn: Does my hon. Friend accept that that is actually a self-defeating exercise? Unless the inquiry can attribute blame and point in the direction of legal liability for the war, the demands for an inquiry will not go away. They will become stronger and stronger, and the next Parliament and the one after that will have further inquiries. It will go on until the truth is found.

Alan Simpson: I think that is the case, and it will confirm to the public that everything this House did not want to know in 2003, it does not want to know now. If we set the terms of the inquiry so narrowly that it cannot carry out the rigorous forensic investigation that is required, it will be subject to the ridicule that it deserves.
	I remind the House of some of the inconvenient elements that were already in place in the run-up to the war in 2003. I pay tribute to many of my hon. Friends, some of whom are in their places, who at that time formed Labour Against the War. It was to demonstrate in the Chamber that there was not a consensus in the Labour party that endorsed the country being bounced into an illegal and immoral war.
	It was under the auspices of Labour Against the War that we brought into the Palace of Westminster several of the key international players who ought to have informed our debate. Dominique de Villepin was here, and he set out the French perspective. Scott Ritter, a former head of the United Nations Special Commission weapons inspectors, came here and set out what the inspectors already knew about the destruction of both Iraq's capabilities and its potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction. He gave UNSCOM's evidence to Members who were interested. Denis Halliday, the UN humanitarian co-ordinator, came and told us what a devastating mess we were already making in Iraq and how disastrous it would be to compound that error.
	On the eve of the publication of the Government's dodgy dossier, those of us who had the temerity to do so produced a counter-dossier, which was Labour Against the War's case against the war in Iraq. It set out the degree of international evidence available that contradicted all the claims that were coming out of Downing street. The inquiry therefore needs to address how, in the face of that evidence, this House could be bounced into a war of choice.
	A number of hon. Members have referred to the importance of the availability of the legal advice at the time. However, it is not enough to have access to the legal advice; it is also important that the memorandums and notes of meetings should be available. Two of those memorandums that have already been widely leaked have been mentioned. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) referred to the secret Downing street memo produced on 23 July 2002 by David Manning and Matthew Rycroft, the Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser at the time. My hon. and learned Friend cited the comments by the head of MI6 about the need to fix the facts around the policy. However, I was far more interested in the comments made by elected Members of this House at the meeting described in that memorandum.
	The then Foreign Secretary, for instance, said:
	It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
	In an attempt to be helpful, the then Defence Secretary said that
	if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early.
	Even at that time, however, the Attorney-General said that
	the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action.
	In conclusion, however, the then Prime Minister said:
	If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had a political strategy to give it the space to work.
	For the Prime Minister, the question was not then, and perhaps never was, whether the war was legal. It was not then, and possibly never was, whether there were weapons of mass destruction. The question was: can we manufacture the case for a war, in order to con the country, the Cabinet and the Commons into endorsing that plan? That absence of legality and the cynical manipulation of a case for a war of choice must be the focus of the inquiry's work.
	The second note relates to the meeting that took place in the Oval Office on 31 January 2003, to which the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) referred. He is right to question the absence from that meeting of both members of Cabinet and the UK ambassador to the US, because there were only three people at that meeting from the UK side: the Prime Minister, Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Matthew Rycroft, the foreign policy aide who was the author of the memo. However, that memo said that
	the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of drawing fire, or assassinating Mr. Hussein.
	That is the cynical pursuit of conditions under which it will be possible to manufacture a case for legally going to war when no legal basis for doing so exists.
	The inquiry must address to what extent members of the Cabinet were ever informed of those discussions. It must address whether the Cabinet knew, for instance, that the then Prime Minister was planning a war of choice in Iraq nine months before it was fought; that his objective was regime change, not the removal of weapons of mass destruction; that he had agreed nine months in advance to fix intelligence and facts around the Bush policy; and that Britain, based on the Prime Minister's approval, was colluding with acts of provocation or assassination.
	Those are all illegal acts. Had we had evidence that Saddam Hussein had been doing the same thing, it would have been justification for a war against him. It would also have been justification for him to be tried as a war criminal. I am not interested in the question whether the House should be judged according to the accusations of the Hague on the Opposition Benches. Ultimately, I have always argued that The Hague in the Netherlands should be the place where these questions are tried. My belief is that those who have perpetrated war crimes and acted as war criminals should be tried at the International Criminal Court. Those who say that we cannot do that now because it is too late to attribute blame ignore the fact that, for example, faced with institutional acts of child abuse, the House would never accept that we could root out that abuse without punishing the abusers. We are being asked today whether we have the courage to do this.

Adam Price: At this point in the proceedings, we begin to echo each other, and we are doing so today across the Floor of the House. It might be repetitive but, at times such as this, we begin, as a House, to get to the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is that this inquiry is not just about the specific events leading up to the war or about its aftermath. It is also about our constitution and the way in which we conduct our democracy. That is its importance. The House has an opportunity today to restore the proper balance of power in this country.
	We need to accept our share of the collective responsibility. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) referred to the many institutional failings that lie at the heart of this terrible, tragic, unnecessary war. Unfortunately, Parliament also played its part in that, on 18 March 2003, and it is now up to Parliament to play its part in making amends for that mistake. We have the opportunity to do that today.
	Most of the Labour Members who have spoken todayindeed, most of the Labour Back Benchers who have attended the debatevoted against the war on that day. I ask them to join us in voting for the motion in the name of the official Opposition today. I speak as a miner's son from Ammanford, and I mean no personal disrespect when I say that, on occasion, it is difficult for me to join the Conservatives in the Lobby. Today, however, the Opposition are doing what an Opposition should do: we are probing the contradictions in the Government's stated position. We had a new Prime Minister who said that he wanted to restore the proper balance of power between Parliament and the Executive, but does anyone seriously believe that he would have rowed back so fast and so furiously if the Opposition had not tabled this motion on the openness of the inquiry?
	Today, we have to push the Prime Minister even further, on the key question of the terms of reference. The line of accountability on this issue, which is a stain on our democracy, has to lie through Parliament to the people, who are the ultimate arbiters. It should not involve the Privy Council or a hand-picked group of people whose accountability is fundamentally to the Prime Minister. We cannot allow that mistake to happen again. It was that very concentration of power that got us into this mess in the first place.
	Let us go back a century, to the time when some would say we moved away from a balanced constitution. The House of Lords lost its power to this House, then, in the 20th century, this House lost its power to the Cabinet. Finally, the Cabinet was sidelined and power was concentrated in the hands of one man. The power symbolised by the Macethe royal prerogativewas placed in the hands of one man and a small cabal of advisers. That was what led to the terrible tragedy of the Iraq war, and that is what we, as a House, must now put right. We shall do that by voting for the motion and insisting that this inquiry into the war has to report to us in terms that we have set.
	I remember when the then Prime Minister spoke at that Dispatch Box on that terrible day for our democracy. He referred to the UN inspectors' reports, which contained, he said, unanswered questions and
	29 different areas in which the inspectors have been unable to obtain information.[ Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 763.]
	He used that terrible Rumsfeldian logic. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; the fact that there was no evidence of WMD did not mean that the WMD were not there. That was sufficient reasonjustificationfor the war.
	I did not believe a word that the Prime Minister said, but many hon. Members believed that it was not possible for a serving Prime Minister to lie to the House and to the people. Because he is no longer a Member of the House, I no longer have to fear being ejected for saying what many people believe: we were misled and the House was misled on a matter so seriouslife or death, peace or war. That is why it is our responsibility tonight to get to the heart of the matter, both the specifics of the Iraq war and how our democracy and our machinery of government were so terribly undermined. We have to establish the truth and ensure that that never happens againand yes, if as a result of that the inquiry believes that it must attribute blame, it should be free to do so if there is individual culpability, as many of us believe.
	There are three key issues that the inquiry must consider and which have been touched on by many hon. and right hon. Members. On the motivation for the war, I believe that WMD were the pretext. As we have heard, various minutes and the Downing street memos that have emerged subsequent to the Butler inquiry suggest clearly, as Wolfowitz said, that WMD were simply the bureaucratic rationale. The real reason lay elsewhere, and it was regime change all along.
	On legality, the contribution made by the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) was fascinating and it chimes with what Philippe Sands said in his book, Lawless World: the Butler inquiry saw correspondence between Ministers that the Cabinet never saw and which raised serious doubts about the legality of the war, and indeed shared some doubts that Colin Powell had about its legality.
	We now know that the legal advisers in the Foreign Ministry of the Dutch Government believed that
	the Netherlands would lose any case brought before the International Court of Justice.
	Interestingly, written on that memorandum were the words:
	Bury it well in the archives for future generations.
	Our memorandums will not be buried. We owe it to future generations to ensure that this does not happen again.
	Will there be prima facie evidence? Will the inquiry conclude that there is evidence that the war was indeed unlawful? We must remember that in November, Lord Bingham, former Lord Chief Justice and senior Law Lord of the United Kingdom, said that the Attorney-General's advice to the British Government contained
	no hard evidence,
	that Iraq had defied UN resolutions
	in a manner justifying resort to force
	and that the invasionthe Iraq warwas
	a serious violation of international law and of the rule of law
	in this country as well.

Barry Gardiner: Does the hon. Gentleman recall the words of resolution 1441, which includes the words:
	Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
	Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations...Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687?
	Chapter VII, of course, is the only chapter of the UN charter that justifies the use of force.

Adam Price: That point was dealt with by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood when she said that there was no automaticity as a result of that resolution and that a second resolution was required. The Government changed their position when they could not get the second resolutionthat is the reality of itand they misled the House, the UN and the people of this country.
	I believe that if the inquiry concludesas the senior Law Lord of the United Kingdom has concludedthat the war was indeed unlawful, the Government should voluntarily report themselves. They should report the Iraq war to the International Court of Justice for a declaratory opinion so that we can ensure that, for the avoidance of doubt, it is established in international law for future generations, and so that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and the 179 British servicemen and women who lost their lives will not have lost them in vain. We will then have established a core principle in our democracy: that those who lead us cannot mislead us and expect to get away with it.
	There is a fundamental principle in the way in which we govern relations between the nations of this world, and it is called the law. It is time for us, as a House of Commons, to undo the wrong of six years ago and vote for the motion. Sometimes it is necessary to have a parliamentary insurrection. I believe that Labour Members would be in tune with the best principles and traditions of the Labour party if they joined the official Opposition in the Lobby tonight. They may have their own reasons for doing somany of us are mixtures of altruism and self-interestbut we know what it is right for us as a House of Commons to do tonight, and that is to unite behind an amendment calling for a proper inquiry that deserves the respect of the people of this country.

Lynne Jones: In March last year, on another occasion when we debated the need for an inquiry on Iraq, the Foreign Secretary expressed surprise at my reservations about the credibility of the inquiry chaired by Lord Butler. In the speech that I made later in the debate I set out my concerns, which I will not repeat now.
	When that inquiry was set up, we already knew of Lord Butler's form from his evidence to the Scott inquiry. When asked about the less than full information being provided in parliamentary answers, he said:
	You have to be selective about the facts.
	Commenting to the inquiry on other parliamentary answers, he added:
	It was an accurate but incomplete answer. The purpose of it was to give an answer which itself was true. It did not give the full picture. It was half an answer.
	We must ensure that the inquiry that we set up following today's debate gives the full answer.
	Given the outcome of the Butler inquiry, it is appropriate to consider what we know about the chair and members of the current inquiryespecially as we heard from the Foreign Secretary today that, having first announced an inquiry to be held in private, the Government are now putting their faith in Sir John Chilcot to conduct the inquiry in an acceptable manner, telling the House that the Chilcot approach meets all reasonable expectations. I think that today's debate demonstrates that that is not the case.
	We also learnt from the Foreign Secretary today that Sir John Chilcot went along with the proposal for the inquiry to be conducted in private. In contrast, Sir John is now saying that as much of it as possible should be held in public. That is good, but what message does it convey about his objectivity and impartiality, given that he was apparently happy to accept an inquiry conducted in private? Surely it should have been perfectly obvious to everyoneat least those with no interest in a cover-upthat that would not do.
	By accepting such a condition, Sir Johna retired civil servant and as such someone who could be regarded as an establishment figurefailed to exert his independence. He does not seem to be the sort of person who robustly evaluates evidence and arrives at careful conclusions. Indeed, as a member of the Butler committee, he must have gone along with the remarkable decision to support the Government's claim that Iraq had sought to procure uranium from Africa, ignoring the conclusion of the International Atomic Energy Agency that the allegation was unfounded. Moreover, it did so without giving any reasons for disagreeing with the IAEA, and without addressing probing questions that I and the former Member for Blaenau Gwent, Llew Smith, submitted in our dossier to the inquiry.
	I am not the only person who is raising questions about the selection of Sir John to chair the inquiry, as we heard in earlier comments from the Opposition Benches. In an article in last Sunday's edition of  The Observer, Professor Philippe Sands talks of the role of the chairman as crucial, but says questions abound about the choice of Sir John. He asks:
	What was it about his role in the Butler inquiry that caused the prime minister to conclude he was suitable? Some who have worked closely with him, including on the Butler inquiry, fear he is not the right person. Someone who has seen him first hand described his approach as one of 'obvious deference to governmental authority'
	as is, perhaps, indicated by his acceptance of an inquiry in private. Philippe Sands continues:
	This is a view I have heard repeated several times. More troubling is evidence I have seen for myself.
	He then refers to the occasion when the Butler committee took evidence from the former Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, on 5 May 2004:
	The uncorrected transcript shows some members of the inquiry pressing him hard. By contrast, Sir John's spoonfed questions give every impression of being designed to elicit a response from the attorney general that would demonstrate the reasonableness of his actions and those of the government.
	Let me now turn to the other members of the inquiry team. Sir Roderic Lyne is a former ambassador to Russia. He retired in 2004 and took up a number of posts in the private sector. He was a special adviser to BP, which currently has major interests in Iraq. Regardless of whether that represents a conflict of interests, it does not help public confidence given the concern that we went to war for oil.
	There are also two historians on the committee. Sir Lawrence Freedman is a military historian and professor of war studies.  The Scotsman reports that he previously praised Tony Blair's attempts to influence US foreign policy in the run-up to the warattempts at influence that proved fruitless. The other historian, Sir Martin Gilbert, compared George W. Bush and Tony Blair to Roosevelt and Churchill in an article in  The Observer in 2004. Both historians could be seen as establishment figures.
	Another member of the committee is Baroness Usha Prashar. She has a virtuous CV but, as other Members have said, would it not have been more appropriate to include Members of this House? Public confidence in the inquiry would be enhanced if its membership included at least one Member who has questioned the decision to go to war. Some names have been mentioned in the debate; I suggest my hon. Friend the Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice), as I think he would be an excellent choice.
	I would also like to suggest another member. John Morrison was an analyst at the Ministry of Defence with wide experience of the British intelligence community. When he retired in 1999, he took up a post as the Intelligence and Security Committee's investigator, but he was sacked after he was interviewed, with the Committee's agreement, on Panorama in July 2004. In that interview he referred to the collective raspberry that went around Whitehall when the Prime Minister stated in the UK dossier of September 2002 that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed a serious and current threat. John Morrison said that
	the Prime Minister was going way beyond anything any professional analyst would have agreed.
	The former chief of defence intelligence and former deputy chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Air Marshal Sir John Walker, worked with Mr. Morrison and has expressed concern about the non-renewal of his contract. The ISC had previously described Mr. Morrison as a valuable asset to the Committee. Sir John is reported as saying:
	John Morrison is an extremely experienced and extremely good intelligence operative. I have the highest regard and respect for him. He has broken ranks, together with people like Brian Jones and David Kelly, because of a considerable concern about what was going on. If...people of John Morrison's calibre...break ranks it is very serious.
	He also said that it was beyond belief that Mr. Morrison was going because his contract was up and that he would be surprised if pressure had not come from No. 10 after the embarrassment of the Panorama criticisms. A member such as John Morrison would add credibility to the Committee.
	It is essential that we have an inquiry in which all shades of opinion in this House and the public can have confidence. It is supremely evident from this debate that that is not the case. I still cannot understand why the Government could not simply accept the motion in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. It would have been a way to make progress. It is still not too late to do so.

Greg Mulholland: It seems a long time since 15 February 2003. Much has changed for me in that time. I was then not an elected politicianI had not even been elected to Leeds city council, never mind as a Member of Parliament. I was one of the manyperhaps as many as 2 millionwho marched on the streets of London in an unprecedented display of public protest that the Government were even considering taking this country into an illegal war. I was joined by my then girlfriendnow my wife, I am happy to saywho was one of the many who were not political people and who had never protested before in their lives. She took to the streets because she was so concerned about what might be done in her name.
	A lot has changed since then for this House, too. We have had a general electionsome Members left and some new faces, including me, joined. We have a new Prime Ministerindeed, a few weeks ago, we thought that we were going to have yet another Prime Minister. But the reality is that, not long after that march in February 2003, this House, which at the time seemed so immune to and out of touch with what the country felt, voted to approve the invasion of Iraq.

Barry Gardiner: Does the hon. Gentleman recall that on 18 March 2003, the opinion polls showed that 56 per cent. of the population were in favour of the war?

Greg Mulholland: The hon. Gentleman shows how out of touch with the public he remains. That is also what the Government have achieved with their bungling of the attempt to introduce a half-baked inquiry into Iraq. We all know that it was introduced only as a sop to Labour Back Benchers to try to save the Prime Minister's political life a few weeks ago. Close scrutiny shows that, once again, the Prime Minister has taken his blunderbuss and shot himself in both feet.
	We now have an inquiry that will not even have the power to summon witnesses before it, and witnesses will not necessarily be speaking under oath. After everything that has already come out about this sorry affair, how can the public possibly trust witnesses who are not speaking under oath? The members of the inquiry team will be hand-picked by the Government from establishment figures. Yes, this House is right to be concerned that we will not have a say in who the members should be. We should be far more concerned, however, that the general public should find the members credible. The general public must believe that the committee is credible, or it is not even worth starting the exercise.
	Of course, I shall support the Opposition motion; however, I have to disagree with something that the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) said. He said that this is not about who was right and who was wrong. I am afraid that it is. It is time for all those who voted for the war to admit that they were wrong. That is patently obvious.
	I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central (Mr. Sarwar), who has acknowledged that he made a mistake. It would be interesting to get a list of all those who voted for the war who have now had the courage to say that they were wrong, for whatever reason, and that they regret that decision. It is certainly a decision that they should regret.
	The wording of the Government amendment is interesting. It says that we wish to
	establish the lessons to be learnt.
	Surely the main lesson is not to manipulate and misrepresent intelligence to justify sending British soldiers into an illegal war that is to be waged by America. We do not need an inquiry to tell us that. However, we do need an inquiry to tell us how and why that disastrous decision was ever reached and to find out whether the House was deliberately misled.
	I share the concerns that have been expressed about extending the remit of the committee. We must consider what happened afterwards, but we must first get closure for this country on why we went into the war in the first place. I echo the comments made by the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), who talked about punishment. We are now talking about having a one-year jail sentence for Members who abuse their expenses. What punishment should we have for a Prime Minister who deliberately misled the House of Commons and the British public into an illegal and immoral war? That is a question that we should be asking as part of the process. We simply cannot hide from it.
	I am sure that we have all seen the ghost of Tony Blair over the past week. We still see his hand on the shoulder of the current Prime Minister. The sad reality is that although George W. Bush is discredited and did not get away with the illegal invasion of Iraq, as usual, Teflon Tony did. The only way to change that is to get him in front of a public inquiry, under oath, and finally get to the bottom of that decision.
	If anyone doubts what I have said, the former Prime Minister, at the same Dispatch Box from which he misled the people of this country, once said something that was entirely untrue about me. He never had the decency or honour to apologise for that. What hope do we have that he will ever apologise for his disastrous decision?
	There is a lot of talk about whether Tony Blair influenced the decision to have the inquiry held in private. I think that just about everyone on the Government Benches realises that that has done them a great deal of damage. Frankly, it does not matter, because Tony Blair's legacy is that it does not matter what the truth is, but simply how it is presented. Let me quote a supporter of the war, Bruce Anderson, from  The Independent on 22 June. He said:
	Especially in Britain, policy towards Iraq was founded on a lie, because the Prime Minister could not admit his real...motive: regime change.
	That quotation comes from someone who supported the decision to go into war. The reality, however, is that the current Prime Minister took part in that decision. In May 2007, he said:
	I take my responsibility as a member of the Cabinet for the collective decisions that we made, and I believe that they were the right decisions.
	The reality is that millions of people in this country do not believe that the decisions were right, but they do believe that we have the right to find out exactly why they were taken.
	The expenses scandal of the past few weeks has brought this House into disrepute. The decision to take this country into an illegal and immoral war brought the Government into disrepute. If we are to restore public confidence in the House and the Government, we need a proper inquiry and not the half-baked one that the Government are trying to get away with. We need a genuine inquiry that will finally give the answers needed to put this sorry issue to rest and to restore credibility in this House and this Government.
	The people who marched in February 2003, some of whom had never marched before, deserve a proper inquiry. The fallen soldiers and their families must have that. If we want to restore faith in our democracy, we must demand it. If the biggest foreign policy mistake since Suez does not warrant a public inquiry, what does? This House failed the nation in 2003. It must not do so again this evening.

Andrew MacKinlay: I am one of those who voted for the conflict. I have told the House before that I shall deeply regret that until the day that I die. I believe that I was hoodwinked. I also think that my judgments were unsound.
	I remember that we all went through a crisis at the time, as we examined whether it was a just war. We looked into what Thomas Aquinas said and we tried to understand the international law, but the background was that a British Prime Minister came to the House and told us that there was an immediate and serious threat. That certainly influenced me, and perhaps I will be able to amplify on that on another occasion.
	The House and the nation were misled, and I am angry at having been fooled and at the way that I was bounced into voting for the war. I am bewildered by how anyone could consider not voting for the Opposition motion before the House this evening, because it sums up what must be done. It says that there should be an independent inquiry, and that there should be a resolution of the House of Commons to confirm its terms of appointment and its membership. The Prime Minister keeps going on about rejuvenating Parliament and constitutional reform. That is one reason why he should embrace the motion, but I shall refer to another in a moment.
	The Government amendment makes me very angry. At last Wednesday's Prime Minister's Question Time, I cautioned the Prime Minister that I wanted to know whether people would give evidence under oath. Until the past few hours, there was no great response or interest from Members of Parliament or the press. Even some very good Members of Parliament from all parties still did not seem to understand that no one will be able to give evidence under oath because it is not a statutory inquiry. The amendment says that the Government will
	consult party leaders...on the scope for taking evidence under oath
	but I know, and the Prime Minister knows, that that is complete nonsense. The only way to get evidence given under oath is by the House passing a swift Act of Parliament to facilitate an extraordinary, one-off inquiry. I think that I am the only person in the House to have given evidence to the Hutton inquiry. None of that evidence was given under oath, and I shall say more about that in a moment.
	Both Prime Minister Blair and the current Prime Minister try to claim that there have been numerous inquiries on this matter, such as the ones by the Foreign Affairs Committee, Butler and Hutton. Not one of those so-called inquiries was held under oath, and as a member of the FAC, I can say that extracting the truth was like extracting teeth from a whale. Every obstruction was put in our way. There were redactions in the report, as was mentioned earlier. The Butler inquiry was held behind closed doors, and we do not really know what evidence it received. We can look at the report, but no evidence was given under oath.
	I have said already that the Hutton inquiry was informal and non-statutory, albeit headed by a distinguished judge. No evidence was given under oath to that inquiry either, and our witness statements are covered by the 30-year rule. My humble little witness statement will not be seen for 30 years; neither will the witness statements of the Defence Secretary at the time, the right hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Hoon), or of the then Prime Minister, or of people in the security and intelligence services see the light of dayunless, of course, this new inquiry is independent and appointed under the tribunals of inquiry legislation.
	Of course, the establishment dare not do that, because all the documents seen by Hutton, Butler and the Foreign Affairs Committee would then be out in the open as documents before an independent inquiry. We know that there has been extensive dissemblinguntruths told by a number of parties and agencies since the Iraq war and before it. We need to expose that and find out the motive for the dissembling, the misleading and the downright lies in some cases.
	Over the past few days, the Whips have come to me, saying that they do not want a Saville-type inquiry, as that one went on a long time and cost a lot of money. Actually, I do not want a Saville-type inquiry and I am not advocating such an inquiry, as it is not necessary. The Saville inquiry related to one traumatic and heart-rending incident, but in terms of the volume and level of deceit, the Iraq war is much bigger than the awful events in Londonderry a quarter of a century agoI am not minimising what happened there, of course. Saville's was a judicial inquiry, at which people had to give evidence under oath, and the same was true of the Lawrence inquiry. If I may go back in history, Winston Churchill gave evidence under oath at the Gallipoli inquiry. Although that was a long time ago, it is the sort of inquiry that is required to deal with the Iraq war today.
	Why am I so upset by the Government trying to spin the yarn that, somehow, evidence can be given under what I think they say is the equivalent of an oath? That cannot be done and the Government know it. If I am wrong, let the Minister tell me where I am wrong when he replies to the debate. The fact is that the oath not only makes people tell the truth, but protects those who are being leaned on by superiors and other agencies. History would have been different if evidence had been given under oath to the Foreign Affairs Committee and, I believe, to the Hutton inquiry.
	I regret to say this, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the problem is the Prime Minister. The fact is that he does not understand that he does not understand. He came along last week to announce the inquiry and he handed it down like tablets of stone. What he basically said is, We are the Government, so we decide. That simply will not do. Things have moved on since last week. We were told that it was going to be a Franks-style inquiryquite wrongly, I think, for reasons I have explainedbut it has now mutated into something completely different. The Prime Minister and, downwards from him, his advisers, were panicking, so he wrote to Chilcot and asked him to see what he could do about having some sessions in public, using what is said in their phrase to be some equivalent to the oath. There is no equivalent to the oath; there would be more value in the wolf cub's promise than what they are proposing. That is the fact of the matter. There is no such equivalent to the oath and the Prime Minister knows it.  [Interruption.] If the Minister thinks I am wrong, I repeat my call for him to explain when he replies from the Dispatch Box what this equivalent is that will have the force of law and criminal sanctions if it were ever to be abrogated.
	As I have said, the Prime Minister does not understand that he does not understand. The real test of all the stuff he has been saying about rejuvenating Parliamenthe almost puts the blame on the rest of us for bringing Parliament into disreputeis whether he is prepared to acknowledge that this Parliament has the right to decide the nature of the inquiry into why and how it was misled on the Iraq war. I am buttressed in my arguments by many of the people the Prime Minister relied on to say what a good idea a Franks-type inquiry would be. One after the other over the past seven days, those civil servants and members of the judiciary, for example, have said that that idea is nonsense. A few nights ago, I cheered when General Mike Jackson said on Newsnight that evidence to the inquiry must be given under oath. It showed that the Government cannot hide the fact that some military people who have seen the conflict and seen the evidence knew what was going on. They say this must be an independent inquiry and that evidence must be given under oath. Why does the Minister not understand that? Why does his boss the Prime Minister not understand that?
	It is time the Minister went behind the Chair and phoned the Prime Minister to tell him to accept the motion. If the Prime Minister does not do so, he may win the voteI am not certainbut he will certainly lose the debate. The arguments for an independent inquiry will go on and on and on until one is conceded.

Geoffrey Cox: I have listened awestruck and impressed to the contributions made to the House today. I was not a Member of the House until 2005, and it is humbling to listen to the sincerity, passion and candour of those who lived through the experience of having to vote in the House on so weighty and solemn a matter as sending our country to war. I have not had that responsibility, so it is with some trepidation but, I hope, a degree of humility that I offer my remarks about the motion on the inquiry that faces the House.
	I intended to confine my remarks to the structure, nature, procedure and terms of reference of the inquiry, and not to venture into the substantive aspects of the question relating to the merits of the war in Iraq, but inevitably the two are connected. Nobody can deny that the events and circumstances of the Iraq war were of the greatest magnitude in the history of our nationfar greater, I submit, than the events and circumstances of the Falklands war.
	One of the reasons I suggest the Iraq war is of greater magnitude is that it presents itself as a much greater and more complex series of questions and problems for the House and for history. It presents in that way because it raises much more fundamental questions, including questions of constitutional breakdown, as many Members have already said. How we came to the war includes the role of the Attorney-General and an analysis of how the Attorney-General interacts with the Government of the day. It includes complex questions of law, such as what was known to those who were advising the Government on the status of the war in international law. It raises questions of the House and its prerogatives, and of the accountability of the Government to the House. How can the House prevent itself from beingas some would saydeceived by evidence that has been exaggerated or distorted, when it cannot see the underlying documents?
	The Franks inquiry certainly never had to contend with the question of constitutional breakdown, because the Falklands war presented itself in a fairly simple light. There were questions about the defects in intelligence and, some might say, about a defect in the Government's conduct of policy running up to the war and the invasion by the Argentines, but what was never questionedat least not by an overwhelming majority of the nationwas the justification for going to war in the Falkland Islands in the first place. There was never a question of the constitutional processes by which that war had been undertaken.
	I recall as a young man listening to the wonderful debate in 1982 in which Michael Foot gave a great speech pledging his support and that of the Opposition for the vindication of those little islands and their population against the bullying of a larger nation that had taken international law into its own hands and made a mockery of it by invasion. The war we are dealing with in the inquiry raises much more fundamental questions and will have a much stronger effect on history than the war fought in 1982.
	It is precisely because of the multiplicity of aspects that the methods the Government have chosen to set up the inquiry are so fundamentally lacking. Let me explain. There are no terms of reference. Those we have seen, and which one can espy in the Prime Minister's statement, are non-existent. They have not been debated by the House. They have not been subject to the to and frothe forensic testing and struggleacross the Floor of the House to ascertain and define precisely the instructions that the inquiry must follow. That is wrong and does not do justice to the complexity and gravity of the circumstances of the Iraq war because many of us might disagree about what central questions should be the focus of Sir John Chilcot's terms of reference. We cannot leave it to a bunch of civil servants, however distinguished they might be, to decide the fundamental questions to address.
	The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) defined the central question as he saw it: how the House came to be deceived by a series of exaggerations and distortions. However, others might see the inquiry's central question as military unpreparedness and the Government sending our troops into war ill-equippedand in many cases unequippedfor the kinds of warfare with which they had to contend. They are not the only considerationsothers might see the aftermath of the war as the central questionbut this House ought to decide the central questions for the inquiry and define the terms of reference. It is only through the democratic process of debate in the House about the terms of reference that the public can have any confidence that they have been established transparently and objectively.
	The motion in the name of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition says that the Government should
	submit proposed terms of reference...to the House on a substantive motion for full debate and scrutiny.
	No other proposition can conceivably do justice to the gravity of the circumstances and the solemnity of the occasion with which we are confronted. I urge hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber to note the importance, as others have eloquently said, of the House taking back the right to say to the Executive, This is our prerogative.
	I want to say something about the procedure. Historians are generally not especially experienced at interrogating live actorsI hope that that statement is pretty uncontroversial. I have no doubt that the two historians on the panel are especially good at interpreting historical documents and evidence, but I would be surprised if they had much experience of winkling out the truth from a reluctant and sometimes even self-deceived witness. There is one forensic toolI would say this, and I declare an interestthat is guaranteed to winkle out the truth from a Minister or anybody else: cross-examination. Cross-examination by a skilled and experienced cross-examiner is an indefeasible tool in the hands of an inquiry. It is absurdit is fantasyto propose that creating the conditions of secrecy will somehow lead to a cosy, fireside chat in which the likes of Alastair Campbell will be induced to confide their secret heart to the listening committee. It is only with the forensic tool of cross-examination that we can hope to get to the bottom of many of the complex and thorny issues with which the committee will be challenged.
	If the Government are to have cross-examination and to get to the bottom of this, there has got to be an oath. It is no use suggesting, as the Foreign Secretary appeared to do at one point, that an oath can somehow be administered informally. If an oath is to mean anything, it must have legal consequences, and the legal consequences of telling a lie on oath are prosecution for perjury. If an oath is to be administered, it must be done in circumstances that leave no room for any doubt that telling a lie will be visited with all the penalties of the law, namely a prosecution for perjury. That is why I agree with the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) that the only way is to have an oath. The only way is to have cross-examination. The only way is to have the inquiry in public when compelling interests of national security do not require otherwise. I say again that the only way is to have an inquiry that does justice to the gravity of the war, and to have a committee that includes men or women with experience, weight and wisdom in the relevant areas of this complicated issue.

Several hon. Members: rose

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I advise hon. Members that the winding-up speeches will begin at 6.30 pm. Five Members are hoping to catch my eye; I hope to be able to include everyone. Will Members please do the sums necessary?

John McDonnell: I shall be extremely brief, Madam Deputy Speaker. I have not intervened in the debate, and did not stand up to speak, because although I had put my name down to do so, I had to attend a funeral earlier and so missed the introductory speeches. I did not want to intervene on others who had put their names down in advance.
	My point follows on from that made by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay). There is an hour and 10 minutes of this debate left, and to be frank to the Government, whatever the outcome of the vote tonight, the inquiry is now in disarray. If it cannot command the cross-party support of the House, it will not command the support of the people outside.
	Many arguments have been set outon the lack of terms of reference, on the lack of consultation with, and involvement of, the House on that, on the composition, on the remit, and on oaths. The oath is absolutely critical. As my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has said, the equivalent to the oath will elicit the equivalent to the truth. The whole point of the exercise is to try to get to the truth. As my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock says, I wonder whether, in view of the new practices that we are trying to introduce in Parliament, tonight could be the one occasion when a Minister contacts No. 10 and says, The game's up. What we need to do now is try to find consensus in the House on this important issue.
	This started with a tragedy. I voted against the war after one of the most heart-rending debates that we have had. It was heart-rending because at every Prime Minister's Question Time since then, a Prime Minister has announced the names of the fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan; I think that the Iraq war led to the climate that enabled the Government to go into Afghanistan. Now, we are going from tragedy to absolute farce.
	I was at the parliamentary Labour party meeting only two Mondays ago. I do not often attend these days, but I did on that occasion. The Prime Minister discussed change and learning the lessons from the European elections. It was an excellent speech, in which he said that there would be change, we would learn lessons and we would listen. When he announced, the following day, that there would be an inquiry on Iraq, I was absolutely heartened. I thought, We've learned a lesson; we're now going to address one of the central issues that stained the history of this Government. I thought that we would look for consensus across parties, establish terms of reference, and have complete openness and transparency, because that is what we are supposed to be all about these days. Within 24 hours, we realised that it wassomeone said spin, but I think that it was absolute incompetence, to put it charitably.

Andrew MacKinlay: He doesn't understand.

John McDonnell: It is as my hon. Friend says. I do not think that the Prime Minister and others around him have understood the importance of the issue, in terms of clearing the decks for this Government or any future Government. If we cannot address the central question of whether the House and the country were misled by individuals, so that we can expose what went on, learn the lessons and move forward, we will not have cleaned the record of this Government, or be able, as a Government, to make such consequential decisions about life and death in future.
	That is why I urge the Government tonight to hang up the guns at the door of the saloon. Let us get out of the trenches tonight and start talking about what the real needs of the country are. The real need is for honesty. To be frank, I follow what was said by the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Galloway). We need an inquiry that brings forward the truth, no matter what the consequences. Many of my constituents feel that there has been a war crime; they feel that there was an act of criminality involved. If there are consequences that lead to our own Nuremburg or to The Hague or whatever, let us at least explain to our people that we recognise that possibility, and we are willing to examine the issue, no matter what the consequences.
	The subject that we are debating is, as other speakers have said, fundamental to the standing of Parliament. If we are to restore credibility, this is one of the key issues that we must address.

Mark Durkan: Further to the poignant arguments that my hon. Friend is making and that the House should consider, does he accept that some of us know John Chilcot, and we know that if he is put in charge of deciding whether something is public or private, depending on national security, he has an elastic concept of national security? He stretches it to cover many things, and in the past has stretched it to cover up many things.

John McDonnell: In today's debate we have gone beyond the examination of the individuals appointed to conduct the inquiry. So many doubts have been expressed across the House about the individuals who have been selected that the Prime Minister should convene a meeting of the leaders of the various parties to see whether we can gain consensus about the composition. Yes, I agree with hon. Members who have argued that the terms of reference should be determined not by the party leaders, but by the House.
	I hope that on such a fundamental point of principle, this could be the one occasion when we can throw aside all past practices and stop the Whips rushing round for fear of the defeat of the Government, leaning on individual Back Benchers and trying to drag them through the Lobby. On the principle of good governance, I hope we can put party politics to one side and seek a consensual position across the House. As others have said, it is so important for people who have lost loved ones that we arrive at the truth and at a process in which they have confidence.
	After today's debate, after what has happened in the media over the past week, and after the variations that have come forward from the Prime Minister almost daily about what the inquiry is about and how it will operate, all confidence has been lost. To restore that, we need to start again. I repeat the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock. This is the last hour that we have to restore the credibility of the House and give some credibility to the process of examination of the issue of Iraq. I appeal to Ministers to withdraw the Government's proposals. Whether by accepting the Opposition motion or not, the Government should say tonight that they will start again, involving all parties in an open and properly transparent process of arriving at a new inquiry that will have the confidence of the House and the country.

Richard Shepherd: I agree with the burden of the arguments made by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and the arguments that have come from all quarters of the House.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox) made a compelling case as to why he should be counsel to the inquiry. I know that his bag is full and his commitments are heavy, but he enunciated a principle that is at the heart of parliamentary democracy. This is a House of debate and of a Government making reasoned arguments and, by and large, trying to win an argument. We have seen chaos over recent weeks.
	My own dilemma has been reflected by others. I also voted for the war. That was against the advice of many friends in the defence industry, those who have some connections with intelligence, those who write for the newspapers, and colleagues in the House and elsewhere. Yet I disregarded their advice, because I was confronted with a Prime Minister who assured me that the war was necessary to the national interest. Why should I suspend my own judgment? I am normally the most critical of individuals. Why was I showing deference to a proposition put forward by a Prime Minister?
	I am old enough to remember Eden. When I was a boy in the combined cadet force at my school, we marched when Suez happened, to show our patriotic fervour. Within months, Eden was discredited and, unfortunately, health meant that he left for the country for a longish period. In Eden, we had a Prime Minister who lied to this House, according to Edward Heath, who in a broadcast said, He knew he had made a lie on the Floor of the House over the events surrounding Suez. Mr. Heath was asked, What did you do? He replied, Well, I got on with it, didn't I? That is what has happened to this House: too many of us get on with it. That is our duty: to support the Government with whom we were elected or the party that, as a consequence of our election, becomes the Government.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon is in my mind, but was it not Denning who said, However mighty the citizen, the law is mightier still? That is what is behind the construction of the proposition before usconstructed not by this House, incidentally, but by the Executive on the advice of Whitehall, presumably. The Government's proposition is designed to ensure that no one can be found culpable and suffer the consequences ofhow shall we put it?misadvising whatever committee comes into existence.
	Perjury is an awful threat, and the consequences of perjury are dramatic. A Cabinet Minister from this House perjured himself and went to prison. That is the jeopardy if anyone should mislead a properly founded inquiry with an oath sworn on it and the prospect of retribution if candour is not employed before its inquisitors. That concept is terribly important.
	We can see how the central question of the oath is dealt with on the Order Paper, and others have adequately referred to it. The Government's proposition is almost derisory. Its proposers, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, want
	the chairman of the inquiry to consult party leaders and chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees on the scope for taking evidence.
	From the Order Paper, one of the central questions for the Secretary of State is: what is that scope for taking an oath? Ministers must have questioned, and been advised on, that central proposition, but earlier we saw the Foreign Secretary, in that wonderful, elegant and nonchalant way, dance away from the questionall the time. It was about the scope, and people should inquire, ask around and find out. The Government do not know? Of course they know. Those are the deceits that follow from propositions that are foisted upon this House by the Executive on the advice of Whitehall. I have no idea what the advice in Whitehall was, but I do not doubt that Whitehall would have asked itself the question and advised the Government that the decision about whether evidence would be on oath or not had implications.
	That is why this matter is a struggle for this Chamberwe, as elected representatives of the people, checking and holding to account a Government. Since I voted for the war, I have noted and shared some of the emotions of other Members. Events have moved on, and we have had the inquiry into the circumstances of the death of Dr. Kelly. What a revelation! There were all the e-mails. Who were they from? Alastair Campbell to Johnnow, Sir JohnScarlett, the head of intelligence. The Prime Minister's special adviser also said that the contents of one memorandumthe dodgy memorandumdid not seem to lead to the conclusion. What conclusion? The conclusion to go to war. It was altered. We know that from the Hutton inquiry and from the silence of the Foreign Officethe dog that did not bark in the night. There are no e-mails coming from the now Lord Chancellorthe lord high panjandrumto inquire about intelligence. There is MI6, too. What about the Ministry of Defence, the Department at which the former Chief Whip of the Labour party was then Secretary of State? The defence intelligence unit was querying what the single source was.
	Here am I, having taken the word of a British Prime Minister, seeing unravel the very props with which I reinforced my vote. I want to know, in a proper and full inquiry, the circumstances surrounding how we went to war. I want to be able to reconcile in my mind the contradictions between, I know nothing about the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. Kelly, and, I am responsible for all these matters. That was the then Prime Minister in front of Hutton and in conversation on an aeroplane. When I asked the then Prime Minister about the issue on the Floor of the House, he said, Oh! We must wait until the outcome of the Hutton inquiry. Did Hutton answer the question? Did he reconcile the two seemingly contradictory statements? Not a bit of it.
	I want an inquiry, as does every Member who is really serious about the business of the House and our representative function. It should explicitly look into the matters of concern affecting a matter of great public policygoing to war. As the Prime Minister tolls out the lives of others who have been sent to Iraq, we are tolling our own bell. We need no servants to inquire; we should be the dynamic in the process of establishing the appropriate form for an inquiry.

Dai Davies: As I look around the Chamber, I see that I am probably the junior Member. Today Members have made some of the most powerful and incisive speeches that I have heard in the more than three years I have been here, and that shows the importance of the decision to go to war with Iraq. I have considered why I came to this House, and the main reason is that I could not get 55,000 people into the Chamber. So I have come on their behalf, to express their views and concerns.
	I fully understand that the Prime Minister cannot visit supermarkets or pop down the pub, as some of us can, to hear what constituents say on the street. But I cannot accept the fact that the policy of the Government is being made by people who are not elected to the House. The Government came here and made a statement on the Iraq inquiry, which they said would be in private, and someone unelected then changed the mind of the Prime Minister. That cannot be right.
	We have waited six years for an inquiry. None of us, inside the House or outside it, criticised the armed forces once war was declared, and rightly so; we have supported them and should continue to do so. However, the inquiry has been on the books for a considerable time. For the sake of a few more days, we must hold fire and allow the House to make the decision on the composition, remit and powers of the inquiry. If we do not, its very legitimacy will be lost. That legitimacy is needed to put at rest the minds of the families of those who have been killed and injured, and for the sake of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi people who died during the war. We must make sure that the inquiry has the legitimacy of public debate.
	Within that debate, we understand that some thingsthey should be the exceptionmight have to be discussed and considered in private. But the vast majority of the debate must be held in public. The people of this country have rightly expressed their anger and concern, given how the expenses issue has blown up in the press. But I would rather that the press had a field day with a public inquiry than made things up because the inquiry was held in private. We need to be open and transparent, and we must achieve that through the House.
	Considering why we went to war is the primary reason for the inquiry. There is no doubt about that, and we have heard it said many times this afternoon. That must be the main focus of the inquiry, but many of my constituents are concerned also about the strategy of the war and the fact that we had no exit strategy. We did not really know how we would leave Iraq, and in fact there is still a lot of answering to be done about that.
	One major concern that has been expressed to me on many occasions is the equipment that has been used in Iraq, or the lack of it. That is a concern for today, not just in Iraq but in the war that we are fighting in Afghanistan, and it must be addressed.
	The Hutton inquiry was held in public and reported regularly throughout the time for which it was held. I hope that that will be the case as and when we settle the terms of reference for this inquiry. There must be regular reports, and certainly having to wait 12 months for the first part of the report is unacceptable. If the Government cannot step back tonight and think again about how the inquiry will be set up, and especially about the composition of the inquiry panel, I urge all hon. Members to support the official Opposition's motion.

Tobias Ellwood: It is a pleasure to speak at the end of this important debate. Right hon. and hon. Members have made some powerful arguments, to which I hope the Government have listened. I wish to place on record my concern about what the outcome of the inquiry will be, because some basic schoolboy errors have been made in Iraq that we could learn from. We do not need an inquiry to understand where mistakes have been made, but we are now leaning on one to tell us that. I wonder why the Government are not learning some of the lessons that could already have been put into effect in other theatres of operation.
	For example, we know that the justification for going to war in the first place was based on what the Americans wanted to do. General Tommy Franks was told by President Bush to make preparations for a potential war in Iraq back in November 2001, when he was in charge of the United States Central Command, having just succeeded in launching the invasion in Afghanistan. We know that the evidence of weapons of mass destruction was based on a single source, an Iraqi chemical officer who went into a German refugee camp. That was never authorised or seconded, but it ended up being translated into the claim of the existence of tactical weapons that could be used in 45 minutes and possibly hit Cyprus.
	Hon. Members voted on resolution 1441, which did not allow the invasion of Iraq. It allowed us to return to a previous resolution, resolution 678, written 11 years earlier in 1990, to allow the use of force. Huge mistakes were made, and I hope that the inquiry will pull them out. We walked blindly into a war with Iraq, which turned out to be a massive distraction from another operation that had already started, in Afghanistan, which is still ongoing.
	Everybody has repeated the need to learn lessons. That is the point of an inquiry, but my argument is that we know some of the lessons already, yet we are failing to recognise them. Once the decision to go to Iraq was made, I was astonished to learnbut pleased with the honesty of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) for admitting itthat there was no plan by the Department for International Development about what to do once the war fighting started.
	The invasion took place in March 2003, and of course there was huge euphoria, particularly about the liberation of Basra considering what had happened under Saddam Hussein. I have had a discussion with General Robin Brims, the commander of 1 (UK) Armoured Division, who said that in April 2003 he went into the middle of Basra when the dust had settled and knew straight away that things were going to go pear-shaped. He knew that gangs would be formed and militias created, simply because there was a massive vacuum as there was no plan. He did not know what to do except watch very sadly as the security situation deteriorated.

Clare Short: Just to make this clear, I have not said that there were no plans. Detailed plans were made with the State Department, the UN and other international agencies. The hon. Gentleman is from the military. DFID and the humanitarian agencies cannot bring peace in an occupied territorythat is a military job. I do not honour the attempt to pass over to the humanitarian agencies the responsibility for the chaos after the invasion.

Tobias Ellwood: The right hon. Lady is actually making my point for me. Whose responsibility is it to make peace? Is it the military's? The military provide the security on top of the hill. Something else has to happen in the village below, however, to ensure that the reconstruction takes place, that the schools are built and that the electricity is turned onall the things that are involved in nation building. That is not the role of the military, although I would like it to be; rather, it was the responsibility of DFID. The right hon. Lady admitted to sending a diktat to the directors in her Department saying, Do nothing. We're not even sure that this war is legal. I admire her consistency in the matter, but it does not help anybody in military uniform being sent over the start line by this Government then to realise that once the war fighting has stopped, we do not have a plan to keep the peace. That is where things went so pear-shaped.
	By 2004, the number of civilian deaths had risen to 20,000 a year and the number of UK military deaths had risen to 800 a year. By 2007, the situation had deteriorated so much that we had become part of the problem. We went from liberators to occupiers. A personal friend of mine who was leading 2nd Battalion the Rifles was made to leave Basra palace with his tail between his legs because he had become part of the problem. He had to return to the comfort of the air base, never to participate in proper patrolling again. Why? Because we did not have the plan for peace. That is the big lesson to be learned by the Government, but we do not need an inquiry to learn it. That is the point that I am stressing. I am afraid that we are making exactly the same mistakes in Afghanistan.
	It should not be that we spend three weeks war fighting and six years engaged in failed stabilisation. We must look at the type of warfare in which we are now involved. It is not called warfare any more; it is counter-insurgency, and we must recognise that we are not very good at it. General Petraeus has said that it is no longer good enough simply to defeat the enemy; we have to go further and enable the local. Until we get that into our heads, we will continue to fail as we are doing.
	I stress that we cannot expect the military to do that work: they are not trained to do it, nor are they equipped. We need a different type of equipment to do post-conflict stabilisation operations. As we have heard, DFID does not do that either. DFID does what it says on the tin: it tackles poverty. There is therefore a huge void that needs to be filled if we want not only to win wars, but to win the peace as well. At the moment, we are winning wars but losing the peacekeeping. Those are the lessons that we can learn without the need for an inquiry.
	I hope that the inquiry looks into what Whitehall did. I would like a huge overhaul of the way in which we approach post-conflict operations. It is no good trying to get soldiers to maintain a level of security when they see the demise of the infrastructure around them, with nobody willing to step forward and do the job. It is in that fragile window of opportunitythose few weeks to months after the war fighting has finished when the dust settlesthat we want to win hearts and minds.

Oliver Heald: My hon. Friend is making a powerful case, with which I strongly agree. Does he agree that it is vital to put in place a proper civil justice system, so that we do not face the sort of situation that we face in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have been left to provide the judging and resolve disputes?

Tobias Ellwood: My hon. Friend makes such a valid point. That is the level of detail that needs to be looked at. It is not just the justice system that is important, however; it is the training of the police and the armed forces. Who is doing that now? Our armed forces are doing it, because of an absence of anybody else. Let us bite the bullet and recognise that our military are in the best place to do that. Our Royal Engineers are capable of making the roads and rebuilding the schools and so forth. They are capable of showing the locals that they mean businessthat they want to help and then to go home. They do not want to hang around in a conflict zone for six years and watch the security situation deteriorate.
	What happened in Iraq was appalling, and I am afraid that Whitehall should take the blame for that. As the security situation deteriorated, because nobody bothered to try to fill the power vacuum, who came into Iraq? Al-Qaeda did, making its home there and making the job of providing security all the more tough. Those are the lessons. Do we need an inquiry? Yes, of course, it would help; but boy, we could have learned those lessons many moons ago. I am pleased to see the Secretary of State for Defence in the Chamber now. I stress that we need to wake up to our capability and to what we are doing. The Americans have done so, but we have not. Until we do so, we will struggle to win these campaigns after the war fighting has finished.
	In the long history of British engagements, Iraq was far from being our finest hour. That was no fault of our armed forces, who can hold their heads up high. The blame falls squarely on Whitehall, which failed to plan for peace. We cannot totally blame the Americans. I am now aware that Colin Powell had 15 737s on the runway with all the reconstruction gear and an army of civil servants, but Basra was our responsibility and we failed to make the effort to make the reconstruction work.
	I hope that the inquiry will exonerate our military forces of mismanaging the peace. They are feeling the blame at the moment and, although they cannot say so publicly, they are deeply angry about the demise of the security situation, supposedly on their watch. I hope that these blatant errors will be recognised and acknowledged by the inquiry so that lessons can be learned, although I am afraid that some of the errors are already being repeated in Afghanistan. There is a gaping hole in our post-conflict stabilisation capability, and I hope that the inquiry will expedite a desire to fix it.

Jeremy Corbyn: I have been present at virtually every debate on Iraq for the past seven years. I never thought that, seven years on, we would still be debating the legality of, and responsibility for, the war, and how to conduct a proper investigation into it. The image of Parliament has suffered enormously over the past few weeksnay, the past few months. If we fudge this issue tonight and decline to hold the kind of open, public, legally based, oath-taking, subpoenaed inquiry that is required, yes, there will be a reportsome kind of bowdlerised version of what happened will be produced by a group of Privy Counsellors, and everyone will go away and say, That's finebut the demand for an inquiry will still be there, culpability will still be sought and the responsibility will still rest on those people who took us into the conflict. Fudging the issue tonight will merely delay the debate until another day, and another day after that.
	I was one of those who helped to organise the massive demonstration in 2003, and I have attended hundreds of meetings all over the country against the invasion of Iraq and the legality of the war. The 1 million and more people who came to London on that day in 2003and the millions more around the country who attended local demonstrations, wrote to their MPs, sent e-mails, signed petitions or simply expressed an opinion against the warfelt very let down by Parliament on that occasion. They also felt very let down by the political system, and a whole generation of young people have now been radicalised to question the effectiveness of this place and to wonder what is the point of a political system that can take us into a war that turns out to be illegal and then blinker its eyes to the consequences. We need to take some serious decisions tonight.

Diane Abbott: Like me, my hon. Friend was on that great march in 2003. Does he agree that part of the disillusion with the political system stems from people's sadness and bitterness that so many people could have been out on the streets of London that day and yet be ignored by the political establishment?

Jeremy Corbyn: Absolutely. My Friend gets that message about Iraq in her constituency, as every Member does, and it simply will not go away. Many Memberson this side of the House and on the Opposition Benchespublicly regret the way they voted on that occasion, and many, many more do so privately. They know that they were told falsehoods in the lead-up to the war, and they have also seen the consequences and the costs of it.
	The Prime Minister of the day, Tony Blair, said in terms in the House that this war was about removing the weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. A short time later, he, the then Foreign Secretary and others were involved in ensuring that Hans Blix and Mohamed el-Baradei were not allowed back into Iraq to continue the process of inspection and disarmament that they were so effectively carrying out at that time.
	The Prime Minister also said in a broadcast the day after the vote in Parliament that this war was about getting rid of Saddam Hussein and regime change. George Bush, on the other hand, was relatively straightforward in that he said it was always about regime change. They cannot have it all ways and there should have been honesty towards us in that respect.
	I use the figures carefully, but well over 500,000 Iraqis have died since 2003. The living standards of many are no better. Instability in many cases is far worse, and I say that not as somebody who was ever an apologist for or defender of the Saddam Hussein regime. Indeed, there is plenty of recorded opposition from me and some other Members to arms sales to Iraq in the 1980s.
	We have spent billions of pounds of UK public money on this war. We have lost 179 soldiers. Many more have been seriously injured and traumatised by the experience. During the activities of the Stop the War Coalition, I have had the good fortune to meet many military families who have joined Military Families Against the War. They tell in graphic detail what it was like to lose their son or daughter, how their son or daughter has been badly injured and traumatised by this event and how angry they feel at how they were led into this situation.
	The legality of war is an interesting concept; the idea that going to war can be legalised is itself an interesting concept. Nevertheless, there is such a concept and it revolves around the UN charter, a real and credible threat to an individual country, and the UN itself. If resolution 1441, as we were told later, gave us the authority to go to war, why did the Foreign Secretary and others put such great effort into getting a second UN resolution that was then not possible? The Secretary-General of the United Nations said in terms at the end of the conflict that he believed the actions to be illegal.
	We must look now to what an inquiry can do. A week ago, the Prime Minister announced in the wake of the famous parliamentary Labour party meeting that there would be an inquiry on the war in Iraq. I thought, Good news, at last a real change. Let's have an inquiry. We would have been better off having no inquiry whatever than what we were presented with a week agoa private inquiry of Privy Counsellors sitting around together.
	The Government have made concessions in saying that some of the inquiry will be held in public, but the idea that the chair of the inquiry should consult on the terms of the inquiry with people who themselves may be subject to that inquiry seems a little wide of serious and strong inquisitive action on the whole process and the war in Iraq.

Mark Durkan: My hon. Friend refers to the chair of the inquiry, who has form. In Northern Ireland, he was used to report on the security implications of the Castlereagh inquiry. Then we had a classic exercise in misdirection, because that report had nothing to do with the events of the break-in, what lay behind it or anything else. It was used as a vehicle for an ulterior agenda to change intelligence policing in Northern Ireland and break the Patten model for policing. Sir John Chilcot, if he was a business, would not be in Yellow Pages under headings such as Independent or Challenging.

Jeremy Corbyn: I think the Member for Foyle is telling us in the vernacular that the chairman of the inquiry has form in this matter.
	Governments set up inquiries for two reasons: either to cover something up or to get to the truth. I suspect that this inquiry is all about diversion and ensuring that we do not get to the questions of culpability or the details of how this decision came about and why Parliament was presented with the information that it was.
	I shall conclude with this point, as my time is almost up. Parliament can make a decision tonight to ask the Government to come back with a better proposal. That is all the Opposition motion says. I would support and welcome that, because it would give us the opportunity to have the kind of inquiry that Members on both sides and with all points of view on the war have asked for. I suspect that we might be getting the opposite, which is an inquiry with terms of reference that allow it to operate in secret and on Privy Council rules, that do not give it the power of subpoena or inquisition, and that do not give it the power to point to the legal responsibility for going to war.
	As sure as night follows day, whatever decision we make, the demand for the truth will be there and the legal process will be there. Eminent lawyers such as Philippe Sands will not give up, and I suspect that many of the protagonists in the war will at some point end up in the International Court of Justice at The Haguenot because of a process of indiction, but because those of us who believe in international law believe in its protecting us from war, not taking us to war. That is why we must get to the truth, and I hope that we get there tonight.

Liam Fox: This has been an excellent debate, and has featured some outstanding contributions. A wide range of issues have been discussed: the terms of reference, the question of oaths, the question of public versus private hearings, the membership of the committee, blame apportionment, and the concept of an interim report.
	Let me begin with developments that I think we all welcome. The scope of the committee will allow it to deal with the events leading up to the war, the conduct of the war itself, and the post-war reconstruction. That is a good scheme. The time frame now goes back to 2001, and we welcome that. If we are to believe what we have heard today, most of the committee's deliberations will now take place in public; private hearings will be held only when national security is involved.
	A point on which almost all of us can agree is thatas the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) put itthis has been an object lesson in how not to set up an inquiry. The hon. Member for Newport, West (Paul Flynn), with characteristic candour, said that he was embarrassed by the bungling of the Government. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) said that the inquiry would be in disarray, and that if it did not command all-party support in this House it would be difficult for it to command respect in the country. There was a great deal of disquiet about what has happened.
	We could have had consensus on the nature, scope, membership and terms of reference of the inquiry if the Prime Minister had engaged in proper consultation. A number of speakers drew attention to the contrast with what happened in the case of the Franks report. The Prime Minister has had limited contacts with other political leaders and Committee Chairmen. With an important issue such as thison which there has been genuine division in the country, mirrored by division here in Parliamentconsensus is all the more important, but the Prime Minister seems to have lacked the personal capability, humility and skills to seek consensus on such a momentous issue. Perhaps that is the fatal character flaw that condemns his Government to ultimate defeat.
	One of the key questions that raised a great deal of passion was the basis on which evidence should be given. There was an interesting and, indeed, passionate discussion of whether it should be given under oath. I must confess that, having listened to a number of learned Members setting out their rather different cases, I am not entirely sure what the legal status of oaths would be in the inquiry as it is currently proposed. The Minister should clarify that. There was widespread concernincluding that expressed by the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox)that unless evidence was given under oath, the credibility of the inquiry itself could be fatally undermined. Having heard strong feelings in the House, what do the Government intend to do? They have changed their minds on a number of other issues over the past nine days.
	On 15 June, the Prime Minister said, on the issue of public and private hearings,
	evidence will be heard in private. I believe that that will also ensure that evidence given by serving and former Ministers, military officers and officials is as full and candid as possible.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 23.]
	The intention was clear: it was to minimise the scrutiny in public of some of the most senior Ministers who were due to give evidence. We have now seen a U-turna welcome U-turn, it must be saidnot least because of the motion that we tabled.
	The most impressive speech was made by the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who listed a number of substantial questions that the inquiry should consider. He pointed out that many of the most politically controversial issues did not involve national security and could therefore be discussed in public, and that there was absolutely no reason other than the politics for that not to happen.
	However, it was the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) who really started to shed some light on the issue. She asked whether Sir John Chilcot had been consulted in advance of the Prime Minister's statement. The Foreign Secretary replied that Sir John had had no objection to the Prime Minister's statement, but that in the light of the Prime Minister's subsequent letter it had been decided to hold some more public hearings. That was a bullseye for the hon. Lady.
	As many of these hearings as possible should be held in public, of course. The Foreign Secretary rightly said that there are always those who make up their mind in advance of the outcome and that they would describe any inquiry, public or private, as a whitewash, but the key point is that the brighter the spotlight, the more forensic the process and the more transparent the inquiry, the more the public will be able to make an objective decision about what they see before them; and, frankly, only fools and knaves will fear the truth in this matter.

Andrew MacKinlay: The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister are now petrified that, as some of the hearings will be in public, the inquiry will inevitablyand rightly, I thinkrun for longer, and that the members of it who have been invited under the old order of seven or eight days ago might say, Well, I'm not prepared to give up a year or more of my life attending for three days a week. They will have to attend, too, whereas when a committee is held behind closed doors, nobody knows who is, and is not, in attendance at any given time.

Liam Fox: The hon. Gentleman knows other Labour Members better than I do, and on this occasion I am willing to bow to his judgment as to exactly what their motives may be.
	There is widespread concern about the narrowness of the membership of the committee, and particular concern about the lack of military representation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) hit the nail on the head when he said that there must be someone with senior military experience in order to have credibility with the military and beyond, and my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) echoed that point in his speech.
	The committee is, after all, looking into a warits conduct, its manning and equipment, and the tactics employed. It will also have to look at the interaction between our war-fighting capability and our reconstruction capability. If it has no senior military membership, how can it fully interpret the military evidence given to it? For example, we have had inquests into the deaths of service personnel that have put the blame on the late procurement of body armour. The inference was that that occurred late because the Secretary of State at the time did not want to send a political signal that the Government had already decided to embark on war in Iraq. Few more serious charges than that can be levelled at a Minister or Government. Those issues will have to be dealt with very clearly and forensically in the inquiry, because we need to learn lessons as we are still at war in Afghanistan.
	Let me give the House one other example. There are lessons that we need to learn from the events that led up to Operation Charge of the Knights in Basra about how we handled intelligence and how it was interpreted. To summarise, those who were there say that, ultimately, the decision was that we were in Palermo, not Beirut; in other words, we were dealing with criminality rather than insurgency. We know, however, that the intelligence coming upwards was that it was an Iranian-inspired, religious-driven insurgency, so how did we come to the conclusion that we reached? How did we get ourselves into that corner? Was it the result of a failure to interpret intelligence? If so, we must be very concerned about that for Afghanistan. Or was there in any way some interference with the process, so that the conclusion that was reached was the one that was most favourable to the Government at the time? These are very serious questions, because they affect the well-being of our armed forces currently in theatre.
	My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) made an impassioned plea for there to be one or more political figures on the committee. As he said, it was politicians in this House who voted to go to war in Iraq, so we are intrinsically involved by our own actions and decisions. It would at the least be of benefit to have senior figures on the committee who understand how government works and how decisions are taken, if the committee is to make a proper evaluation of the evidence.
	We were told that no MPs would be on the committee because we would be partisan. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) said in his opening speech, the members who have been named already are hardly disinterested bystanders. Sir Lawrence Freedman has written extensively on the war in Iraq, and Sir Roderic Lyne has not only commentated on the war but was involved in the efforts to secure a second United Nations resolution ahead of the war. These are not non-partisan, disinterested figures. If they are not, why are Members of Parliament being excluded from the process, when we are the ones who carry the can for the decision that was taken by the vote?
	There was a lot of debate about whether we should have an interim report, and there is a widespread belief that the timing of that report is designed to minimise adverse comment about current or former Labour Ministers during a general election period. As the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife pointed out, this Government and Prime Minister seem incapable of distinguishing between Government embarrassment and the national interest. There is no reason why we cannot have an interim report or reports, depending on how it is carried out. The House needs to be given an assurance tonight that the committee will be able to issue such reports during the course of its deliberations, if it believes that it is in the public interest to do so.
	The other issue that emerged today and surprised many of us was the question of apportioning blame. The Prime Minister said on 15 June:
	The committee will not set out to apportion blame.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 24.]
	Many Members, on both sides of the House, asked, Why not? If a distinguished group such as that which will carry out the inquiry comes to the conclusion that political or policy failures occurred, and that individuals had culpability, by what possible sense of justice or decency could the Government set the terms of reference in a way that delivers no blame, even if blame is justified? Today the Foreign Secretary gave us a new line, when he said that the inquiry could praise or blame anyone it likes. That is another U-turn, and one for the Minister to confirm when he speaks.
	Two things will stick in my mind from today's debate. The first is that in a debate of such momentous importance we reached a point at which there was no Minister on the Front Bench. That was hugely disrespectful to the House on an issue on which it is trying to hold the Government to account.
	Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, from the opening speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks, a single common thread has run through the debate. It was well expressed by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase and it echoed from Carmarthen, Billericay and Torridge and West Devon. It was that this House should have ownership of the terms of reference of this inquiry, not the Prime Minister. That point cut across party politics and it gave voice to a growing belief that this House has been neutered by Executives of both colours over a period of time.
	This should be a preliminary debate, because we should have a commitment that we will have a further opportunity to discuss this issue on a substantive motion setting out the terms of reference of the inquiry. Whether that commitment is forthcoming or not will determine not only whether many Labour Members will vote for the motion, but whether the Prime Minister's much trumpeted transparency is real. Or has he learned nothing from the serial own goals that seem to be the hallmark of his premiership?

Bill Rammell: We have had an exceedingly good debate. It is clear that Members in all parts of the House have genuine concerns and convictions on this subject, whatever view they take.
	Earlier today, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary set outrightly, in my viewwhy we are having an inquiry into the Iraq war and why we believe that Sir John Chilcot and his committee have the remit, the support and the authority to fulfil that objective. Let me be clear: if we are serious about learning lessons from the Iraq war, we need an independent, strategic review to be conducted with full access to Government documents

Andrew MacKinlay: Yes: independent.

Bill Rammell: As my hon. Friend says, the inquiry needs to be independent, and, in the way that it is structured, it will be independent. It will have the force of that independence and it will get at the facts. That is what we propose. It is not about indicting individuals, but about understanding collectively what went right as well as what went wrong, and ensuring that we all learn lessonsGovernment, Parliament, the armed forces, police and development and humanitarian experts alike.

Liam Fox: The Minister says the inquiry is not about indicting individuals. The Foreign Secretary said that the committee can praise or blame who it likes. Will it be able to apportion blame to individuals?

Bill Rammell: I shall deal with that point directly. I assure the hon. Gentleman that he will get a response.
	In the time that I have available, I shall respond to as many of the points that have been made as possible. Let me start with those made by the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague). I listened seriously and intently to what he said. His speech was long on critique, but short on substantive differences with the Government on where we are today. He acknowledged that, since a week ago on Monday, the Government have consulted; he said that we had listened and that the outcome was what he had been calling for. If the accusation is that, as a Government, we have listened and moved, I plead guilty. I make no apology for saying that. I say that because the inquiry matters. It is crucial that we get it right. It was therefore right, in my view, that we listened to the views and concerns that were being expressed. I want to leave no Member in any doubt about whether we have listened.
	The right hon. Gentleman also stated his view on an interim report. Sir John Chilcot has made it clear that he does not rule that out, but, to quote what he said in his letter in response to the Prime Minister:
	the causes and effects of particular phases of these events cannot simply be divided up so as to separate clearly one period from another.
	Nevertheless, Chilcot is not ruling an interim report out, and nor are the Government. There is, however, a genuine difficulty that should be overcome.

Geoffrey Cox: What has the Minister to fear from submitting proposed terms of reference to this House on a substantive motion for full debate and scrutiny? Will he answer that question?

Bill Rammell: I am making it clear how we have listened and responded, how the inquiry will be conducted and how the views that have been expressed have been addressed.
	The shadow Foreign Secretary also accused us of prohibiting the apportionment of blame. I do not think that that is the case. We have given the inquiry the widest possible terms of reference and the committee will decide for itself what issues to focus on. The Prime Minister has made it clear that this is not about civil or criminal liability, but beyond that, it is a matter for the inquiry to decide when it comes to write its report.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is saying what the Prime Minister made clear. What he made clear on 15 June is that
	The committee will not set out to apportion blame.[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 24.]
	Those are the words of the Prime Minister, so how can the Minister say that the Prime Minister did not intend that to be the outcome?

Bill Rammell: There is a problem in our political system. When Governments listen to the concerns that have been expressed to them, respond to them and alter their actions accordingly, they are criticised for inconsistency. I think that it is right in the circumstances that the Government have genuinely listened to the views that have been expressed and responded to them. That is what we are trying to do.

Andrew MacKinlay: What about the oath? Answer the point about the oath.

Bill Rammell: I will come on to the issue of the oath.

William Hague: Can we be absolutely clear, for the avoidance of all further doubt, that the Prime Minister's statement, quoted a moment ago by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), that the inquiry would not set out to apportion blame is no longer operative and no longer part of Government policy?

Bill Rammell: There has never been a ban on what the inquiry can consider. Compared with any other inquiry, this one has one of the widest remits possible. It will be able to consider all those issues.

Bernard Jenkin: Will the Minister give way?

Bill Rammell: Let me make some progress, then I will give way.
	I ask those of my hon. Friends who might be considering voting against the Government to look at the Opposition's motion and our amendment. There is very little difference between the two. The only substantive differencewe are both now talking in terms of opennessis that the Opposition call for a wider and more diverse membership for the inquiry. There are arguments for and against that. I ask my hon. Friends whether that difference is worth defeating the Government this evening. I do not believe that it is.
	On the question of the oath, I understand the House's concern. That is why the Prime Minister asked Chilcot to look at the matter. In his letter of 21 June, Chilcot said:
	I will indeed, as you suggest, examine how best, given the non-judicial nature of the inquiry, a formal undertaking can be given by witnesses that their contributions will be complete, truthful and accurate.
	It is clear that the Prime Minister understands the concern and that Chilcot gets it and is seeking a way to deliver. I think that we should support him on that.

Andrew MacKinlay: But there is no way to deliver that. The Prime Minister knows that, Chilcot knows it and anyone in this House with a bit of brain knows it too. Without a statutory base, there is no way that the oath can be administered so that a person who abrogates it commits perjury. The Minister knows that, I know that, so take it back.

Bill Rammell: With the greatest respect, I must tell my hon. Friend that the problem with a statutory judicial inquiry, based on the experience that we all know, is that it would take years. It would involve legal representation for every witness and cost hundreds of millions of pounds, and it would not get to the answers that people are looking for.

Menzies Campbell: If the House resolves to give the inquiry the authority to compel witnesses and to put them on oath, that is exercisable against any witness. Why is the House not being asked to provide that safeguard, so that the inquiry commands public confidence?

Bill Rammell: In all the debates that we have had on this matter in recent months, the Franks inquiry has been cited as the model for getting to the heart of these matters. That is certainly what the Opposition argued, but that inquiry was not conducted with witnesses under oath. No one has argued either plausibly or persuasively this evening that the absence of the oath prevented that inquiry from getting at the truth. Nevertheless, we have asked Sir John Chilcot to look at the matter.

Tony Wright: I think that we are making unnecessarily heavy weather of this. We have made enormous progress and consensus is within our grasp. All that my hon. Friend the Minister has to say is that, having learned the lessons of the consultations with Sir John Chilcot, he or the Foreign Secretary will come back to the House to announce the formal terms of reference for the inquiry and how it will be conducted. If he were to say that, and those points were to be incorporated in a substantive motion, he would carry the whole House with him.

Bill Rammell: I know that my hon. Friend is not driven by partisanship on this issue, and he makes a very reasonable case. We have to vote this evening on the motion before us, but we will report back to the House once those consultations and deliberations have taken place.
	I turn now to the arguments advanced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). He made some very serious accusations about the Government's conduct in the run-up to war, saying that the Government had deliberately misled and deceived the House. I was a Foreign Office Minister during the run-up to the war. I was not looking at the dossier, but I did look at the raw intelligence almost daily. I was persuaded by that to the extent that my biggest fear as we went to war was that chemical weapons would be used on our troops in Iraq. I would not have reached that conclusion unless I found the evidence persuasive.
	The conspiracy theorists say that this was all a plot and that we misled people. Yes, the intelligence on which we formed our views was wrong, but the intelligence of every advanced intelligence agency in the worldeven in those countries opposed to the warreflected the same view and conviction.

Iain Duncan Smith: May I return the Minister to the central issue? It is not about the war itself, but about how we inquire into it. Whether one is in favour of it or not, the reality is that the Minister must come back to the House with a substantive motion, as the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) said. Sir John Chilcot could be told to do everything that we have described, but is it not important the he gets a vote from us? Does it not matter to him whether the inquiry gets the endorsement of the House of Commons?

Bill Rammell: Over the past 10 days, we have genuinely listened to the views and criticisms expressed. We have rightly moved, and Members now have an opportunity to make a judgment on that. That is why we are having a vote, and I urge Members to do so.
	The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said that we did not consult the armed forces. That is emphatically not true. The Chief of the Defence Staff, as the head of the armed forces, was consulted and was content with the form of the inquiry.

Malcolm Rifkind: The Minister says that the Government have been in listening mode and that they want to go along with the armed forces, so will he now accept the overwhelming view on both sides of the House that someone with a military background should be a full member of the committee of inquiry? If he is not prepared to accept that, will he explain why not?

Bill Rammell: Because I believe that there is sufficient expertise on the committee of inquiry. Sir John Chilcot has made it clear that some military experts will come forward both to give advice to the committee and to question witnesses. If we put that alongside the expertise and experience of the members of the committee, I believe that we have a basis of a way forward.
	In conclusion, the inquiry we propose closely matches what the Opposition and many hon. Members have asked for. The Opposition have consistently called for an independent Franks-style inquiry. The inquiry we propose is modelled on Franks, but it goes further. The Opposition have called for Parliament to have the opportunity to debate the findings of the inquiry, which is precisely what we have proposed. However, the Prime Minister has rightly granted significant discretion to the chairman of the inquiry and has specified that the inquiry should be conducted in a way that delivers maximum candour, openness and efficiency, and maintains full public confidence while avoiding damage to national security. The Prime Minister also made it clearrightly, in my viewthat Sir John and his colleagues should be able to decide how best to achieve that.

Bernard Jenkin: Why should the Government, and not the House, decide?

Bill Rammell: The House has the opportunity and the right to decide this evening.
	Having started on the basis [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The House must come to order. I know that tempers are running high and feelings are strong, but the House must come to order.

Bill Rammell: Having started on the basis that we did, the Prime Minister and the Government, as I have said, have rightly listened to arguments about hearing evidence in public. That is why the Prime Minister asked Sir John Chilcot to consider evidence being heard in public, and Sir John has now stated that as many of the proceedings as possible will be held in public. We strongly welcome that. That has been the major point of contention in the debate of the past 10 days, and the Government have listened and moved on it, so I urge Members to support us.
	A number of Members have asked whether the inquiry will have access to all Government papers. I can confirm that that will be the case, to ensure that we get to the bottom of the matter. The inquiry has as wide a remit as possible to enable it to get at the facts. The inquiry is tasked to look at the totality of our engagement in Iraq over an eight-year period, and it has a far broader remit than any remotely comparable inquiry.
	As I said earlier, this is not about indictment, although if blame is to be apportioned, it will be. The fundamental issue before the House, and before the inquiry, is that it is crucial to the future conduct of our operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere that we genuinely learn the lessons from the conflict in Iraq. I believe we have the ability to do that.
	The Government have rightly listened to the criticisms and the views that have been put forward. We have shifted, and I urge Members to support us in the Lobby.
	 Question put (Standing Order No. 31(2)), That the original words stand part of the Question.
	 The House proceeded to a Division.

Mr. Speaker: I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the No Lobby.

The House having divided: Ayes 260, Noes 299.

Question accordingly negatived.
	 Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 31(2)), That the proposed words be there added.
	 The House divided: Ayes 305, Noes 251.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	 Mr. Speaker declared the main Question, as amended, to be agreed to (Standing Order No. 31(2)).
	 Resolved,
	That this House welcomes the announcement by the Government of a wide ranging and independent inquiry to establish the lessons to be learnt from the United Kingdom's engagement in Iraq, which will consider the run-up to the conflict, the military action and reconstruction; recognises the importance of allowing the families of those who gave their lives in Iraq to express their views about the nature and procedures of the inquiry; notes the Prime Minister's request that the chairman of the inquiry consult party leaders and chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees on the scope for taking evidence under oath and holding sessions in public; and commends the proposal by the chair of the inquiry to hold as much of the proceedings as possible in public without compromising national security or the inquiry's ability to report thoroughly and without delay.

Business without Debate
	  
	delegated legislation

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Environmental Protection

That the draft Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 13 May, be approved. (David Wright.)
	 The Speaker's opinion as to the decision of the Question being challenged, the Division was deferred until Wednesday 1 July (Standing Order No. 41A).
	 Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Limited Liability Partnerships

That the draft Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 18 May, be approved. (David Wright.)
	 Question agreed to.

Mr. Speaker: With the leave of the House, we shall take motions 4 to 11 together.
	 Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Tribunals and Inquiries

That the draft Transfer of Functions of the Consumer Credit Appeals Tribunal Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 1 June, be approved.
	That the draft Transfer of Functions (Transport Tribunal and Appeal Panel) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 1 June, be approved.
	That the draft Transfer of Functions (Estate Agents Appeals and Additional Scheduled Tribunal) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 1 June, be approved.

International Immunities and Privileges

That the draft European Organization for Astronomical Research in the Southern Hemisphere (Immunities and Privileges) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 1 June, be approved.

Family Law

That the draft Child Support Collection and Enforcement (Deduction Orders) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 3 June, be approved.

Defence

That the draft Armed Forces, Army, Air Force and Naval Discipline Acts (Continuation) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 13 May, be approved.
	That the draft Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 5 May, be approved.
	That the draft Armed Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 19 May, be approved. (David Wright.)
	 Question agreed to.

Business of the House

Ordered,
	That, in respect of the Parliamentary Standards Bill, notices of Amendments, new Clauses and new Schedules to be moved in Committee may be accepted by the Clerks at the Table before the Bill has been read a second time. (David Wright.)

TAXI DRIVERS (ASSAULT)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. (David Wright.)

Brian Binley: The debate provides me with an opportunity [Interruption.] After you have been congratulated again by the Members who are at the Chair, Mr. Speaker, the debate provides me with the opportunity to wish you well. I understand the congratulations, and I wish you well in your very difficult task and recognise the courage that you have displayed in taking it on. My job tonight, however, is to talk about assaults on taxi drivers and the need to protect them further than we might have done so far.
	I set the scene by pointing out that violence against taxi drivers has increased sizeably over the past decade. To be fair to the Government, they have recognised that on a number of occasions. I might add, however, that the increase is linkedthere is now some evidence of the linkagewith the rise in late-night drinking in our major town centres, given the unsociable hours that taxi drivers work and the fact that people come out of clubs at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning and then spend perhaps another half an hour in the kebab house before seeking a taxi. Those two factors are important in the increase in violence.
	I do not need to tell the Minister about the vital importance of taxis to the transport industry. However, that importance is not well understood by many in local government. For instance, five or six years ago, Northamptonshire county council undertook a multi-modal study costing some 750,000. It might surprise the Minister to know that taxis were not included in that study, yet we are talking about an industry that employs 340,000 people. The latest figures to hand show that there are 71,500 Hackney cab drivers and more than 250,000 private-hire drivers. The industry makes about 700 million taxi journeys a year, which means an average of roughly 11 journeys for each member of the population. About 3 billion is spent on fares each year. We are therefore talking about a sizeable industry that plays a major role in our public transportation. It is important to recognise that.
	I do not need to tell the Minister that taxi drivers are often alone with their customers in their cabs, and are therefore highly vulnerable. We need to bear that in mind quite seriously. Taxi drivers work on the front line of transportation and in the late hours, not least because no other transportation is available then. Their customers are unknown to them and they often pick them up in the very dimmest of light. Whereas the Minister and I might be able to spot an undesirable customer in the light of day, it is difficult for taxi drivers to do that.
	Taxi drivers also take home groups of more than one person. Late at night, their customers are often the worse for drink. Those are difficult circumstances for any service provider to deal with customers in. Taxi drivers carry out a vital function in some of the most difficult circumstances that we might imagine, and they pay a price. Taxi drivers are under attack. The figures are not only clear; they are quite horrifying. There were 51 murders in the private-hire and Hackney cab industry over a 15-year period, which means an average of a little over three a year. That is a frightening figure in an industry that is about providing a service during antisocial hours to a customer base that often has no alternative. In truth, that might be a comment on our society, although it is not my purpose to talk about that this evening.
	Let me give some examples of taxi drivers who were murdered. In May 2006, 37-year-old Mahmood Ahmed, a family man, was found stabbed to death in a country lane in Keighley. The post-mortem revealed that he had been hit hard on the head with a blunt instrument from behindthat is an important fact. In May 2007, in Gravesham, Kent, a 70-year-old grandfather, Gian Chand Bajar, was attacked and had the proceeds of that evening's work stolen. The attackers then took his taxi by force, ran over him and left him to die in the street. He died in hospital, and his car was found abandoned, having been set on fire, a mile from the site of the attack. In 2005, Mr. Colin Winstone, aged 44 and from Bristol, was found dead after being stabbed outside the Old Fox Inn at Easton, Bristol. Those three cases illuminate the fact that these are family people doing an important job, who meet a violent end that horrifies us all.
	In addition to murders, there are thousands of attacks. Only last month in the Halifax area, a taxi driver named Amjad Farooq, aged 35, was violently attacked. He sustained serious head injuries, was beaten unconscious, had his car stolen and was hospitalised for a considerable time. In June 2009only this monthanother driver, whose name I was unable to get, was robbed at knifepoint by three men in Burnage, Manchester. In November 2008, another taxi driver recovered at home after being struck over the head with what was believed to have been a handgun. He was attacked by two men in Normanton, Derby, who then drove off in his taxi.
	Those are just three examplessix altogether, including the murders that I have mentionedof the thousands of incidents that are inflicted on taxi drivers every year. I would like to make the point that race is a major factor in this issue. Although only one third of the trade's drivers are from our ethnic minority communities, two thirds of the attacks are on people from those communities. I know that the Minister does not need me to underline that point to him, as he is aware of it and understands the horror of that aspect of these crimes.
	Sadly, taxi drivers lack faith in the justice system, and many attacks are not reported. A survey carried out in Portsmouth in 2008 showed that, of the 396 drivers who responded, 60 per cent. had been a victim of crime in the past 12 months. It also showed that 70 per cent. admitted not reporting incidents to the police, and that the most common reason for that was that they did not think the police would be interested. We need to take that on board. Rightly or wrongly, that is the general impression that people have, and we have to deal with that. We cannot afford to have a sizeable part of our community believing that the police are not interested. Action needs to be taken in that regard.
	As I have said, taxi drivers do not have faith in the justice system. Equally, the evidence suggests that, in certain parts of the country, the relationship between police and taxi drivers is simply not good enough. That is a pretty disturbing indictment, yet that is what the evidence shows. I fear that we are not in a position to refute it, but we are in a position to try to do something about it.
	The cost to the nation of dealing with attacks on taxi drivers is remarkably high. The estimated cost of investigating the 51 murders over 15 years was 77.7 million. The cost of each investigation of violence against a person in relation to taxi drivers was 3,036 for each attack. That is quite a lot of money but, bearing in mind the crime, it is a price that we have to pay. It is, however, a price that we would wish not to pay. I know that the Minister feels the same. If we add social security and loss of earnings, the total cost to the country over those 15 years is sizeable. I have been given a figure, but I think that it is a mistake, so I shall not read it out, because I do not want it to go on the record. A sizeable amount is involved, nevertheless, and we need to take that into account.
	There is action that we can take to help taxi drivers. There is a need for automatic protection between taxi drivers and their customers. That means screens in hire cars. Screens could be purchased to stop attacks from the rear, which is where many attacks emanate from in non-Hackney cab taxis. There would be a double benefit because, sadly, there are reports of unwanted sexual approaches made to young ladies late in the night and screens would stop that happening. There are good social reasons to encourage a simple answer for authorities that give licences to taxi cabs, and it would be easy to introduce a requirement to ensure that screens were fitted in non-Hackney taxi cabsif we were willing to do so.
	In March, Mr. Bryan Roland, general secretary of the Private Hire Association, fully endorsed in an open letter Safe Shield or shield-type products in cabs for those very reasons. However, and surprisingly, some councils will not permit the use of screens. That is quite remarkable. The Minister looks quizzical, but that is the information I have. I will write to him about it, although I am glad that he was as surprised as I was when I learned of it.
	Screens are an aid to cutting violence against taxi drivers, as is CCTV. In Sheffield, a local taxi company had problems with assaults on its drivers. Over Christmas 2006, it suffered 400 incidents of violence. It was so worried that it paid for in-car camerasan expensive exercise. The result? In 2007, only six incidents occurred. What a tremendous deterrent and a 98.5 per cent. reduction on the previous year thanks to CCTV. In Blackburn, Lancashire, there were 140 crimesone for every five such vehicles on the road. Fourteen cars were fitted with CCTV equipment as part of a pilot scheme, with council help. That increased security for drivers and passengers.
	There are ways to deal with these problems, therefore, and the London Taxi Network is another. The Minister will know that 4,500 London taxi drivers signed up to Dial-a-Cab and Radio Taxis Group, which provided enhanced security. I could go on. He will also know about the Taxi Marshals scheme. It is another way in which local authorities in particular can help in this respect.
	I bring your attention, Mr. Speaker, to an Adjournment debate that I held on this very subject on 1 May 2008. On the point about CCTV, I said:
	There are problems, however. The units cost between 700 and 1,000 a car, and we know that most taxi drivers are self-employed and do not have that sort of capital. I am told that the cost of production is only 80 and that the rest is maintenance and back-up.[ Official Report, 1 May 2008; Vol. 475, c. 547.]
	I asked whether the Government would look into that. I did not receive an answer at the time, so I hope the Minister can come back with information that would be encouraging to taxi drivers vis--vis the cost and perhaps with ways that we can help to encourage the purchase of CCTV cameras.
	A year ago, I asked the Minister who responded to the debate about local authorities encouraging the use of screens. It might almost be in the Government's thinking to say that screens ought to be fitted as a basic requirement in non-Hackney cab taxis. Will this Minister be kind enough to come back to me on that issue?
	I ask the Minister to consider ways to improve relationships between taxi drivers and the police, if only to get rid of the perception among taxi drivers that the police do not care. Perhaps the police could do a little more to protect both the safety of taxicab customers and, equally important, that of their drivers.
	As I said at the beginning of my speech, I feel that the Government have a responsibility. The drinking laws changed, and the House quite properly accepted that, but that change has had results with which most other people must be unhappy. We must address the side-effects of the increasing late-night drinking in our towns and cities, which has led to more attacks on taxis.
	I believe that taxi drivers seek real and meaningful answers and, perhaps, action from the Government. I hope that the Government will be able to give us some reassurance, and give the taxi drivers who serve our community in such an important way a little confidence that we may do a bit more to minimise a problem that is clearly of great import to their industry.

Sadiq Khan: I join the hon. Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Binley) in welcoming you to your new position, Mr. Speaker. We both look forward to catching your eye on many occasions in the future.
	I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for initiating the annual event at which he rightly holds the Government to account on the serious issue of what we are doing about the safety of taxi drivers. I think it important for him to do so. I read the  Hansard report of last year's debate on the subject, and I have news of some of the progress that we have made over the past 12 months. In preparation for the debate, I not only did the usual things such as speaking to officials but read a couple of editions of  Private Hire and Taxi Monthly, which includes a section in which victims of the assaults referred to by the hon. Gentleman describe what happened to them.
	The debate is of interest not only to people who work as taxi and private hire vehicle drivers, but to all who are concerned with the safety of people who work in the transport sector. It is truly appalling that drivers who are, after all, providing a service for the public should be fearful about the prospect of getting through the working day unscathed, or, worse still, should have to endure abuse or violence. That is why we are keen to do what we can to help. I hope that once the hon. Gentleman has heard what I have to say about the progress made last year he will, with renewed vigour, ensure that this is an annual event, so that he can take us to task and make us go even further.
	We have now published the findings of our national research on the personal security of taxi and private hire vehicle drivers. Reading the  Hansard report of last year's debate, I noted the frustration that the hon. Gentleman experienced in trying simply to obtain an executive summary of the research. It was particularly depressing to note from that research that Asian and other ethnic-minority drivers appear to have been subject to higher levels of abuse, much of which is racist in content. It was equally depressing to note that very few such incidents are reported to the police. I shall say more about that later, but let me now pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for highlighting the fact that a disproportionate number of victims are from ethnic minorities. There is no reason at all why they should suffer more than anyone else. No one should suffer as a result of crime, irrespective of ethnicity or faith.
	Although the report has assisted our understanding of the issues, we have also undertaken a constructive initiative to help taxi and private hire vehicle drivers to enhance their own personal security. We have prepared and published guidance for drivers, in a convenient leaflet form, on measures that they can take in order to stay safe. In recognition of the differences between the trades, we published two separate leaflets, one for taxi drivers and one for private hire vehicle drivers. We distributed many thousands of copies through local licensing authorities to ensure that every taxi and PHV driver in the country could have one.
	The principle underlying the leaflets is that those who serve the travelling public are entitled to do their work in safety and without abuse. The leaflets include practical advice on how to reduce the risk of violence, and also identify action that should be taken to deal with threatening behaviour and attacks. They were drawn up with the help of the taxi and private hire vehicle trades. That is an example of our consulting rather than imposing our own ideas and solutions. We have also published guidance for crime and disorder reduction partnerships on ways in which they can work with the transport industryincluding the taxi and private hire vehicle tradesto help to reduce crime and the fear of crime. That includes attempting to reduce the number of assaults on taxi and private hire vehicle drivers.
	The best practice guidance that the Department produces on taxi and private hire vehicle licensing is a useful tool in assisting local licensing authorities in drawing up suitable licensing policies. The hon. Gentleman referred to some initiatives, including the installation in cabs of measures to improve drivers' personal security, such as CCTV or having a screen between the driver and the passenger. The guidance urged local authorities to look into that, which is why I was surprised that the hon. Gentleman mentioned an example of a council discouraging it, and I want to investigate that and write to him about it.
	We are now consulting on a revised version of the guidance. We propose that it should encourage local licensing authorities to draw up signs or notices that drivers could display in their cabs setting out what passengers can expect from drivers and what drivers should be able to expect from passengers. That is a new initiative, which we hope will appeal to local licensing authoritiesand to such an extent that they will want to produce their own notices in consultation with the local trade.
	We know that fare disputes are a major cause of potential confrontation between passengers and driversa reading of the trade journals highlights that. We would hope that the advice in the leaflets, together with any local notices that licensing authorities decide to produce, will lead to a reduction in the number of such disputes. On the subject of fares, the hon. Gentleman will be pleased to learn that we are in discussions with the Association of Chief Police Officers on ways to raise awareness of the legal position on bilkingthe commonly used term for passengers making off without paying their fare. As a number of the hon. Gentleman's friends are taxi drivers, he will know that that is a big issue in the industry, and a source of huge tension. We hope ACPO will be able to help in this area.
	I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that we have taken a number of actions to reduce the number of assaults on taxi and private hire vehicle drivers. However, we are not complacent, which is why it is important that he continues to hold us to account. We know that far too many drivers are still putting up with verbal, and, indeed, physical, abuse far too oftenlet alone the murders to which the hon. Gentleman has referred.
	I believe that the key to reducing the number of assaults is effective partnership-working at local level. The taxi and private hire vehicle trades need to work with the local police, licensing authorities and community safety partnerships to highlight their concerns and to seek suitable solutions. That may lead to the funding of in-car CCTV cameras, for example, or shields between the driver and the passenger compartment, or to the deployment of taxi marshals at taxi rank hot spots. I know that Northampton has taxi marshals, so the hon. Gentleman will be aware of that.
	I know that there are a number of such initiatives around the country, and I urge the trade to learn the lessons from the good practice that already exists, and also to be aware of the potential sources of funding for security measures. That could be local authority funding, community safety partnership funding or eventhe hon. Gentleman will enjoy thisEU funding. We must not cut off any funding routes.
	It should be borne in mind that the sort of measures that would enhance drivers' personal security might also have a beneficial effect on passenger safety. For example, a lone female at a city centre taxi rank in the early hours of the morning might appreciate the role of a taxi marshal in maintaining order at the rank, and the use of CCTV and security shields in saloon car taxis and private hire vehicles might provide passengers with an added degree of reassurancea point made by the hon. Gentleman in his excellent speech.
	I reiterate what I said in last year's Adjournment debate about violence against taxi and private hire vehicle drivers: those in that trade should report all incidents to the police and the appropriate local community safety forums. The report that I mentioned earlier made it clear that many incidents go unreported to the police, and that is a tremendous shame. I recognise that reporting incidents means time away from work, and some may fear reprisals, but non-reporting also means that the police can be unaware of the type and scale of the problems that drivers face. I accept that the police need to redouble their efforts to win the trust and confidence of taxi drivers, as they have done in other areas of our society, so that more crime is reported.
	I hope that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that progress has been made since last year, but that there is no magic silver bullet or panacea that will solve these problems. It is a terrible shame that we live in a society in which people still think that they can abuse taxi drivers verbally or physically and get away without sanction from the criminal justice system. We look forward to working further with the trade, the police, local licensing authorities, the Home Office and the hon. Gentleman to ensure that we can find solutions to some of the challenges that he poses. I again congratulate him and thank him for raising these important issues.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 House adjourned.